

44121

TREATISE ON PARTISAN WARFARE

JOHANN EWALD

Translation, Introduction, and Annotation by
ROBERT A. SELIG and DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS

MARQUAT MEMORIAL LIBRARY
USAJFK SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
ROOM 140-KENNEDY HALL
FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA 28307

Contributions in Military Studies, Number 116



GREENWOOD PRESS

New York · Westport, Connecticut · London

d079-92

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ewald, Johann von, 1744-1813.

[Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg. English]

Treatise on partisan warfare / Johann Ewald ; translation, introduction, and annotation by Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs.

p. cm.—(Contributions in military studies, ISSN 0883-6884 ; no. 116)

Translation of: Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-313-27350-2 (alk. paper)

1. Guerrilla warfare. 2. Infantry drill and tactics. 3. Cavalry drill and tactics. I. Selig, Robert A. II. Skaggs, David Curtis.

III. Title. IV. Series.

U240.E813 1991

355.02'18—dc20 91-21190

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 1991 by Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 91-21190

ISBN: 0-313-27350-2

ISSN: 0883-6884

First published in 1991

Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881

An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America



The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

**For Barbara
and Margo**

Contents

Preface	ix
A Note on the Translation	1
The Author	1
The Treatise	2
<i>Kleiner Krieg</i> as Partisan Warfare	5
Introductory Essay	9
The Concept of the <i>Kleiner Krieg</i> in the Context of Warfare in the Age of Absolutism	9
The Troops of the <i>Kleiner Krieg</i> : East European Origins	12
The Troops of the <i>Kleiner Krieg</i> : West European Adaptations	14
The Troops of the <i>Kleiner Krieg</i> : The Hessian <i>Jäger</i>	17
Johann von Ewald and His <i>Treatise on Partisan Warfare</i>	20
Johann von Ewald and the American Experience	23
The American Experience and the European Response	28
The Concept of Light Infantry in Today's U.S. Military	29
Distinctive Light Infantry Characteristics	32
Notes	39

TREATISE ON PARTISAN WARFARE

Preface	63
1. On the Recruitment and Discipline of a Light Corps Composed of Infantry and Cavalry	67
2. Of the Strength and Arms of a Light Corps	71
3. Of the Drill of the Infantry and the Cavalry	73
4. How Such a Corps or Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Ought to Act Upon a March and When It Meets the Enemy	75
5. Of the Selection of an Outpost, and How the Leader of a Light Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Infantry and Cavalry, Has to Conduct Himself in This Case	85
6. What the Leader of a Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Has to Do When He Needs to Occupy and Defend a Fortified Town	91
7. On the Rules to Be Observed in Reconnaissance	97
8. On Raids in an Open Terrain and Against Walled Towns	101
9. How the Commanding Officer of a Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Who Holds the Advance Post of an Army Has to Act if the Enemy Retreats	113
10. On Ambushes	117
11. On Retreats	121
Appendix: On the Three Most Important Tasks That an Officer of Light Cavalry Has to Perform in the Field	125
Notes	133
Select Bibliography	163
Index	171

Preface

This translation of Johann Ewald's *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg* is the result of a conversation over a cup of coffee in the student union cafeteria of Bowling Green State University in early January 1989, the days before classes resume and faculty members confidently make plans for all the things they hope to accomplish in the course of the new term. At first everything seemed easy enough. A slender volume of some 150 pages, an introduction, some notes. Today, after some two years, 250 manuscript pages, and numerous hours of discussion over the translation of the very title, we have to admit that even so slender a volume would not have been possible without the help of numerous people on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

In Germany our thanks go to Dr. Werner Giesebrecht of the Institut für Geschichte at the Universität Würzburg, who provided a copy of the *Abhandlung* as well as secondary sources unavailable here in the United States. At the Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg, Professor Dr. Inge Auerbach was extremely helpful during two visits there in 1989 and 1990.

Here in the United States thanks go first of all to Hope College, where a faculty development grant from the Willard C. Wichers fund gave the necessary leisure for the translation of the text in the summer of 1990. Professor G. Larry Penrose, the Russian specialist, kindly gave of his time whenever asked for his advice. Professor Ion Agheana provided expert translations of the French quotes. The Bowling Green State University Department of History and the Air War College Department of Strategy and Forces provided reduced teaching loads that allowed opportunities to engage in research. John Dann, director of the William

L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and Robert S. Cox, curator of manuscripts, generously gave of their time during our research in the Jungkenn and Simcoe papers as well as permission to use material from their collection in this volume. In addition, the staff of the Newberry Library in Chicago, the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Lilly Library at Indiana University in Bloomington were extremely helpful during research visits there. Finally, our thanks go to our wives Barbara and Margo, who sacrificed a summer vacation for the sake of the timely completion of the translation, notes, and introduction.

It must be one of the ironies of fate that one of the editors, while stationed with the 2nd *Jägerdivision* in Kassel in the 1970s, should have learned the trade of a *jäger* officer on the very ground where Ewald had practiced two centuries earlier, while the other, Professor David C. Skaggs, completed thirty-one years of service in the U.S. Army Reserve as the U.S. European Command's command historian in Stuttgart.

Needless to say, any errors of the text and notes are ours and some of the translation of the German text is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, we hope that this volume will add some new information to the already vast body of knowledge on the American Revolutionary War, which was the purpose of our enterprise.

A Note on the Translation

The Author

Johann (von) Ewald was born on March 30, 1744, in Cassel, where his father worked as a bookkeeper with the local post office. In 1760, at age sixteen, he joined the Hessian Regiment Gilsa as a cadet and almost immediately saw field service. Wounded in March 1761, he was promoted to ensign for bravery. After the conclusion of peace in 1763, Ewald was able to stay on in his regiment until 1765, when he was transferred to the guards. Here he was promoted to second lieutenant in 1766. After the loss of his left eye in a duel in February 1770, he was briefly sent to the *Collegium Carolinum* in Cassel to study military science. After the publication of his *Gedanken eines hessischen Officiers über das, was man bey Führung eines Detachements im Felde zu thun hat* [Thoughts of a Hessian Officer on the Leadership of a Detachment in the Field] (Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer) in 1774, he was transferred to the *Leibjäger Corps* and promoted to captain.

In 1776, Ewald as commanding officer of one of two *jäger* companies, the elite of the Hessian army, left for the United States. During the next eight years, Ewald, "the famous *jäger* captain," that "gallant and able officer" of "well-known ability and bravery," this "man of keen intellect, great courage, with an exceedingly honorable, strictly military character," and his troops fought bravely in every major battle, from New York to Yorktown, as well as in dozens of those little engagements that characterized the war in America.

Decorated with the order *pour la vertu militaire*, he returned to Cassel in the spring of 1784, and, following the reduction of the *Jäger Corps*,

Ewald was reassigned to the Regiment von Dittfurth. On January 1, 1786, Ewald was placed again in command of the second company of *jäger*, but having been passed over repeatedly for promotion, he joined the service of Denmark in August 1788, shortly after his marriage. Here he became a lieutenant colonel, organized the *Schleswig Jäger Corps*, and was elevated to the nobility in 1790. A colonel in 1795 and major general in 1802, Ewald fought valiantly during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted in his promotion to lieutenant general and commanding general of the Duchy of Holstein in 1812. He died on June 25, 1813, "a national hero in his adopted country."¹

Except for a few specialists in the evolution of light infantry operations, Johann Ewald's reputation was lost until the publication of his *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal* in 1979. Edited with an extensive introduction and thorough notes by Joseph P. Tustin, the book became an immediate classic and must reading for students of the War for American Independence. Few who have read it will ever forget his graphic description of the American garrison at West Point, which he visited shortly before his return to Germany:

The men looked haggard and pallid and were poorly dressed. Indeed, very many stood quite proudly under arms without shoes and stockings. Although I shuddered at the distress of these men, it filled me with awe for them, for I did not think there was an army in the world which could be maintained as cheaply as the American army. . . .—What army could be maintained in this manner? None, certainly, for the whole army would gradually run away.—This, too, is a part of the "Liberty and Independence" for which these poor fellows had to have their arms and legs smashed.—But to what cannot enthusiasm lead a people!²

In the literature of military operations there are few such candid analyses of one's opponents as this. Because his other writings have remained largely untranslated from their original German and because few copies of them remain, we sought to bring Ewald's contributions to a wider audience through this translation of one of his most famous commentaries on light infantry tactics.

The Treatise

Immediately after his return from the American War in 1784, Ewald began writing his *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg*. When the book was published in 1785, it was successful and quickly became a classic.³ In 1790, Ewald expanded the original text into the *Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen*, which, according to the introduction, is a second

edition of his earlier work. It is, however, really a different work in both organization and content. A new edition of the latter was published in 1796 and translated into English by a Lieutenant A. Maimburg and published in London in 1803. In this translation Ewald's book served as the manual for Sir John Moore's troops during the Peninsular War.⁴

Twenty-five years after its publication, Carl von Clausewitz in his *Vorlesungen über den Kleinen Krieg* (1810–1811) still recommended it to his students, as did Hans David Ludwig von York in his *Instructionen für die leichten Truppen* (1811).⁵ In a review of the 1790 edition for the *Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, himself the author of a widely read text on light infantry, wrote that it "contains quite useful rules for the service of light troops." At the same time he pointed out that "those who know Jenny [sic] and Grandmaison will not find anything exactly new in it."⁶ But that had not been Ewald's intention.

In the introduction to the *Treatise* he acknowledges that "I know that I am not writing anything new." His primary goal was the instruction of his fellow officers. Using his own experiences in North America, examples from other campaigns (most notably the Seven Years' War), as well as lifting information from a wide array of secondary sources, he wanted to provide his comrades with a useful guide to irregular warfare for further study and self-education. As intended by Ewald, the *Treatise* was a military manual the merits of which lie not so much in the literary qualities of the text as in the real-life situations and possible applications of these examples in future conflicts. Following Ewald's intentions, the editors have striven in this edition not so much to create a work of literary value, which Ewald's work is not, but to provide a readable translation of the manuscript in modern English while trying to preserve some of the idiosyncracies of Ewald's style. This means that punctuation and spelling have been changed to modern usage while word order and sentence structure of the original text have been preserved as much as possible.

Ewald's most important source was his own experiences, collected during twenty-four years of military service in the Hessian army. They give the text a real-life quality, a feature also noticed by contemporaries like Clausewitz. Additional information was certainly gained from conversations with fellow officers and veterans of the Seven Years' War. The text makes it clear, however, that Ewald also used a wide variety of the available literature on the *Kleiner Krieg* for his work.

In the introduction to the *Treatise*, Ewald gives some clues as to his sources. Here he mentions Friedrich Christoph von Saldern's *Taktische Grundsätze und Anweisung zu militärischen Evolutionen. Von der Hand eines berühmten Generals*, published in 1781, as well as the writings of the Saxon Captain Johann Gottlieb Tielke and British Major General Henry Lloyd.⁷

In the *Vorrede* to his *Gedanken*, a source from which Ewald quotes

liberally, he provides considerably more information on his sources. Here he lists, among others, Jacques François de Chastenot, Marquis de Puy-ségur (1656–1743), whose *Art de la guerre, par principes et par règles*, 2 vols. (Paris: C. A. Jombert, 1748), was published by his son Jacques François Maxime.⁸ Other authors recommended are Lancelot Comte Turpin de Crissé,⁹ Jean Louis Le Cointe,¹⁰ Carl August Struensee von Carlsbach,¹¹ Thomas Auguste Le Roy de Grandmaison, Louis de Jeney, Jean Charles de Folard,¹² and, the most important of them all, Maurice de Saxe.¹³ In addition it is clear that Ewald perused journals like the *Bellona*¹⁴ as well as the *Kriegesbibliothek*,¹⁵ where besides Armand François de La Croix' *Traité de la petite guerre*, other treatises on the *Kleiner Krieg* were published. Ewald certainly also used the relevant manuals of the Hessian army, which were at his disposal, as well as the files of the Hessian War Ministry in Cassel. As was customary in the eighteenth century, Ewald liberally quoted these and other sources without identifying them, and in turn is quoted quite freely by others without being mentioned as the source.

It is here that one of the problems of the translation arose. An excellent, though by no means the only, example is found in his introduction to the *Treatise*, in which he states that in the *Kleiner Krieg* an officer "has to do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale," and that "light warfare is the school in which already very many great generals have been trained." These lines are taken almost verbatim from the introduction to the *Gedanken*.¹⁶ A few years earlier, Grandmaison had voiced similar ideas,¹⁷ and in 1777, George Graf Browne, one of the leading practitioners of this kind of warfare in the Austrian army, used almost the same words in his manual for young officers.¹⁸ In 1778, Georg von Wissel, a Brunswickian captain of infantry with extensive experience with irregular warfare during the Seven Years' War, where he had served under Heinrich Wilhelm von Freytag and Heinrich Ludwig von Stockhausen, also echoed Ewald's analysis.¹⁹ Additional examples can be found easily, but since they add little to the overall value of the translation while making the notes unreasonably long, the editors considered it unnecessary to pursue such comparisons beyond the examples given here.

Consequently the editors have refrained from trying to locate Ewald's exact references and to draw comparisons between his possible sources. Only where Ewald himself mentions authors, as in the case of Vegetius and Xenophon, have we compared his version with the original text. Otherwise the notes are confined to identifying dates, names, places, and events unfamiliar to the modern reader.

Kleiner Krieg as Partisan Warfare

Some readers may object to our translation of the term *Kleiner Krieg* as "partisan warfare" and its subsequent use in the text. In the absence of a corresponding term to the German *Kleiner Krieg* or the French *petite guerre* in the English language and after careful consideration of all available options, however, we decided "partisan warfare" to be the most satisfactory translation of the term. At first glance it may seem as if we had tried to apply a modern term to events that took place more than two centuries ago.²⁰ Yet partisan warfare is not necessarily an invention of our times. Insurrection, revolt, and rebellion against tyrannical rulers or foreign invaders in the form of irregular warfare by regulated as well as irregular troops and even armed civilians have a long history in Europe. What we mean today by the term "partisan warfare" does not necessarily include in pre-revolutionary Europe the political component connected with this kind of conflict in the twentieth century. At the same time it is well worth remembering that a number of conflicts in early modern Europe, as well as the American Revolutionary War, nevertheless often did include an ideological component that set them apart from the "war of cabinets" waged among rulers.²¹

In a fascinating essay on the Rákóczi rebellion, Charles W. Ingrao terms the rebellion of the Hungarian peasants against the Habsburgs "the longest self-sustained guerrilla war in early modern times," and applies a term even more loaded with modern connotations to events of the early eighteenth century in Eastern Europe.²² The resistance of the Bavarian peasants in 1705 against the Austrian army during the War of the Spanish Succession was characterized by manifestations of popular feelings against unwanted political changes.²³ Ernst A. Legahn labels the Prussian peasants resisting Cossaks during the Seven Years' War—a resistance very much against the wishes of Frederick the Great—*Preußische Partisanen*. Ian K. Steele writes about *Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760*,²⁴ and Russell F. Weigley entitled his book on the war in the South *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780–1782*.²⁵ Most recently Mark V. Kwasny's dissertation "Partisan War in the Middle States: The Militia and the American War Effort around the British Stronghold of New York City, 1775–1783" applies the term to the American Revolutionary War in the Northern colonies.²⁶ All of these conflicts are characterized by their political content, which warrants the use of the term "partisan warfare" in their analysis.

More importantly, the eighteenth century used the term as well. In his *Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon* (1740), Johann Heinrich Zedler defines *Parthey*, *Parti* as "a group of soldiers on horseback or on foot, which is sent out by a general to do damage to the enemy by ruses and

speed, or to investigate his condition. . . . It has to have valid passports, letters of marque or salviguards, otherwise they are considered highway robbers. The leader of such a party is called a *Partheygänger* oder *Partisan*.²⁷ Titles like Ray de St. Geniés' *L'Officer Partisan*²⁸ or Baron Wüst's *L'Art militaire d'un partisan*²⁹ show the concurrent use of the term in French as well. As late as 1910, Captain Oré could write that the Austrian *Freicorps* waged "une véritable guerre de partisans" in his description of the origins of light troops and irregular warfare in the French army without undue concern for an ideological connotation.³⁰

In contemporary English, the "Military Dictionary" attached to the second volume of the 1735 translation of Antoine de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, *Memoirs Historical and Military*, defined a partisan as "a Person who is very dexterous in commanding a Party, and knows the Country very well; he is employed in surprising the Enemy Convoys, or in getting Intelligence."³¹ Saint-Geniés' definition of the French *Partisan* was translated in 1763 as: "What is meant by a partisan? By 'party' one means a corps of cavalry or infantry which goes to reconnoitre the enemy; and by 'partisan' is meant a man of war who knows the theatre of war, who knows how to lead ambushes and to lead a party."³² George Washington in 1778 recommended the establishment of an "independent partisan corps" under "Light-Horse" Harry Lee.³³ George Smith, in *An Universal Military Dictionary*, in 1779 used the definition "PETITE-GUERRE, is carried on by a light party, commanded by an expert partisan."³⁴ A partisan is "a person dexterous in commanding a party. . . . The word also means an officer sent out upon a party, with the command of a body of light troops, generally under the appellation of the partisan's corps."³⁵ The second edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* of 1780 defined *petite guerre* as the "manoeuvres of the Partisan."³⁶ In 1787 John Graves Simcoe wrote in his *Journal* that the "command of a light corps, or, as it is termed, the service of a partizan, gives opportunity of exemplifying professional acquisitions."³⁷ The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines a partisan as a "member of a party of light or irregular troops employed in scouring the country, surprising the enemy's outposts and foraging parties, and the like; a member of a volunteer force similarly engaged, a guerrilla." A partisan is a "leader of such a party of light or irregular troops."³⁸

The first light infantry manual published in the American colonies by Roger Stevenson was entitled *Military Instructions for Officers detached in the field: Containing, a Scheme for Forming A Corps of a Partisan. Illustrated with plans of the manoeuvres necessary in carrying on the petite guerre*.³⁹ Here both English and French usage are combined. In 1760, De Jeney's book was translated as *The Partisan: or, The Art of Making war in detachment*.⁴⁰

These examples should make it clear that for the eighteenth century

a partisan was the leader of a detachment of regular or irregular troops with an internal structure and organization of their own, and that Ewald used the German *Partheygänger* in this definition in his *Treatise*. As irregular troops they may have stood outside the supply and command structure of the military establishment, but were nevertheless part of the overall defensive effort carried out by the regular armed forces while engaged in irregular, that is, partisan, warfare. Their officers had regular commissions, whether employed in a regular light infantry or in an irregular corps. Whether the armed forces were those levied by the holders of power and the services performed part of a regular war against another state or against a domestic insurrection, or whether they were raised to fight against the existing political order in a popular revolt or insurrection, that is, whether a political component was present or not, was of little relevance for their application of the term "partisan" even though it might determine the nature of the conflict. Bands of soldiers or armed civilians without proper identification or justification, on the other hand, stood outside the rules of war and were considered, in the words of Zedler, "highway robbers."

That does not mean, however, that there are no other options for the translation of *Kleiner Krieg*. In correspondence with the authors, Peter Paret warned of the modern ideological connotation of partisan warfare.⁴¹ He suggests "small war" instead, after having used the term "little war" in both his *Clausewitz and the State* as well as in *York and the Era of Prussian Reform*. While discussing the issue in his *York and the Era of Prussian Reform*, he expresses his preference for "war of detachments."⁴² "Small war," a term more popular in Europe, is also suggested by John Keegan,⁴³ and used by Gunther Rothenberg and Béla Király.⁴⁴ Walter Laqueur finally uses both terms, "small war" as well as "partisan warfare," concurrently in his *The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine*, published in 1975.⁴⁵

As suggested by Professor Paret, "war of detachments" or "war of outposts" also has some current as well as historical usage. Jean Louis Le Cointe's book was translated in 1761 as *The Science of Military Posts, for the Use of Military Officers, who frequently command detached Parties*,⁴⁶ as was De Jeney's book. Ewald's first treatise employs *Führung eines Detachements im Felde* in its title, and York in 1811 termed it the *Detachements-Krieg*.⁴⁷ Rodney Atwood finally uses the "war of outposts,"⁴⁸ but the editors feel that such a translation only partially addresses the nature of the warfare analyzed by Ewald.

On the strength of the examples cited from contemporary definitions of the term, we think that "partisan" and "partisan warfare" were well known and widely used in English during the eighteenth century unless the issue was avoided altogether by using the French *petite guerre*.⁴⁹ It was widely used to describe the kind of irregular warfare by regular

light troops that Ewald had in mind when he published his book in 1785, and is certainly preferable to the Spanish term *guerilla*, used by some modern authors.⁵⁰ In our opinion its use here does not constitute an ahistorical transferral of a modern term to the eighteenth century, even though it may not be the perfect translation for *Kleiner Krieg*.

Introductory Essay

The Concept of the *Kleiner Krieg* in the Context of Warfare in the Age of Absolutism

The development of the concept of the *Kleiner Krieg* (*la petite guerre*, partisan warfare, or irregular warfare) and the creation of troops to wage this war are intricately connected with the concept of the standing armies of absolutist Europe. The permanent military establishment proved an expensive but indispensable component of absolutist rule. In domestic politics it served as a means to bind the nobility to the state through its integration into the officer corps and as an ever-present police force to ensure compliance with the wishes of the ruler. In foreign policy it formed a readily available instrument for power politics against real and potential enemies. It provided the ruler with a heretofore unknown independence in domestic and foreign affairs and bound the potentially dangerous noble elites into the service of the state. Its rank and file, however, lacked a feeling of loyalty to the state or dynasty. Levied from among the lowest social classes, forced into military service often as an alternative to sometimes even worse punishment, or recruited from prisoners of war, the standing armies of Europe more often than not were held together by brutal force and blind drill. Too great an investment to be risked lightly in battle and liable to desert at any moment, they were most efficient in a pitched battle over open ground, where superior drill, volume of fire, and sheer numbers often decided the outcome of battles. Any kind of individual action was almost impossible with such "regular" troops.¹

As a supplement to the regular armies and a correlative to the "big

war," the "little war" found its justification in its ability to perform tasks and assignments that the standing army could no longer cover. As the eighteenth century progressed, irregular troops, first raised in the borderlands of the Habsburg Empire as *Insurrection*, *National Regiment*, or *Irreguliere* (called *Freicorps* in Germany or *Compagnies Franches* in France), became an indispensable part of active warfare on the Continent.

Parallel to these irregular light troops, almost all German states raised *jäger* (huntsmen) units, and France her *chasseurs*, as specialized regular light infantry and cavalry units as part of the military establishment, even though they were frequently still called irregulars. In the British military they were organized in the Light Infantry and Scottish Highlanders, their heritage of irregular warfare notwithstanding.

Raised initially only for the duration of the war, irregular troops served outside the supply structures, promotion rules, and often also the ethical standards governing the standing army. They were free from the restrictions and benefits governing the regulated, regular units. Together with the regular light troops, they complemented the line, which in its structure, organization, and way of fighting reflected the desire of the absolutist ruler for order and systematization. In the rationalized and heavily structured warfare of absolutist armies, the war waged by small detachments became a necessary correlative, a corrective of linear tactics. Their way of fighting, in the words of Werner Hahlweg, "represents a manifestation of natural war vis-a-vis the often rigid, artificial forms of linear tactics." "Regular war, which is determined very much by learned theories and systems, gets assistance from irregular war, which itself is determined by practical needs, and only the mutually beneficial cooperation of both forms creates the reality of war in the eighteenth century."²

But the Age of Absolutism very early on differentiated between irregular war waged by true irregulars and irregular war waged by regular troops. The former was the warfare of bandits, despised by rulers like Frederick the Great as standing outside civilized behavior.³ "Under the name of light troops I never understand irregular troops without all order and organization," wrote Georg von Wissel in 1784 in the introduction to his *Der Jäger im Felde*. "With such troops more damage is done to an army than that they are useful for it. Instead I always mean such light troops which have to be just as regulated and have to stand in just a good order and discipline as other heavy or field troops."⁴ In the absolutist states of Europe, where war was to be an affair of the princes, even irregular war was, at least in theory, to be waged by regulars employing the principles of irregular warfare. Consequently they tried to mold them in the image of their regular armies, unconcerned with the fact that this might destroy their very character as light troops.

Drawing on his experiences in Eastern Europe, the "reality" of irreg-

ular war was defined by the Marechal de Saxe as early as 1732 as war waged by small detachments, consisting in patrols, raids, the gathering of information, ambushes, reconnaissance, protection of the main army from surprise attacks, foraging, capturing of prisoners, and the like.⁵ Lecturing on the topic in 1810, Clausewitz still defined irregular war as the "use of small bodies of troops in the field. Engagements of 20, 50, 100 or 3 to 400 men belong, if they are not part of a larger action, into the little war."⁶ Its main purpose was to gather information and to harass the enemy, called *Beobachtungskrieg*, or reconnaissance warfare.⁷ Thus the *Kleiner Krieg* was clearly understood as having a supportive function within the general context of war. In the military theory of the times, the actions of small bodies of troops were only supplementary to those of the main army.

Little war was continuous war. If, to paraphrase Clausewitz, tactics are the science of how to lead troops in battle, strategy is the science of the use of battles in the general context of war. Since "the strategy of the little war is part of the tactics (of warfare), and since the tactics of the little war quite certainly have to be a part of tactics as a whole, then all of the little war is part of tactics,"⁸ that is, troops in action.

This could be achieved only through reliable, mobile, and independent units led by highly trained and motivated officers. Yet the distinctive features and functions of the troops of the little war within the general concept of war—continually in action yet only supportive in function, outside the support structures and promotion criteria of the line, unconventional in actions and dissolved at the conclusion of peace—were all characteristics that held little allure to the noble officer of the ancien régime. The roots of this concept and its earliest practitioners, their way of fighting as well as what was perceived to be a general lack of discipline, did nothing to diminish the reluctance, if not downright refusal, of the nobility to serve in either "regular" light infantry or "irregular" units. This in turn enhanced the ill repute of all light infantry and determined the composition of the officer corps of light troops until the Napoleonic Wars.

But true light infantry units, in contrast to the rag-tag irregular forces of the armies of absolutist Europe, needed not only talented officers but reliable troops as well. The rank and file had to be able and trustworthy to act independently. Light troops were not bound to any fortified locations or predetermined positions in battle, but were used wherever needed. They had to adapt quickly to any given environment, sustain themselves almost anywhere, and operate clandestinely and with speed. This kind of warfare placed the highest demands on the commander, subaltern, and individual soldier. He fought alone or in small groups, and ultimately he could only depend upon himself and his own abilities to extricate himself from danger.⁹ Blind drill and fear of pun-

ishment were useless instruments in this kind of war, which demanded individual initiative and trust in the commanding officer. In contrast to the "big war," the manifestations of the "little war" were determined "more by a certain craftsmanship, the development and practice of the natural aptitudes (of the soldier), while in the big war more scientific . . . views prevail."¹⁰ The search for the soldier who possessed these "natural aptitudes" proceeded along divergent routes and the concept of light troops developed from two very different roots.

The Troops of the *Kleiner Krieg*: East European Origins

One concept of the "irregular" evolved in southeastern Europe, in the Turkish-Hungarian border area, where the Habsburgs recruited their feared Pandurs, and in the steppes of the Ukraine, where the tsars levied units of Cossaks for use in their wars. The peoples of the Russo-Austro-Hungarian-Turkish border area could look back on a long tradition of irregular warfare, which had been shaped by centuries of internal and external conflicts dating back at least to the Battle of Mohacz (1526). For the next century and a half, they preserved a de facto independence from the authorities in Vienna and Moscow, waging intermittent warfare with the Ottoman Empire or against any attempt to curtail their independence. With the decline of the Turkish threat, however, a concurrent tightening of tsarist and imperial reigns occurred. This led to a series of rebellions in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries particularly along the frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which very early on included a political component characteristic of irregular wars.

It was in Poland and the plains of Hungary that West Europeans (Frenchmen), first experienced this new kind of warfare. From the 1670s onward, the Hungarians under Count Imre Thököly rebelled against the House of Habsburg. They were aided by a French-Polish force of some 2,000 men under the Marquis de Feuquières, commissioned by Louis XIV.¹¹ In 1674, Antoine de Ville published a first account on the kind of war he witnessed there.¹² In the *Mémoires sur la Guerre* of 1711 and the *Mémoires historiques et militaires*, published posthumously in 1735, Feuquières identified the causes of the insurrection in the distress of "the Protestants and the Grandees of Hungary" and the subversion of "the Privileges of the whole Nation." This had led to a "high degree of motivation" among the Hungarians, which expressed itself in a popular revolt.¹³ The Hungarians took up arms against the Habsburgs for the same reason that the Americans would take up arms against King George III a century later, using the same tactics. The Habsburg rulers had ceased to be just rulers, and the Hungarians fought back using methods

of irregular warfare as well as the support of regular forces supplied by outside powers (France, and after 1682, Turkey). Thököly lost and died in exile in Turkey in 1705, but his cause was taken up again in the *Kuruc* Rebellion of 1701 to 1711, led by Prince Ference II Rákóczi.¹⁴ Even the Compromise of Szatmár of 1711, which ended the *Kuruc* War, did not bring peace to the area. Other parts of the border area rebelled repeatedly against attempts by the Habsburgs to reduce them to the status of peasants and curtail their traditional rights.

Absolutism has been defined as "an effective form of government only insofar as the sovereign can inspire loyalty or fear,"¹⁵ and Joseph Friedrich Duke of Hildburghausen, who was sent to the Warasdin Generalcy in 1737 to investigate the latest uprising, recommended the standard solution to internal security problems in the age of absolutism. Hildburghausen called for an attempt to coopt the loyalty of the ruling elites and the harnessing and channeling of their military spirit into the service of the House of Habsburg. The War of the Austrian Succession saw the realization of Hildburghausen's dream of "the Military Border as a huge barracks, a manpower reservoir for the wars of the Austrian monarchy."¹⁶ The *Grenzer* were organized into regiments within the Habsburg military but with their own elected officers. Others formed independent corps under leaders of their own choosing. Commanded by officers whom they trusted and venerated, these troops proved extremely valuable to Maria Theresa in her wars with Frederick the Great. In 1740, out of a total of 153,000 troops, some 20,000 were recruited from the military frontier. In 1756, the 40,000 Habsburg irregulars constituted a little over 25 percent of the total strength of the armies of the empress. Prince Ferdinand, by comparison, had only about 8,000 light troops in 1762, while the French had about 11,000.¹⁷ On the battlefield, the concept was successful, and as late as 1778, John Wraxall could report from Vienna that while the "Croats and Hungarians [were] fierce, undisciplined and subject to scarcely any military laws," they were unquestioningly loyal to the House of Habsburg.¹⁸

The introduction of East European irregulars into the Central European battlefields on a large scale took place during the Silesian wars. In 1745 the Croats mustered over 45,000 men, causing significant tactical changes. Irregular warfare as practiced by these troops was perceived as a particularly cruel and brutal method of fighting. Their inclination to plunder, combined with what was perceived to be a general lack of discipline among them, instilled contempt and hatred in their adversaries, who accused them of fighting like bandits. The Austrian Prince Johann Joseph Khevenhüller-Metsch described their art of war as "setting fire to houses, pillaging churches, cutting off ears and eyes, murdering citizens and raping women."¹⁹ In 1745, Ferdinand of Brunswick wrote disgustedly that "they have wounded two of our men with their

fire by hiding as always like thieves and robbers behind trees and never showing themselves on the open field as true soldiers should."²⁰

In order to protect themselves from the constant harassment by Austrian and Russian irregulars, Prussia and her allies were forced to raise units capable of waging the little war against Pandurs and Croats. They responded by raising dozens of *Freicorps* or *Legions* of an even more dubious character. In 1763, the *London Chronicle* would write about the British Legion that it was "composed of deserters of all nations [and] probably had the name of Legion from our soldiers who never heard of any legion but the legion of the devils mentioned in the Bible."²¹ Lacking any sense of loyalty to either ruling family or state, the free corps of Prussia and her allies were no match for the likes of Baron Franz von der Trenck. Considered dispensable by the line, they were composed of deserters, criminals, and the general "riff-raff" of society, commanded by unreliable or overly ambitious officers seeking to make a name for themselves. Almost dependent upon booty for survival, and chosen to perform tasks regular troops refused to perform, they were generally despised as nothing more than a necessary evil. For Frederick the Great they were cannon fodder "on which one can fire if necessary if they should retreat or not attack bravely."²² As late as the 1780s the leadership of the British army held that "Humanity cannot . . . but wish that this barbarous mode of hostility was, by universal consent, banished from the warfare of all nations."²³

The Troops of the *Kleiner Krieg*: West European Adaptations

Even before the successes of the "new" Habsburg troops during the Silesian wars, the concept of light troops had been introduced into the standing armies of Western Europe. Based on their experiences in Eastern Europe in the 1680s and 1690s, French officers had called for the introduction of light troops as combat troops into the French army. By 1692, the first French regiment of hussars of some 200 men was raised, followed quickly by two more. By 1702, the French army had *Compagnies Franches* as well, and by 1727 they experimented with skirmishers in military exercises. Following the Austrian example, the 1740s saw the formation of numerous irregular troops in the French army, thus creating a parallel service to the light troops in the standing army.²⁴ The Seven Years' War witnessed the merging of these two concepts, when in 1760, Marshal de Broglie ordered the formation of a company of *chasseurs* in each of the infantry battalions under his command. Concurrently two corps of *chasseurs* of five companies each were raised. Nevertheless, the French "were consistently at a disadvantage in the *petite guerre*," since her enemies were even better organized.²⁵ In 1776 the

concept of light infantry was institutionalized in the French army when each infantry regiment received one company of *chasseurs à pied*.

In 1681 already the first British regiment of dragoons had been raised, and starting in 1741/42, light infantry companies became a regular, and elite, feature of British regiments. They were institutionalized in 1771/72, when each British battalion formed a light company of forty-four men. The two concepts met in the American colonies, when Colonel Thomas Gage proposed the first independent regiment of light infantry in November 1757. This proposal was based to a large degree on the mistrust in the capabilities of the irregular "Light Infantry" such as Rogers' Rangers. The regiment was raised in the spring of 1758 by Gage in the colonies to combine the necessary staying power with the mobility of the Rangers.²⁶

In Prussia developments took a somewhat different turn as Frederick the Great drew a clear distinction between irregular troops as combat troops and the *jäger* as elite light troops with primarily police functions. The assumption of police functions was natural, since the *jäger* as members of the hunting administration had always performed similar tasks in their efforts to keep poachers at bay. Throughout the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years' War, the *Königlich Preussisches Reitendes Feld Jäger Corps* and the *Feld Jäger Corps zu Fuß*, both founded almost 700 men strong in 1740 and 1741, respectively, operated in close cooperation with the various *Freikorps*. Unlike their Hessian counterparts, however, they were primarily staff troops and military police, similar to the *Feldjäger* in the German *Bundeswehr* today.²⁷ Reconstituted at two companies of some 300 men on June 15, 1744, the *Feld Jäger Corps zu Fuß* was enlarged to a battalion in 1761 but reduced again to two companies in 1763 under Philipp Ludwig Bouton des Granges (1730–1801). Des Granges had gained ample experience in irregular warfare as a lieutenant in the *Freibataillon* Mayr and later as a captain in the free corps Courbieres. In July 1759 he transferred as a captain to the Prussian *jäger*, which were now developing into true combat troops.

It was not until after the Seven Years' War, however, that the Prussian king seriously considered raising light troops as a permanent component of his military. In April 1770 Frederick ordered the levying of troops for the Prussian *Fuß Jäger Corps*, which was to be composed of 200 foreigners and 100 Prussian subjects. In December 1773, Lieutenant Colonel Des Granges as commanding officer of the newly established *Feldjägerbataillon* of five companies received 400 *Taler* to recruit *jäger* in Hesse, which were considered to be the best at the time.²⁸ By 1784 the *jäger* had developed into a regiment of two battalions of ten companies of 120 men each, and its formation was completed by 1786. Concurrently the *Freikorps*, which had totaled about 500 men in 1757 but formed almost 20 percent of Frederick's infantry and 14 percent of

his cavalry in 1762, were also transformed into a regular light force and integrated into the standing army. In 1783, Frederick issued his "Instruction für die Frei-Regimenter oder leichten Infanterie-Regimenter," which were finally established three regiments strong as part of the standing army after his death in 1786.²⁹

By now the *jäger* had established themselves as an elite among the armed forces, a status that found expression in preferential treatment in pay and equipment as well as their use as military police. This distinctive feature of the *jäger* in German armies following the Prussian model caused tensions with line troops. Not surprisingly, Prussian influence on the use of *jäger* troops as staff and security troops was particularly strong in the military organization of states like Ansbach-Bayreuth. One of the causes for the rebellion of the Ansbach-Bayreuth line in Ochsenfurt in 1777 as described by an eyewitness was "because the *jäger* wanted to get preferential treatment, and also because they were ordered and entrusted with the supervision over them, because the majority of them were volunteers."³⁰ Like their Prussian counterparts, the *jäger* of all German armies were considered especially reliable and trustworthy, and performed, when needed, functions as military police and staff troops.³¹

By the end of the Seven Years' War, almost all German states—from Bavaria to Saxony and Hesse, Brunswick, and Bückeburg—had raised light infantry troops of their own.³² Austria, on the other hand, which had pioneered the use of irregular light troops, had fallen behind. Old concepts proved hard to change, and only under the impact of the successes of enemy regular light infantry did she raise a small *Jägercorps* composed of ethnic Germans in 1758 and a *Tyroler Scharfschützencorps* in 1778 and thus also emulate the German concept.³³ The concepts of irregular light troops and regular light troops were never merged successfully. As serious attempts were made to turn the *Grenzer* into regular troops by pressing on them the uniform and discipline of the Austrian line, the strength of the Habsburg light troops was destroyed. To the degree that these military reforms were successful, the character and effectiveness of the Croats and Pandurs as irregulars were lost. They became little more than "cheap troops of the line drilled in linear tactics."³⁴ The character of the personnel composing Austrian irregular troops resisted attempts at pressing them into line formations. But if the East European concept reached the limits of its development in the 1780s, the *jäger* concept of Central Europe proved capable of further development after the Seven Years' War.

The Troops of the *Kleiner Krieg*: The Hessian *Jäger*

While the East European concept of irregular light troops was either integrated into the armies of Western Europe, losing its characteristic features in the process, or degenerated into the cheap and dispensable heavy infantry, the concept of the *jäger* provided the "natural aptitudes" of Clausewitz' soldier in the "civilized" form of a fighter familiar with nature, an expert shot, independent, yet also willing to serve and devoted to the ruling house. The first state to organize hunters in regular units and to use them in war was Hussia.

In July 1631, at the height of the Thirty Years' War, Landgraf William V (1627–1637) concluded an alliance with Sweden that brought Hussia out of her neutrality and reorganized the Hessian military. Initially two regiments of infantry and two regiments of cavalry were raised, but by 1648, Hussia had an army of almost 16,000 men. In it were included six *Freicompanien* of cavalry and fourteen *Freicompanien* of infantry, but more important, three companies of *jäger* drafted from the hunting personnel. The qualifications for service in these companies, which stood under the command of the chief foresters (*Oberförster*) of the respective hunting districts of the Landgraviate, were marksmanship, familiarity with nature, and a good reputation. Dressed in green, their "working clothes," and equipped with rifles and daggers, the *jäger* were to protect regular troops from surprise attacks, serve as their guides, and reconnoiter, lay ambushes, and harass the enemy in every possible way. When the war ended in 1648, the companies were dissolved and the *jäger* returned to their civilian positions.³⁵

In 1684 Hussia mustered 200 mounted *jäger* and 200 men on foot, equipped with *Pfürschbüchsen* (hunting rifles) and again commanded by the chief foresters. They were known as the *Jäger zu Pferd, Bauer, or Förster Companies von Sobieski/Sobiewalski*. During the War of the League of Augsburg, the Hessian *Jäger-Corps*, composed of one company on foot and one mounted, took part in the siege of Namur in 1695, but was withdrawn after the break between Kassel and the Circle of the Upper Rhine in 1696.³⁶

Accurate marksmanship was a hallmark of these troops, and in the course of the seventeenth century several other German and non-German states took advantage of the progress made in the manufacturing of precision guns that allowed for much more accurate fire. Originally designed for hunting purposes, such rifles were accurate at a distance of 200 paces or more, which more than made up for the slowness and difficulty of handling them.³⁷ Thomas Raymond, an English soldier, described their effectiveness during the siege of Rijnberg in 1633: "Many are shott in peeping to see what the enemy doe betweene the muskett basketts that stand on topp of the breast worke. . . . Let but the topp

of an old hatt appeare betweene the basketts and you shall have presently have 3 or 4 bullets shott into it."³⁸

Following the Hessian example, other states also raised light infantry units from among their hunting administration. Bavaria did so in 1645. Prussia raised a company of *jäger* under the chief forester in 1656/57 and in 1689 levied a corps of 143 *jäger* from Piedmont, which took part in the siege of Bonn. In 1674 and again in 1700 each Prussian company of infantry was to designate a few sharpshooters equipped with rifles, a step imitated by France in 1679 and Sweden in 1691.³⁹ The outbreak of the Silesian War in 1740 witnessed the constitution of *jäger* troops as permanent features in the armies of Frederick the Great and his allies as well as his enemies, but it was during the Seven Years' War that the *jäger* earned their reputation as the elite of the German armies.

In Hussia, the *jäger* were reestablished 2 companies strong in February 1758. In January 1759, the corps was expanded to 4 companies on foot (400 men plus a staff of 16). In December 1759, 2 companies of mounted *jäger* at 100 men each were added, bringing the total strength of the Hessian *Jäger-Corps* to some 600 men.⁴⁰ At the same time efforts were under way to expand the *jäger* concept to all line infantry regiments.

If Hussia had pioneered the use of hunters as elite soldiers in the Thirty Years' War and *tirailleur* practices in the 1750s, the establishment of the "Chasseurs d'Armée" under Major Johann Gottlieb Rall in the spring of 1762 showed Hussia again in the forefront of military developments. The "Chasseurs d'Armée" were composed of the elite of the Hussian line regiments. They were now concentrated in special units and trained by the *jäger* in the art of light infantry warfare: fighting in open order and aimed fire. This represented a crucial step in the development toward permanent and elitist light infantry units and their subsequent integration into the standing army. The "Chasseurs d'Armée" not only solved the problem of a limited supply of hunters and the need for them to return to forest work at the end of the war, but also that of discipline and reliability, upon which so much of the success of such troops rested.⁴¹

In 1763 budgetary considerations forced Landgraf Frederick to disband the "Chasseurs d'Armée," as well as *jäger* units, keeping only a core of one captain, two non-commissioned officers, and twelve men at his court in Kassel under the name of *Leib Jäger Compagnie*. By the spring of 1774, the *Leib Jäger Compagnie* had been expanded to a strength of thirty-one men. Its commanding officer, from March 4, 1774, was Captain Johann Ewald. Ewald was aided by Lieutenant Friedrich Heinrich Lorey, who had been with the *jäger* since 1773. One sergeant, one corporal, a fourier, two bugle horns, and twenty-four *jäger* formed the

rank and file. On April 22, 1774, the Hessian War Ministry issued an order to expand the *Jäger Volontairs* into a company of *jäger* of 102 men. Ewald remained the commanding officer of this elite Hessian infantry unit, which eventually reached an effective strength of seventy-one men.⁴²

Events in America, however, overtook other plans of the Hessian War Ministry. On January 15, 1776, the Landgraf promised the British 12,984 soldiers, including two companies of *jäger*, 125 men strong each, in exchange for subsidies. The first Hessian troops, some 8,674 soldiers including the first company of *jäger* under Captain Karl Emil von Donop, left Kassel on March 2, 1776. Eight weeks later, on May 9, 1776, Johann Ewald and the second company of *jäger* left Kassel for Bremerhaven and the New World, where they arrived on August 13, 1776. In April 1777 orders were given to raise four more companies, and the third company under Ernst Karl von Prüschenk as well as a company of mounted *jäger* were added. A fifth company under Philipp von Wurmb and a sixth under Captain Lorey was activated later on in the year. By November 1777, the *jäger* mustered a total strength of 1,028 men, but its effective strength was always less.⁴³

In America the *jäger* suffered losses far in excess of those of other troops. Georg Heinz Wetzel estimates that of some 1,600 troops who eventually served with the corps, a maximum of 700 men returned, bringing the attrition rate to roughly 60 percent. Of those only 66 *jäger* were battle casualties; 306 died of other causes, including wounds received in battle. Another 100 men were discharged as no longer fit for field service. These numbers speak clearly of the extremely harsh and dangerous duty of the *jäger* in the New World. Almost as large—402 men—is the number of deserters, 40 percent of which (167 men) left between the surrender at Yorktown and the end of the war. Forty-three were listed as missing in action. Even if we admit that a number of *jäger*, particularly those sent as replacements during the war, did not meet the high standards set for inclusion in the corps in peacetime, these numbers question the reliability of the *jäger*. Due to the nature of their way of fighting, it was easier for a *jäger* to desert than for a line soldier, but the impressive wealth and opportunities in America exerted a strong influence even on Ewald's troops.⁴⁴

In the New World, the *jäger* participated in a war that was at once both familiar and new. Here they experienced light infantry war against (armed) civilians, an "irregular" war by regulars against true irregulars. It was a war of small detachments against the male—and female—adult population of whole counties, as well as against regular troops, and the experiences of this war form an integral part of Johann von Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*.⁴⁵

Johann von Ewald and His *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*

War is an affair of the military—this was the mode of thinking that Ewald had grown up in, and it is on these traditions, filtered through his American experiences, that he based the technical aspects of the little war in his *Treatise*. For those reviewers like Scharnhorst, who were looking for radically new ideas in light infantry techniques in Ewald's treatise the result was indeed disappointing. Light infantry tactics had been virtually perfected by the 1770s. As a manual for irregular warfare, Ewald's book stood at the end of a long tradition that had begun in the 1740s and 1750s, and which by now had spawned dozens of titles.⁴⁶ In his foreword to the 1785 *Treatise* translated here, Ewald himself points out that he is quite aware of the fact that he is not writing anything new. Drawing on twenty-four years of military experience, he wants to write a manual for "the leader of a light corps or a detachment which is composed of cavalry and infantry."⁴⁷ The difference with other light infantry manuals of the time, however, lies in the fact that Ewald's examples and analyses were to a large degree based on his experiences in the American Revolution.⁴⁸

In the first three sections of his book, Ewald discusses recruitment, equipment, and training of light infantry. On the basis of his experiences in America, "where whole regiments had to be taken out of the army to do service" as light infantry, he comes to the conclusion that large numbers of soldiers trained to fight this way are indispensable for a victorious war. Light infantry training provides the best school for future generals, since in that kind of war an officer "has to do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale."⁴⁹ Thus, in contrast to the usual practices in Europe, its officer corps should be composed "of the most agile, skillful and bravest" men available. Similar to the "Chasseurs d'Armée," the rank and file should, if at all possible, be recruited from among the best of the line regiments, not the dregs of society given to deserting, looting, and plundering. He would prefer them to be between sixteen and eighteen years old, and never over thirty years of age. Here we see Ewald again integrating his experiences in the American war into his *Treatise* and ahead of his times. The youthful soldier of the modern army had no place in the military thinking of the eighteenth century. The absolutist rulers preferred older soldiers, who were trained to perfection and had no home outside their regiments. They "were considered inherently superior to young ones."⁵⁰ The age structure of the standing army reflected this thinking. In 1783 the average age of the grenadiers of the Prussian regiment Hacke was 38.9 years, and the average age of all privates 32.8 years, which would have made most of the regiment too old for Ewald's corps.

Ewald considers it of the utmost importance that light troops should

be led with the strictest discipline primarily directed, however, against the villains "who unmercifully torment the locals who are innocent of the war." Do not compromise in punishments as well as in rewards, Ewald argues, but "show the soldier that you love him and take care of him. . . . Once the officer . . . has gained the trust of the common soldier he can certainly count on him in all cases whatsoever."⁵¹

The same strict discipline applies to the officers of a light infantry corps. This leads almost inevitably to a blurring of the distinctions between the ranks, something Ewald had experienced in the American war. Much as he may have regretted the fact that the age of gentleman warfare might be over, he accepts the changes that this means in the traditional way of life of the officer in the field. Throughout the book Ewald vents his anger, although guardedly, over how his and his troops' efforts were hampered by traditions and prejudice. "It is not my intention to insult anyone," he writes, "otherwise I could list any number of examples of carelessness and negligence" that cost the British dearly.⁵² Ewald wants to restrict the number of horses and servants for officers and to replace bread rations with zwieback: "During the American war we received zwieback for years instead of bread, and once our soldiers were finally used to it, they preferred it to bread."⁵³

A *jäger* officer, Ewald believes, has to lead by example. His training, behavior, equipment, and habits must not be different from that of his troops if he does not want to endanger the whole corps.⁵⁴ In another affront to special officer privileges, Ewald wants to forbid afternoon fun rides for the officers and never let them, or their servants, roam the countryside during the daytime where they run the risk of being captured by the enemy. Such joy rides give away the location of the corps and leave it without leadership in case of a surprise attack: "During the American war I saw quite a few corps where no more than three officers were in camp during the afternoons."⁵⁵ During the campaign in South Carolina, the servant of an officer in Colonel Abercrombie's Corps was captured by the Americans while trying to buy bread. He informed the Americans of a planned raid, which had to be cancelled. But "what was even more surprising was the fact that neither the officer nor the servant were punished for this."⁵⁶ Changes like these were certainly easier for the bourgeois Ewald to accept than for the average (noble) British officer. But one of the reasons for the defeat of the British, in Ewald's opinion, was that the British officer was not willing to adapt his way of life or his style of fighting to the new environment.

Based on his experiences in America, Ewald recommends light corps of about 1,000 men strong, with at least one-third being cavalry. If it were smaller, the losses incurred through almost constant action and desertion would soon render it useless, "which we have seen all too often with the British, whose light corps were rarely stronger than a

few hundred men."⁵⁷ The foot component of his corps is composed of two companies of *jäger* (4 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, 151 men), who are "trained huntsmen, good marksmen and young," equipped with rifles, daggers, and 40 rounds of ammunition, and 2 companies of fusiliers at the same strength but equipped with muskets and bayonets. Here again the experiences of the war in America show their influence. Ewald combines riflemen and fusiliers into one corps mostly because his *jäger* did not have bayonets, which left them open to infantry charges. Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe, with whom Ewald had often cooperated, insisted that his men rush upon riflemen: "there was little danger from troops who were without bayonets [sic] and whose object it was to fire a single shot with effect."⁵⁸

To these 2 companies on foot Ewald adds 2 escadrons of cavalry, consisting of 5 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, and 152 men each. At least 25 of them should be good shots, equipped with rifles. Up to the American Revolution, parts of the *jäger* troops had always been mounted, since this provided necessary speed and mobility. But they had not fought on horseback. From their inception they had been a light infantry and would return to this model in the nineteenth century. But the addition of a mounted segment of good shots and the appendix to the *Treatise*, entitled "Beytrag von denen drey vornehmsten Stücken was ein Officier von der leichten Reuterey im Feld zu thun hat," which was written "upon the request of one of my good friends during the American War," shows the influence of the vastness of the American theater of war, which was larger than anything Ewald had ever experienced, on his tactical thinking.⁵⁹ A 14-man administration would bring the total strength of the corps to 1,044 men. The military training would be concentrated, not surprisingly, around the use of aimed fire and fighting *a la débânde*, which is "where the real strength" of light infantry lay. Here Ewald successfully combines Hessian *jäger* traditions with his experiences in the American war.⁶⁰

Beginning in the fourth section, the *Abhandlung* turns into a manual of irregular warfare. Yet Ewald hastens to add that his rules "are more assumptions than fixed principles, because one is always dependent upon circumstances which one can never predict in war."⁶¹ His theory of light infantry warfare rests on five principles: (1) attack is the best defense; (2) know the area you operate in; (3) use your speed and mobility to create an element of surprise; (4) keep your objective secret; and (5) always be prepared for an enemy attack. Ewald does not offer much new as far as the fundamentals of the little war are concerned. He did not have to. Speed, familiarity with the area of operations, discipline, highly qualified and motivated officers and soldiers, knowledge of a number of ruses to surprise the enemy and avoid being surprised, marksmanship, and determination had always been the mark of an elite

light infantry in Europe. The American War only sharpened these skills and re-enforced Ewald's conviction of the importance of a well-trained light infantry in the wars of the future.

Johann von Ewald and the American Experience

In its technical aspects Ewald characterizes the American Revolutionary War by four distinct features: (1) aimed fire; (2) the use of surprise attacks and ambushes; (3) speed, as the rebels perfected hit-and-run tactics; and (4) improvisation and deception.⁶² Here Ewald's European background and strict military training served him extremely well. On the motivational level the war was determined by the increased and voluntary participation of the civilian population through the militia system as well as European-style loyalist and rebel free corps, especially in the southern theater of the war.⁶³ Here was an aspect of fighting that was as new for Ewald as it was for anyone else, and for which he could find no analogy in Europe.

Neither by training nor inclination was the British military leadership prepared to meet the challenges of this war with its overriding political purpose, this military conflict that had become an affair of the people. It is in the tactical approach of the tradition-bound military leadership toward the war, that Ewald found most to criticize in 1785. The military establishment was, and remained, convinced of the appropriateness of its way of fighting, and believed the experience gained in the rebellious colonies would be of hardly any value to them later on the battlefields of Europe. It had been trained in the armies of Western Europe, where war, including irregular war, was waged by professional soldiers, members of the regular forces. In the rebellious colonies, their world was indeed "turned upside down."

They faced modern revolutionary war.⁶⁴ Success in such a conflict depended on two requirements. First, the rebels and their leaders, who in attacking a legitimate government are "invariably guilty of treason," needed to have the material and psychological support of a people prepared to fight for more than just the protection of their property in the wake of attacks by a hostile force. The peasants of Europe had fought for their property for centuries. But to secure their long-range objective, independence, the colonists had to be emotionally involved, they had to perceive a stake in the outcome of the struggle beyond the preservation of their material possessions. Second, the government, "to which the offender legitimately owes allegiance,"⁶⁵ had to be forced to wage the war on terms laid down by the rebels, usually the militarily weaker side. Such a war is no longer simply an affair of the military but has expanded to include political, social, and economic components as well:

it is revolutionary. That side which can convince the people that it is fighting for their interests will win the "psychological" war for the support of the people and thus the "military" war too. The War for American Independence met these criteria. It "provides a compelling example of men fighting of their own free will,"⁶⁶ and as they successfully transformed the war into a revolutionary conflict, the "stronger political motive of the American Revolutionaries" proved decisive in the defeat of the British.⁶⁷

What enabled the colonists to defend successfully their political experiment by means of armed resistance was the genuine fusion of military tactics and political motivation. The colonists diluted the boundaries between regular light troops (permanent members of the field army) and militiamen (temporarily armed civilians) as carriers of irregular warfare. Although lacking a standing army and thus the militarily weaker side, the rebellious colonists raised the concept of irregular warfare to a new level, which the British military leadership was unable to match. In 1776, "British officers were . . . men who did not as yet presume to consider more than the military dimensions of a campaign or war."⁶⁸ Unlike most of his contemporaries Ewald came to appreciate the political dimensions of the war, and it is here that Ewald was most successful in his attempt to integrate his American experiences into his European background.

Since the enemy could be anywhere, the *jäger* had to be able to meet him anywhere. The only way to find the increasingly elusive enemy was to search him out, to rob him of his cover in the population. Bribe wherever that may bring results, threaten if you need to instill fear, cajole, but always try to gain some locals as informants and guides.⁶⁹ Pay them well, treat them well, "show an affable behavior toward everyone, . . . and you will find in all countries people that will help you and one is not easily betrayed."⁷⁰ Informants need to be able to trust you, and you need to trust them. Never consider as untrue or impossible any piece of information that you may get from a deserter or an informant: "I could give you any number of examples where the Crown of England lost the best posts and whole corps in the American war because of such imprudence and negligence."⁷¹ Light troops need to "make friends in the middle of enemy country," otherwise "the revenge of the locals" will have grave consequences. Only a good relationship with them leads to success: "On the day before the Battle of Germantown one of the most respected citizens of Philadelphia and by no means a friend of the king" reported the approach of the American army to Colonel von Wurmb, who had befriended the man through his kind behavior.⁷²

Yet Ewald also cautions that you have to protect your supporters, otherwise this crucial source of information and aid dries up. This can be done through constant patrols and ambushes. During the first cam-

paign in New Jersey in 1777 the Americans used such tactics with resounding success, which not only led to constant loss of life and personnel by the taking of British prisoners, but also dried up local support and foraging opportunities as well. The message for Ewald is clear: "And as you protect the locals through these kinds of ambushes from marauders, you at the same time turn them into such good friends that they will always give you a hint when a good catch is to be made."⁷³ If you fail to provide this protection, the opposite happens. Around Portsmouth, Virginia, in 1781, "the inhabitants of the city as well as the locals of the whole area were rebels, and the few which could be called royalist had become so frightened of the enemy that they did not dare to give us even the least bit of information."⁷⁴

At the same time Ewald acknowledges the dangers inherent in depending too much on local support as this leaves you open to betrayal. Light infantry primarily needs to rely on itself and its own strengths. Ewald insists on constant reconnaissance, constant patrols, constant movement of the troops, "so that one can not easily be betrayed by the locals and chased away by the enemy."⁷⁵ Since its success depends to a large degree on surprise, light infantry has to keep its movements as secret as possible. Never tell more than two officers all the details of your plans, disarm locals whom you do not trust, use the cover of night whenever possible: light infantry has "to make day out of night and night out of day," very much like beasts of prey.⁷⁶ Ewald approaches the war from the point of view of a hunter, and here he is quite prepared to acknowledge the efficiency, and sometimes even superiority, of the American militia over his own troops—and to learn from them. Americans are "the best light infantry-men of the world," he writes, "because every one of them is an experienced hunter and knows all the cunning that is as much part of war as it is of hunting." Sometimes Ewald even uses animal characteristics in describing their style: they "stalk away like a cat from the pigeon-house."⁷⁷ Some participants of the Revolutionary War saw the whole undertaking literally as a hunt: "The whole war in this country is an orderly hunting drive; we are the beaters and often at the same time the prey, and the rebels are the marksmen."⁷⁸ This was the kind of warfare that Ewald's *jäger* knew, where they could use their speed and marksmanship, where they could spread out "according to their wishes."⁷⁹ *Jäger* "fight *en échelons*" was the rule that Ewald "always followed during the American war and which always worked out fine."⁸⁰

The War for Independence was a testing ground for both traditional light infantry war and modern guerrilla war. As a "war without front-lines," to borrow Hahlweg's phrase, it was a hunter's dream. But prey and hunter could quickly change places. Ewald acknowledges the technical skills of his enemy. "The Americans are very skillful in setting up

small ambushes in front of their own outpost for their [additional] security," and they have the advantage of knowing the country better than the enemy.⁸¹ Yet he also recognizes that this involvement of the civilian population, coupled with their skills as hunters and the constant switching from regular light infantry warfare to revolutionary guerilla war makes this "hunt" extremely dangerous. At times his frustration with the invisible and evasive enemy comes through: "What can you do to those small bands who have learned to fight separate, who know how to use any molehill for their protection, and who, when attacked, run back as fast as they will approach you again, who continuously find space to hide. Never have I seen these maneuvers carried out better than by the American militia, especially by that of the province of Jersey. If you were forced to retreat through these people you could be certain of having them constantly around you."⁸²

This quote illuminates both the revolutionary character of the war as well as the limitations of Ewald the theoretician. The reader cannot help feeling that Ewald is constantly moving back and forth between regular light infantry warfare and what we would call guerrilla warfare. He does not offer an answer to the question as to how to respond to "these people," this elusive enemy who eventually won the war. Maybe this was simply a reflection of the rebels' intention; the dilution of the boundaries between traditional irregular and modern irregular warfare. More important, Ewald lacked the theoretical model necessary to understand the changing role of war and the military in society. But maybe this is asking too much of the *jäger* captain.

Under the impact of the American and French Revolutions, the dynastic nationalism of the eighteenth century was transformed into the popular nationalism of the nineteenth century. These political revolutions were accomplished by an almost concurrent military revolution. The intellectual forces behind warfare changed, and the highly specialized little war of the eighteenth century became the popular, politicized guerrilla war of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—in the context of both the *levée en masse*, the people in arms, and the ideological insurgency. The political changes of the French Revolution also resulted in a revolution in warfare. Light troops now became indispensable for "the integrated infantry tactics of the new century." They became the new elite of the armed forces.⁸³ This military revolution was a logical conclusion to everything the eighteenth century had worked to produce in a light infantryman. As the "natural" fighter of the eighteenth century finally found his place in the standing armies, the new style of warfare called for independence, daring, and unconventionality, combined with reliability and loyalty to the impersonal idea of the state. The "subject" of the eighteenth century developed into the "citizen" of revolutionary France and America.

Ewald stood at the beginning of this long process, and not until the 1810s would Clausewitz try to analyze the place of guerrilla warfare in a general concept of war.⁸⁴ Ewald's goal throughout the book is more narrowly defined. Based on historical precedent and his experiences in America, he advocates an expansion in the size and number of light infantry corps and a change in the training of line troops so that they can fight like light infantry. But that absolute obedience that he demands is no longer the *Kadavergehorsam* of the armies of absolutist Europe. This kind of discipline, rooted deeply in Hessian *jäger* traditions, derived from the *jäger* mode of fighting, and differed radically from the traditions of the line. It was an integral part of a system based on mutual trust and cooperation. Kunisch, based on his research of tactical developments in the Austro-Hungarian army in the late eighteenth century, charged Ewald with the attempted destruction of the distinct character of light troops by advocating an expansion of the discipline and principles of the line army over them. Obviously, he completely misunderstood Ewald's intentions.⁸⁵

Ewald has more in mind when concluding his *Abhandlung* with the statement that "in war everything depends on well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers."⁸⁶ If his seven years in the New World had taught Ewald anything, it was surely that the "well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers" of Great Britain and her German allies had been defeated by a combination of irregular and regular forces that they had never before encountered in Europe. From now on expertise in the art of war was not enough. Ewald does not seek reconciliation of the concept of irregular troops with the absolutist military system as Kunisch would have it. Instead he forecasts the army of the future, based on responsible soldiers, acting independently, voluntarily, and accountably. Under the leadership of George Washington these soldiers proved their superiority over the mercenaries of the absolutist system. A few years later the armies of revolutionary France crushed the war machinery of absolutist Europe and rang in the new age in Europe too. Out of Jena and Auerstädt, out of the Vendée and the Tyrolean rebellion, the Spanish resistance,, and the revolts of Schill and Emmerich in Germany arose a new concept of war. In it the little war was no longer a supportive element in the system of warfare. From now on little war would be waged on two levels. One level was the traditional form of light infantry warfare waged by special formations of the regular army as it had been perfected in the eighteenth century. The other level was that of modern guerrilla warfare based on revolutionary masses with an overriding political purpose. In his *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg*, Ewald demonstrates that he can at least read if not interpret the writing on the wall.

The American Experience and the European Response

When Scharnhorst wrote in his review that there was not much new in Ewald's book, he betrayed either a superficial reading or a failure to grasp the notion of a new kind of warfare that emerges out of Ewald's writing. But Scharnhorst only echoed the general feelings of the military elite of the times concerning the American War. This opinion is exemplified by Frederick the Great, who remarked that the "people who come back from America imagine they know all there is to know about war, and yet they have to start learning war all over again in Europe."⁸⁷ The British military "headstrong leadership" would try throughout the war to force light troops to fight like line infantry at "close quarters while at a disadvantage."⁸⁸ In keeping with European norms, the professional French officers too tended to disregard the fighting capabilities of the American militia, while grudgingly admitting that the American soldiers were "harder, more patient than Europeans."⁸⁹ Thus any transfer of practical experiences from America to Europe had to come on the level of junior officers. It was in the writings of officers like Ewald, Lieutenants Adam Ludwig (von) Ochs⁹⁰ and Johann (von) Hinrichs,⁹¹ Andreas Emmerich,⁹² and Englishmen like John Graves Simcoe⁹³ or the Polish volunteer Tadeusz Kościuszko⁹⁴ that these experiences were brought to the attention of a European audience. Through their daily combat experience they sensed the connection between the political and military aspects of the war, and the role armed civilians could play in future armed conflicts. As they rose to the rank of general in the various armies of Europe they shaped organization, equipment, tactics, and training in the light infantry of their services. Once the French Revolutionary wars had broken out, their experiences came in good stead, and the Prussian General Georg Wilhelm Freiherr von Valentini was forced to admit that "in all cases of close contact with the enemy the Hessian officers knew more than ours." They had a certain knowledge of the art of war "which these brave men had acquired in a different part of the world."⁹⁵

Yet modern military historians long accepted Scharnhorst's verdict, not only on Ewald, but on the impact of the American Revolutionary War on Europe as well. In 1964, in a stimulating essay on European military reforms at the end of the eighteenth century, Peter Paret found "little evidence that they were shaped in any essential way by colonial experience." Instead Paret argued that the vital changes that took place in European armies in the last two decades of the century were genuinely European in their origin, that "colonial experience played a secondary role."⁹⁶ In 1976 he reasserted his findings when he wrote that "European armies acquired very little that was new to them from the American War."⁹⁷

But if Paret detected hardly any "tactical influence from overseas" either in the practice or writings of European officers with or without overseas experience,⁹⁸ Werner Hahlweg argued just the opposite. He found frequent references to the Revolutionary War in the specialized military literature of the times, particularly in the writings of officers like Ewald, Emmerich, Hinrichs, and Neithardt von Gneisenau.⁹⁹ Taking a middle route, Don Higginbotham in his *The War of American Independence* detected "scarcely any reflection of American observations" on the operational level of European armies after 1783, but attributed the "somewhat open, flexible battlefield dispositions" of the 1790s to the experiences of British and German officers in the American Revolution.¹⁰⁰

In his 1975 article "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine," Walter Laqueur mentioned the American Revolution only in passing. If the "small-unit engagements and woodland fighting" had had a positive influence on European developments in Higginbotham's estimation,¹⁰¹ for Laqueur the war simply "provided more examples of the many uses which could be made of small, highly mobile units." He summed up his article by saying that "the technique of small war hardly changed between 1750 and 1900," and ended with the well-known fact that what "did change radically in the period under review was the function of partisan warfare."¹⁰² Despite a lengthy analysis of Emmerich and his *The Partisan in War, or The Use of a Corps of Light Troops to an Army*, in which Emmerich drew conclusions from his experiences in a way strikingly similar to those of Ewald, Laqueur concluded that the "outcome" of the American War for Independence had "a delayed influence on military thinking" in Europe.¹⁰³ The discussion about the extent of the interrelationship between the American Revolutionary War and European warfare is still in flux,¹⁰⁴ but there can be no doubt that the axioms for unconventional warfare as laid down by Ewald in his *Treatise on Partisan Warfare* are as valid today as they were 200 years ago.

The Concept of Light Infantry in Today's U.S. Military

Captain Ewald's legacy was not only to his own generation. It also speaks to a controversy over the purpose, roles, and missions of "light infantry" units in the contemporary U.S. military. For that reason we include some comments on the utilization of light infantry today.

Central to this discussion are two concerns. First is whether there is a need for the elite, specialized units like the light infantry and whether such soldiers possess unique skills that distinguish them from heavy or line infantry soldiers. Second is a concern as to whether there are distinctive tactical differences between the two.

Concerning the first issue there has long been a controversy over the efficacy of specialized units. Throughout history there has been a movement to incorporate and to remove specialized units from the armed forces of a nation. They have had a number of names such as *jäger*, *sturmmtruppen*, mountain, ranger, airborne, marines, or light infantry units. Whatever their designation there is a military need for specialized units to meet peculiar tasks and having them available allows one to adapt quickly to changing environmental conditions. Yet it is difficult to use such highly trained soldiers and their officers in tasks other than those for which they were created. For instance, the British airborne troops of World War II spent too much time in reserve with some of the most skilled troops and dedicated officers being wasted when infantrymen were badly needed, just because no suitable airborne mission could be found. Some would argue that the employment of these forces in the ill-fated Operation Market-Garden in September 1944 was primarily to find some way to use these specialized assets. Moreover, specialized units suffer excessive casualties when compared to other units and result in the unfortunate loss of the best soldiers.

A major portion of Ewald's writing is devoted to the justification of the permanent establishment of *jäger* units in the Hessian army. Just as numerous modern writers spend considerable time justifying the creation of the light infantry units, so Ewald devotes his preface and first two chapters to a similar justification.

Another argument about creating such specialization concerns the need for these skills to be universal throughout the army, not peculiar to certain units. Ranger skills, it has been argued, are such that every unit, not just a few, should have officers and men capable of such tasks. As an officer in the Princess Patricia Canadian Light Infantry noted recently: "If one adheres to NATO definitions, there is really no classification difference between standard, or line, infantry and light infantry."¹⁰⁵ some would argue that all infantrymen, once they depart their mode of transportation, are light infantrymen. Another group concludes that "lightness" connotes ineffectiveness, since such units lack combat sustainability on the highly lethal modern battlefield. Others hold that "lightness" in its modern context refers only to a capacity to be air lifted to a region with less weight and cubic volume.

On the other hand, there is a strong core of thought that there are distinctions between the two that go beyond these factors. And this leads to the second rationale for maintaining such units. Leading this opinion are Steven L. Canby and William S. Lind, two of the intellectual figures behind the congressional military reform caucus. They conclude that light infantry does not merely describe a capacity to be lifted to a region with less weight and cubic volume.

From Lind's perspective, too much emphasis is placed on the strategic mobility of so-called light infantry units to distant operational arenas and not enough on their tactical distinctiveness. "Light infantry is more lightly equipped than line infantry, and that does improve its strategic mobility. But its different equipment is more a function of its tactics and of where it fights than of strategic mobility requirements." It also involves an attitude toward a type of fighting, and one that emphasizes ambush, area rather than positional defense, attacking rear areas rather than frontal assaults. True "light, or *jäger*, infantry fights very differently from line infantry," says Lind. "Where it fights is also different; light infantry fights in close terrain and makes no pretense about being an all-terrain, all-conditions force."¹⁰⁶

Modern light infantry includes ranger, airborne, air assault, and light infantry units. "Heavy infantry" consists of armored, mechanized, and motorized units. Emphasis in light infantry formations has been on low-intensity conflict and contingency situations. In mid- and high-intensity conflicts, the light infantrymen would be employed in restricted terrain environments.¹⁰⁷

Specific light infantry tactical operations are spelled out in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion* (1987). Other aspects receive detailed attention in FM 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)* (1982), FM 7-20, *The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger)* (1984), and FM 7-30, *Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Brigade Operations* (1981). The central codification of U.S. Army doctrine is FM 100-5, *Operations* (1986), which provides a body of operational and tactical principles upon which the other manuals base their specific details. In Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1, *Warfighting*, the Corps commandant, General A. M. Gray, outlines his and "the U.S. Marine Corps' philosophy of warfighting."¹⁰⁸ Like U.S. Army doctrine, the Marine Corps emphasizes many of the points that Ewald does.

Major elements of this evolving light infantry doctrine conform closely to the *jäger* tradition described by Ewald. Much of the current U.S. Army discussion, however, revolves around the use of divisional-sized light infantry units. The Hessian Field *Jäger* Corps of the American Revolution was at best a regimental-sized force, and was often employed in company-sized elements. For instance, in 1781, only Ewald's company went from the British garrison in New York to join the forces operating in southeastern Virginia. The remainder of the *jäger* corps stayed in New York. Thus, when making comparisons with contemporary doctrine, one must understand that Ewald operated with relatively small-sized units and that most of his observations apply at the regimental level or below.

Distinctive Light Infantry Characteristics

A recent U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute study on light infantry tactics by Major Scott McMichael emphasizes four distinctive characteristics of the light infantryman. First is an attitude of self-reliance and independence, a willingness to accept the psychological consequences of isolation on the battlefield and a belief in one's tactical superiority over his opponent. Second, the light infantryman learns to appreciate the nuances of terrain and turn them to his advantage. As U.S. Marine Corps Captain John F. Schmitt puts it, "rather than superimpose his tactics *over* the terrain, the light infantryman has tended to fit into the terrain."¹⁰⁹

Third, the light infantryman is particularly adaptable to environmental changes such as jungle, mountains, forest, urban buildings, night, rain, and snow, and he uses these situations to his advantage. Finally, the light infantryman must innovate and improvise. Doctrinal rigidity is not characteristic of such a warrior. He is willing to change when circumstances warrant it rather than conform to standard operating procedures.¹¹⁰

When one follows both the concepts outlined in this translation and his other writings, and in the daily details described in Ewald's diary, it becomes apparent that Ewald instinctively incorporated these four characteristics.

Self-Reliance

Ewald places particular emphasis on the self-reliance of his *jäger*. Officership in such a corps demands "the most agile, skillful and valiant officers,"¹¹¹ he cautions. Without saying so, he implies that *jäger* service is not the place for aristocratic dandies desiring a respectable sinecure.

At the same time, particular attention must be paid to insure "such corps receive a quota of capable non-commissioned officers and privates" or "otherwise you will get a very bad rabble."¹¹² Throughout Ewald's writings there is an emphasis on "trustworthy non-commissioned officers"¹¹³ as the backbone of successful light infantry operations. For instance, in Virginia in 1781 he "placed a corporal with six Scots and six jaegers in two ambuscades in the outlying pine woods along the main road."¹¹⁴

This capacity for self-reliance and professional competence does not come easily. Ewald constantly urges training exercises that require war-time tactical dispositions so that when combat looms "officers and non-commissioned officers know how to keep their men under control and to lead them against the enemy." Only through training can the *jäger* leadership "get a sufficient idea of everything" they might confront in

combat and learn how to react to it properly.¹¹⁵ Training provides that discipline that is at the essence of the effective, self-reliant *jäger*. The commander of a well-disciplined force "can depend upon the courage and fidelity of his men, if he have placed at their head, officers who unite zeal, patience, and bravery with good conduct."¹¹⁶

U.S. Army doctrine describes the light infantry soldier as being "physically strong, emotionally tough, and highly motivated."¹¹⁷ Critical to the success of such operations is subordinate leader initiative that takes mission-type orders, rather than detailed ones and, knowing the commander's intentions, derives the desired results based upon a thorough analysis of the tactical situation.¹¹⁸ These are the exact characteristics that Ewald endorses. They also reflect the U.S. Marine Corps' warfighting philosophy that insists its leaders "be men of action and of intellect both. . . . Resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, they must be energetic and insistent in execution."¹¹⁹

Nowhere is this emphasis on physical toughness and self-reliance better seen than in the raids and reconnaissance in force operations in enemy-held territory. A reconnaissance in force is a deep movement ahead of the main body designed "to discover and test enemy dispositions, composition, strength, and intentions." Usually conducted by battalion-sized or larger forces, reconnaissances in force expect an enemy to react to their presence thereby "revealing his weapons, troop location, and planned use of resources."¹²⁰

A raid, on the other hand, "is a deliberate attack that includes a planned withdrawal from the objective. Raids are done to destroy or capture enemy personnel or equipment, rescue friendly personnel, gain intelligence, or gain the initiative."¹²¹ Ewald participated in both and they severely tested his and his troopers' physical and mental stamina.

Concerning raids, Ewald offers sage advice at the beginning of chapter 8: "Raids are among those actions of war which, if successful, will dishearten the enemy, cause him lots of trouble, and gradually wear him down. They also demand lots of cleverness and speed in their execution though, great prudence and knowledge of the country and a safe retreat, in a word, a thorough acquaintance with war."¹²²

What is most interesting in Ewald's treatment of raids is his use of an American Revolution example—the French attack on the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius in 1781. He did not participate in this event; it happened after he had surrendered at Yorktown. It may well have been the subject of conversations between Ewald and his French captors. The example fits neatly into his axiom that "the farther you are away from the enemy, the more successful your raids will be, because many a man deems himself safe because of the great distance to the enemy."¹²³

It is ironic that one of his best American Revolution examples violates this axiom. British Major General Sir Charles Grey's night light infantry

attack on Major General Anthony Wayne's American forces near Paoli, Pennsylvania, in September 1777, was conducted from close proximity to the American position.¹²⁴ Yet the maxim of the best raids being conducted at a distance from the expected enemy concentration is generally true.

In chapter 7, Ewald's discussion of reconnaissance is much more limiting than current U.S. Army doctrine. He focused on reconnoitering an enemy camp or battle position to determine enemy strength and dispositions, rather than the much larger implications of "in force" in the definition. At the same time, Ewald's example of how 100 *jäger* forced General Washington to bring his whole encampment to arms, demonstrates exactly what current doctrine calls for when it seeks to force an opponent to reveal his position and his planned reaction scenario through the reconnaissance in force.¹²⁵

In all of his discussion of *jäger* operations, Ewald emphasizes the need for individual and group self-reliance and agility. The key to light infantry success is a capacity to react quickly and aggressively to the unexpected. In war, he writes, "everything depends on well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers."¹²⁶

Ewald understands that well-trained soldiers require officer professional education. In his 1785 *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*: "an officer will do very well if he learns in peacetime so much that he can be used for any kind of service when in the field."¹²⁷ In his time this meant primarily self-education, rather than formal military schooling, which modern military forces require of all officers. Ewald echoes this sentiment in his *Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops*: "an officer should study his profession in his youth; for from the least carelessness, or the least fault in war, whole provinces, and indeed whole nations may be lost."¹²⁸ Echoing this sentiment is the U.S. Marine Corps' insistence on the commander's responsibility to oversee the professional development of his subordinates and every marine's "basic responsibility to study the profession of arms on his own."¹²⁹

Terrain Analysis

Terrain appreciation is one of those fundamentals of light infantry operations that receives strong emphasis in Ewald's writings. Throughout the *Treatise* there are frequent references to the need for "an exact knowledge of the country" in which operations are being conducted. For instance, if the light infantry commander notices "that the enemy in a mountainous terrain neglects the heights towering over the valleys and roads through which he is marching, this is where you can carry out the best raids."¹³⁰ Enemy movement through "great forests" allows the *jäger* commander the opportunity to "embitter [the enemy's] life

very much."¹³¹ "If the leader of a light corps . . . knows the terrain," Ewald concludes, he can exploit the situation to his best advantage.¹³²

Modern doctrine places equally as much attention on terrain analysis as part of what is now called "intelligence preparation of the battlefield." Regardless of its nomenclature, the function is to reduce the uncertainty that topographical features might have upon operations and to incorporate the knowledge derived into the operational plan.¹³³

Ewald conducted terrain analysis in a variety of ways. Particularly important was a map reconnaissance. This would be supplemented by personal reconnaissance and patrols, interviews with local citizens, the use of local persons as guides, and information from spies, prisoners, and deserters. Disregarding such intelligence information can be critical. Ewald points out where such "negligence and laxity . . . cost the Crown of England the best posts and whole corps during the American war."¹³⁴

Adaptability

Adaptability is a cardinal precept in Ewald's thinking. "[O]ne has to act according to the circumstances," he admonishes his readers.¹³⁵ Night marches and night attacks are frequently mentioned by Ewald as ideal means of achieving surprise: "A daring enemy can easily make a strong march during long nights and be at one's throat at daybreak."¹³⁶ During night attacks the confused enemy "beholds every thing double through fear, and trees and hedges will at this time be taken for men."¹³⁷ Similarly a "mist, a strong wind with rain, or a fall of snow, are the opportunities which may contribute to . . . success in a surprise."¹³⁸

Surprise is the single most critical asset the light infantryman can utilize since his firepower capacity is limited. The capacity to inflict casualties at the unexpected place, time, or direction is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of successful light infantry operations. Ewald devotes a full chapter to ambushes as the most likely feature of light infantry surprises. Most of his examples are devoted to American ambushes of British-Hessian forces, particularly in the New Jersey no-man's land between the encamped armies of 1777/78.

British foraging parties outside the outposts surrounding the New York City garrison were especially susceptible to ambush. One ambush near New Brunswick, New Jersey, shortly after the battles of Trenton and Princeton, caused the abandonment of much of the foraged materials plus the wagons and horses on which they were loaded.¹³⁹

An interesting variant on what is now called a "baited attack" occurred about the same time near Millstone (Somerset Court House), New Jersey. American soldiers disguised as farmers drove cattle near British positions. "As long as everything was plentiful nobody was

tempted by cows, yet after a few days, once roast beef became rarer, all precautions were forgotten" and elements of a unit went after them. The result was that half of the foragers were lost.¹⁴⁰

All of this endorses central themes in the U.S. Army light infantry doctrine manuals. "Light infantry battalions prefer to attack under cover of darkness and bad weather, using approaches that are impossible or unlikely for other troops."¹⁴¹ The ambush is perceived as "an excellent technique to destroy enemy forces"¹⁴² by light infantrymen. The U.S. Marine Corps insists its leaders prepare "to cope—even better, to thrive—in an environment of chaos, uncertainty, constant change, and friction."¹⁴³

Innovation

Innovation and improvisation were hallmarks of Ewald's tactics. He loved to use the ruse to draw an enemy into an ambush. Near Yorktown one of his lieutenants and thirty men "pulled their shirts over their coats, the leather straps and belts over that, and wore their hats pulled down like the Americans, in order to look like the American militia." This allowed them to approach Virginia militiamen and to kill, wound, or capture a larger number of opponents than themselves.¹⁴⁴ Another successful tactic was to lull the enemy into a false sense of security through numerous false alarms and then suddenly attack when the enemy ignored indications of impending combat.¹⁴⁵

At the same time, Ewald was a victim of American innovations in the use of light infantrymen, particularly the Pennsylvania and Virginia riflemen. During many marches and outpost duty assignments, the Hessians found themselves harassed by "a handful of riflemen . . . who individually annoyed our columns, and advance and rearguards." During such sniping encounters, Ewald observed that he had seen few of the enemy killed and that his troops, "on the contrary, always lost many."¹⁴⁶ In fact, the Hessian believed that had General Washington employed more such units with greater discipline, "the English would have been forced to have given up the war in the second year, and Washington would not have been obliged to have fought a single battle."¹⁴⁷

Ewald always emphasizes the need for an officer to innovate and to expand upon his specific directives. Accordingly, he never confined his "reconnoitering to the worded orders, to accomplish the utmost what was entrusted to me: but . . . always went farther, in order to see or to do nothing by halves." The officer, he observes, "who will only do that in war which he is ordered, and will hazard no more, especially when leading a light corps, does scarcely any thing, and can by no means be reckoned a useful officer."¹⁴⁸ Marine Corps commandant Gray insists

that the first ingredient in his philosophy of command is that "subordinate commanders must make decisions on their own initiative, based on their understanding of their senior's intent, rather than passing information up the chain of command and waiting for the decision to be passed down." The successful commander, he argues, exploits "human traits such as boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, and imagination."¹⁴⁹ Obviously Ewald's writings confirm Gray's admonitions.

Combined Forces

One critical aspect of modern military doctrinal concerns regarding light infantry units is their potential for integration with other arms—heavy infantry, armor (or, in Ewald's day, cavalry), and artillery. Many have argued that light infantry cannot keep up with or sustain itself in the type of combat environment envisioned in Central Europe or the Middle East, where large, heavy fire-powered armored forces dominate any wartime scenario.

One of the architects of the light infantry concept that emerged after Vietnam was General William E. DuPuy. His contention is that "Light infantry is a unique, indispensable element of a balanced fighting force."¹⁵⁰ If it is kept in the confined tactical environment in which it operates best, the light infantry unit can be an important component to the armored and mechanized forces that constitute critical elements in the modern battlefield.

Echoing this sentiment is General John R. Galvin, current Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who understands the reluctance to mix light and heavy forces, but who contends that the need for a tactically diverse force structure and the economic constraints on the maintenance of an all-armored army require an integration of the two types of forces. Two Army colonels with extensive command experience at the battalion and brigade levels argue that the need for mixing light and heavy forces is essential and can be accomplished.¹⁵¹

Ewald's writings endorse such arguments. In fact, nothing so typifies the Hessian's tactical manual than the combination of light infantry and light cavalry. Throughout his commentaries their combination constitutes a critical employment concept. In addition, he continuously advocates the utilization of heavy infantry and occasionally recommends the addition of artillery in combination with his *jäger*.

But because the Hessian is more concerned with the autonomy of *jäger* formations, he never addresses the combined arms team on the formal eighteenth-century battlefield as the writings of DuPuy and Galvin do for the contemporary one. Thus while he devotes numerous chapters to advance and rearguard operations, to outpost duty, to reconnaissance, and to ambushes, Ewald avoids discussing the interopera-

ability of light and heavy units on the battlefield. While understandable given his desire to justify the maintenance of *jäger* units, this omission leaves a hole in light infantry utilization that deserves discussion. As such it probably constitutes the greatest weakness in Ewald's commentaries.

Nonetheless, Ewald made an important contribution to the literature on eighteenth-century light infantry tactics. This introduction, translation, and notes are designed to bring his contributions to a wider public than they have been heretofore.

Notes

A Note on the Translation

1. This short biography is based on the introduction to Johann Ewald, *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). The quotes, characterizations of Ewald by Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe, General von Knyphausen, and Baron von Liliencron are taken from pp. xxi and xxiv. The last quote, taken from p. xxxi, is a characterization of Ewald by Tustin. Since Ewald was not elevated to the nobility until 1790, the *von* is parenthetical.

2. Ewald, *Diary*, p. 355.

3. Johann Ewald, *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg* (Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer, 1785). The book consists of 158 pages of text organized into three parts: an introduction (pp. 3–9), eleven chapters of text (pp. 10–136), and an appendix (pp. 137–58). It is extremely rare today; it is not listed by the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC), and the *National Union Catalog. Pre-1956 Imprints*, 754 vols. (London/Chicago: Mansell, 1968–1981), 164:358, lists only the Newberry Library in Chicago as owning a copy. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are ours.

The second edition bore the title *Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen* (Flensburg, Schleswig, Leipzig: Korten und Boie, 1790). It is considerably larger, containing 308 pages of text vs. 158 pages for the first edition. See here the *Vorrede*, pp. vii–viii.

4. Published in Schleswig by J. G. Röhlß in 1796. The English translation has the title *A Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops. By Colonel Johann von Ewald* [sic] (London: T. Egerton, 1803). It will be quoted hereafter as Maimburg, *Treatise*, in distinction to the treatise translated here.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vorlesungen über den Kleinen Krieg*, in *Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe*, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966), p. 446. The "Instructionen für die Leichten

Truppen" by Hans David Ludwig von York is reprinted in Carl Friedrich Gumtau, *Die Jäger und Schützen des Preussischen Heeres*, 3 vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1834-1838), 3:77-120. On pp. 116-19 York mentions Ewald and his book approvingly.

6. *Jenaer Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung* no. 352 (1790). Quoted in Peter Paret, "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 37 (1964):47-59, note 2.

The works mentioned here are by Thomas Auguste le Roy de Grandmaison (1715-1801), whose *La petite guerre, ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne*, 2 vols. (Paris: n.p., 1756) was one of the most widely read treatises on the *petite guerre*. Frederick the Great greatly appreciated this work, which was reprinted in 1766 and translated into English in 1777. A German translation appeared in Berlin as late as 1809. Grandmaison joined the Regiment de Bearn in 1737, but transferred into a free corps in 1741. A lieutenant colonel by 1748, he formed the Volontaires de Hainault in March 1757 and fought valiantly throughout the Seven Years' War, which he ended as a *maréchal de camp*, the equivalent of the rank of major general. He retired with this rank in 1781. A short biography of him can be found in the *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française*, 17 vols. to date (Paris: Letonzey et Ane, 1933-), 16:985-86.

Very little is known about Louis de Jeney, whose *Le partisan, ou l'art de faire la petite guerre avec succès selon le génie de nos jours* (La Haye: H. Constapel, 1759) was one of the most widely read books on the *petite guerre* in the eighteenth century. Even Thomas Jefferson owned a copy of the book in the English translation of 1760. Another English translation appeared in 1769; German translations were published in Stuttgart in 1765 and in Vienna in 1785. On the title page of the book he is styled a captain and *Ingenieur-Geographe dans l'Etat Major de l'Armée Française sur le Bas Rhin*. In 1760 he entered Prussian service and led a corps of irregular troops, the Volontaires d'Ostfriesie, during the Seven Years' War. In 1765 he submitted a memorandum entitled *Les chevaux de Frise ambulantes* to Frederick the Great.

7. Saldern, Tielke, and Lloyd as well as their works are identified in the notes to the introduction to the translation. The reader is referred to the relevant notes there.

8. A German edition in two volumes was published in Leipzig by J. F. Gleditsch in 1753 and 1754 under the title *Des Herrn Marschalls von Puysegur Grundsätze der Kriegskunst*.

9. Lancelot Comte Turpin de Crissé (1716-1795), *Essay sur l'art de la guerre*, 2 vols. (Paris: Prault, 1754). An English translation appeared in 1761, a German translation in 1756. Ewald was particularly interested in part 5 of the book, entitled "On Hussars and Light Troops."

10. The most important works of Jean Louis Le Cointe (b. 1729) are his *La science des postes militaires, ou Traité des fortifications de campagne, à l'usage des officiers particulieres d'infanterie qui sont détachés à la guerre* (Paris: Desaint & Saillant, 1759), an English translation of which appeared in 1761, and the *Commentaires sur la Retraite des dix-mille de Xénophon; ou, Nouveau traité de la guerre, à l'usage des jeunes officiers*, 2 vols. (Paris: Nyon, 1765). Ewald had read both of them.

11. Karl August Struensee von Carlsbach (1735-1804) published, among

others, the *Anfangsgründe der Artillerie* (Leipzig: D. Siegert, 1760) and the *Anfangsgründe der Kriegsbaukunst*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: D. Siegerts sel. Witwe, 1771–1774). Both works were frequently reprinted and translated into English in 1800.

12. Jean Charles de Folard (1669–1752), *De la guerre des Partisans*, written in the late 1680s, circulated as a manuscript only. Ewald, however, most certainly had read the *L'esprit de chevalier Folard tiré de ses commentaires sur l'Histoire de Polybe pour l'usage d'un officier* (Paris: Pour la Compagnie des Libraires, 1760), an extract of which was compiled and published by Frederick the Great in 1760.

13. Maurice, Comte de Saxe (1696–1750), *Les Rêveries, ou Mémoires sur l'art de la guerre*, was first published in two volumes (La Haye: P. Gosse, 1756), and frequently reprinted and translated over the next several years.

14. The *Bellona: Ein militairisches Journal* was published in twenty parts in Dresden from 1781 to 1787 and contained, among others, a piece entitled "Vom Dienst der leichten Kavallerie im Felde, besonders vor den Subaltern-Offizier" (part 3, 1784).

15. On de La Croix, see chapter 1, note 11. The *Traité* was first published in 1752; a German translation appeared in the *Kriegesbibliothek oder Gesammlete Beyträge zur Krieges-Wissenschaft*, 20 *Versuche* (Breslau, 1755–1772), *Erster Versuch* (1755), pp. 105–132. Other works on the *petite guerre* published here include the "Auszug aus des de Ville Gouverneur von Partheyen," in *Zweiter Versuch* (1755), an excerpt of which is probably the oldest manual on the *petite guerre*, first published in 1674, and Graf G. Basta, "Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Reiterrey," *Vierter Versuch* (1759), which had first been published in Italian in Venice in 1612 as *Il Governo della cavalleria leggiera*. For a discussion of these early works, see Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornnehmlich in Deutschland*, 3 vols. (New York/Hildesheim: Johnson and Georg Olms, repr. 1966), 3:1478 (Folard), 1052 (Basta), and the chapter "Leichte Truppen und Kleiner Krieg," pp. 2710–26.

16. Compare Ewald, *Gedanken*, p. 3, and his *Treatise*, p. 64, *et passim*. All page numbers referring to Ewald's *Treatise on Partisan Warfare* are those in the translation published here rather than those of the German original.

17. Compare Grandmaison in the German translation *Der Kleine Krieg oder Abhandlung von dem Dienste der Leichten Truppen im Felde* (Copenhagen: Roth, 1762), p. 31.

18. See *Die Kriegsschule, oder die Theorie eines jungen Kriegsmannes in allen militairischen Unternehmungen, aus den berühmtesten Kriegsbüchern gezogen und zusammengesetzt von einem kaiserl. königl. Hauptmann der Infanterie* (Vienna: n.p., 1777), p. 137. Here the sequence states that the leader of an irregular corps "must know how to perform on a small scale what the commanding general of the army does on a large scale. . . . The greatest generals of this century have commanded such corps. This has been their school."

19. Georg von Wissel, *Der Jäger im Felde, oder Kurze Abhandlung wie der Dienst bei leichten Truppen im Felde zu verrichten* (Göttingen: J. C. Dieterich, 1778), wrote that "the so-called partisan war has raised the greatest generals, since you learn in it on a small scale that which you can later perform on a large scale with the greatest usefulness." (The quote is taken from the second edition of 1784, p. 3).

20. This paragraph is closely based on the discussion given in Ernst A. Legahn, "Preußische Partisanen," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 18 (1968):159-75.

The rulers of Europe did not always welcome the participation of their peoples in warfare. Even General Gideon Ernst Freiherr von Laudon (1717-1790), one of the creators of the Austrian irregular forces, wrote in 1758 that "all peasants are ready to take up arms and to attack the enemy, and thus wish nothing more than to be led into battle." He considered this to be rather dangerous, "since this might lead to a peasant war" (quoted in Johannes Kunisch, *Der Kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus* [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973], p. 20, note 45).

21. For a closer discussion on the concepts of regular versus irregular troops as well as the role of ideology in the American Revolutionary War, see our introductory essay.

22. Charles W. Ingrao, "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: The Kuruc War (1703-1711)," in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, eds. Béla K. Király and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), p. 48.

23. Max Braubach, "Der bayerische Bauernaufstand von 1705/06," in *Erbe und Verpflichtung* (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), pp. 175-91. The most recent comprehensive treatment of the issues raised here is Winfried Schulze, ed., *Europäische Bauernrevollen der frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), with an excellent bibliography.

24. Ian K. Steele, *Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689-1760* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969).

25. Russell F. Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970).

26. Mark V. Kwasny, "Partisan War in the Middle States: The Militia and the American War Effort around the British Stronghold of New York City, 1775-1783" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1989).

27. Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses Vollständiges Universal Lexicon*, 64 vols. in 63 plus 4 suppl. (Leipzig and Halle: J. H. Zedler, 1732-1750), 26:1050.

28. Jacques Marie Ray de Saint Geniès (1712-1777), *L'Officier Partisan*, 6 vols. (Paris: n.p., 1763-1768).

29. Georg Baron de Wüst, *L'Art militaire d'un partisan* (La Haye: n.p., 1768). Wüst, a self-styled baron, was a German who had served with the French army in India.

30. Capitaine Oré, "Fischer et l'origine des Chasseurs," *Revue de Cavalerie* 51 (August/September 1910): 512-61. In 1748, the Duke de Luynes called Johann Christian Fischer (1713-1762), "un de nos fameux partisans" in his diary (*ibid.*, p. 518).

31. Antoine de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, *Memoirs Historical and Military*, 2 vols. (London: By the Translator, 1735/36).

32. Ray de Saint Geniès, *L'Officier Partisan*, quoted in Robert B. Asprey, *Fredrick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma* (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1986), p. 184, note *.

33. Quoted in Charles Royster, *Light-Horse Harry Lee and the Legacy of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 21.

34. George Smith, *An Universal Military Dictionary* (London: J. Millan, 1779), p. 199.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
36. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 10 vols. (Edinburgh: J. Balfour, 1778–1783), 10:8840.
37. John Graves Simcoe, *A Journal of the Operations of The Queen's Rangers, from the End of the Year 1777, to the Conclusion of the Late American War* (Exeter: For the Author, 1787), quoted in Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions", *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal* 62 (1952): 222, note *.
38. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 20 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), s.v. "Partisan."
39. Roger Stevenson, *Military Instructions for Officers detached in the field: Containing a Scheme for Forming A Corps of a Partisan. Illustrated with plans of the manoeuvres necessary in carrying on the petite guerre* (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1770).
40. Louis de Jeney, *The Partisan: or, The Art of making war in detachment* (London: R. Griffiths, 1760). See also titles like Andreas Emmerich, *Partisan in War, or, The use of a corps of light troops to an army* (London: n.p., 1789).
41. Peter Paret to David C. Skaggs, July 24, 1990, in the editors' files.
42. Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State* (New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 188–92; and *York and the Era of Prussian Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 21, note 36, with a brief discussion of the problems involved with the translation.
43. Béla K. Király, "War and Society in Western and East Central Europe: Similarities and Contrasts," in Király and Rothenberg, eds., *War and Society*, pp. 1–36.
44. John Keegan to Robert A. Selig, October 31, 1990, in the editors' files.
45. Walter Laqueur, "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975): 341–82. Following the example of these authors we have not insisted on the term "partisan warfare" in the translation but use it concurrently with "small war" and "little war."
46. Jean Louis Le Cointe, *The Science of Military Posts, for the Use of Military Officers, who frequently command Detached Parties. Translated from the French. By an Officer.* (London: T. Payne, 1761).
47. Quoted in Gumtau, *Jäger und Schützen*, 3:97.
48. Rodney Atwood, *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 131.
49. See the translation of Grandmaison as *A Treatise, on the military service, of light horse, and light infantry, in the field, and in fortified places* (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1777), or the title of Roger Stevenson's book. Similarly for today see Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Essay* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), pp. 100–101: "The theory of small warfare (*petite guerre*) has its origins in the seventeenth century."
50. See, for example, Werner Hahlweg, *Guerilla: Krieg ohne Fronten* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968); Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1975); and Lewis H. Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971).

Introductory Essay

1. On the general background of war in the eighteenth century, see John Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983); Robert S. Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Tactics in Eighteenth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); Hugh C. B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977); Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); and Matthew S. Anderson, *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). Gerhard Papke, *Von der Miliz zum stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen des Absolutismus* (Munich: Bernhard und Graefe, 1979), analyzes the changing role of the military in society.

The basic work on light infantry in the eighteenth century, particularly in Austria, is Johannes Kunisch, *Der Kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973). For the Prussian side, see Rolf-Eberhard Griebel, *Historische Studien zu Gotthold Ephraim Lessings "Minna von Barnhelm oder das Soldatenglück"* (Diss. Phil., Würzburg, 1978). A list of Prussian irregular troops can be found in Günther Gieraths, *Die Kampfhandlungen der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Armee, 1626-1807* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964), pp. 326-40. Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964), thoroughly analyzes the social background of the officer corps of irregular and regular light troops.

2. Werner Hahlweg, *Guerilla: Krieg ohne Fronten* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), p. 26.

3. In February 1759, Frederick decreed that "it is not customary to give free battalions a winter allowance. They find their allowance in enemy territory, where they loot and plunder, which other regiments are forbidden to do by regulations." In January 1758, the *Freikorps* Mayr plundered Schloss Brühl, and after both General Friedrich Christoph von Saldern and Colonel J. F. A. von der Marwitz had refused to plunder Schloss Hubertusburg, the *Freikorps* Quintus Icilius did the work for them. See Peter Paret, *York and the Era of Prussian Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 32.

4. Georg von Wissel, *Der Jäger im Felde, oder Kurze Abhandlung wie der Dienst bei leichten Truppen im Felde zu verrichten* (Göttingen: J. C. Dieterich, 1784), p. 1.

Martin L. Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Regular Soldiers during the Seven Years' War," *Canadian Historical Review* 70 (1989): 53-75, suggested a definition of "irregular" as light troops "without extensive formal military training" and as standing outside the military establishment. Light infantry he defined as "formally trained light troops who were often regulars rather than militia or auxiliaries" (p. 54, note 2). The emphasis on formal training is somewhat misleading since the very absence of formal training often determined the effectiveness of such troops. After a reading of de La Croix' *Traité*, the Prince de Ligne remarked that each of the Austrian Croats knew as much about the irregular war almost by instinct and could add any number of ruses that de La Croix had not even heard of. Quoted in

Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland*, 3 vols. (New York/Hildesheim: Johnson and Georg Olms, repr. 1966), 3:2712.

5. Maurice de Saxe's *Les Rêveries ou Mémoires sur l'Art de la Guerre* was written in 1732 and circulated for decades in manuscript form before publication in La Haye in 1756, and in Paris, Mannheim, and Dresden in 1757. The first English translation (London, 1757) was reprinted in 1759 and 1776; a German translation appeared in 1767.

6. Werner Hahlweg, ed., *Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966), p. 231; from "Einleitung in den Kleinen Krieg."

7. Ibid., p. 235.

8. Ibid., p. 237. See also Carl von Decker, *Der kleine Krieg im Geist der neueren Kriegführung* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1844), p. 19: "With the troops of the little war, everything is tactics, nothing strategic. They only exist for the sake of the whole; where the whole ceases to exist, their existence also ends. A big war without a little war is possible, a little war without a big war is not." These lines clearly reflect the thinking of the nineteenth century. The book was first published in 1822; the quote is from the fourth edition.

9. We are following here the outline given by Clausewitz in Hahlweg, *Clausewitz*, pp. 234–35. Clausewitz wrote that in the little war "there exists a much larger fear of danger than in the big war. The individual hussar and jäger . . . trusts in himself and in his good luck" (p. 237).

10. Ibid., p. 228.

11. Maurice de Saxe's *Mémoires* are based on his Polish experiences in the early eighteenth century. On the Thököly revolt and the involvement of France, see Béla K. Király, "War and Society in Western and East Central Europe: Similarities and Contrasts," in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, eds. Béla K. Király and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979), pp. 1–36, especially pp. 10ff. On the *Cossaks*, see "Cossaks and Warfare," in *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, eds. Gunther E. Rothenberg et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 451–514.

The background of these troops is clearly expressed in their names. *Pandur* is derived from old Serbian, where it means constable, bailiff, guardian of the public peace, a watcher of fields and vineyards. Hungarian *huszar* means free-booter; Turkish *dragon* means pauper, scum. *Cossak* as derived from Turkii *quz-zag* (adventurer, freebooter) is a cultural construct rather than a linguistic explanation of the term.

12. Antoine de Ville, *Von Partheyen*. Quoted in Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, p. 25.

13. Antoine de Pas, Marquis de Feuquières, *Mémoires sur la Guerre*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1730; originally published in 1711), was reprinted in French in Paris in 1731 and in London in 1736. A two-volume English translation appeared in the same year. His *Mémoires historiques et militaires*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1735) was published as *Memoirs Historical and Military* in two volumes in London in 1735/36 and in a German translation in Leipzig in 1738. The quotes are from Béla K. Király, "War and Society," p. 9.

14. On the *Kuruc* war, see Charles W. Ingrao, "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: The *Kuruc* War (1703–1711)," in Király and Rothenberg, eds.,

War and Society, pp. 46–66. In arming the peasantry and the promise of personal freedom and tax exemptions for participants, Rákoszi challenged the feudal foundations of Hungarian society and was considerably more radical than Washington and the American revolutionaries, who did not want to risk a popular revolt that could turn against them. See also Agnes Varkonyi, "Rákóczi's War of Independence and the Peasantry" in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*, eds. Janos M. Bak and Béla K. Király (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), pp. 369–92.

15. John T. Alexander, *Catherine the Great: Life and Legend* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 11.

16. Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Habsburg Military Border System: Some Reconsiderations," in Király and Rothenberg, eds., *War and Society*, pp. 361–92, especially p. 367. On the *Grenzer* (border people), see in particular Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522–1747* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960).

17. These figures are taken from Paret, *York*, p. 24.

18. Quoted in Kunisch, *Kleine Krieg*, p. 29, note 9.

19. Quoted in Capitaine Oré, "Fischer et l'origine des Chasseurs," *Revue de Cavalerie* 51 (August–September 1910): 514.

20. Quoted in Kunisch, *Kleine Krieg*, p. 27. Robert Donkin wrote in 1777 about "the cowardliness of the rebels, who delight more in murdering from woods, walls, and houses, than in shewing any genius or science in the art military." Quoted in Rodney Atwood, *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 131.

21. In its # 950, January 25, 1763, p. 88. Ewald had quite a different opinion of the British Legion, which he mentioned repeatedly, and approvingly, in his *Treatise*.

22. Quoted in Griebel, *Minna von Barnhelm*, p. 150. A bit later Frederick writes: "To the free battalions I assign competent and determined officers . . . who are however scoundrels and not really suitable for good line regiments." Quoted in Paret, *York*, p. 32.

23. Quoted in Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions," *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal* 62 (1952): 221. For Alexander Graydon in 1776, the officers of the American Light Infantry were "for the most part young and insolent puppies," who served in "their most appropriate destination next to the gallows" (*ibid.*, p. 216).

24. On the transfer of East European concepts to the West, see André Corvisier, "Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Rothenberg et al., eds., *East European Society*, pp. 515–48.

25. Lee Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years' War* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 49.

26. See John A. Houlding, *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 91–92; Daniel Beattie, "The Adaptation of the British Army to the Wilderness Warfare," in *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Maarten Ultee (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1986), pp. 56–83, especially p. 71.

On alternatives, see C. T. Atkinson, "The Highlanders in Westphalia, 1760–1762," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 20 (1940/41): 208–23. The basic work on British Light Infantry is still J. F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1925), but see also Hugh C. B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 200–237. Rogers uses the term *petite guerre* (p. 233).

Gage's Regiment of Light Armed Foot was disbanded in 1763, re-raised in 1778, disbanded again in 1784, and reestablished in 1794. The uneasiness of the British military with the irregular troops as a consequence of this early institutionalization of the concept made it more difficult for them to adapt to revolutionary war. This is clearly expressed in the attitude of General John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, in 1757, toward Rogers' Rangers: "'till Regular Officers with men they can trust, learn to beat the woods, & act as Irregulars, you can never gain any certain intelligence of the Enemy." Quoted in Beattie, *Adaptation*, p. 70. In early 1758, General John Forbes wrote: "I must confess in this country, we must comply and learn the Art of Warr, from Ennemy Indians" (ibid, p. 72, note 43). Robert Rogers, *Journals of Major Robert Rogers: Containing An Account of the several Excursions he made . . . upon the Continent of North America* (London: J. Millan, 1765), with its nineteen rules for irregular warfare, is an invaluable source for the early history of these concepts in America.

The first regular light infantry on the American side was formed in 1777. See John W. Wright, "The Corps of Light Infantry in the Continental Army," *American Historical Review* 31 (1926): 454–61; Robert K. Wright, Jr., *The Continental Army* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983), pp. 149–51, 160–61, 167, 170, 195.

27. See Otto Heym, *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen Reitenden Feldjäger-corps von 1740–1919* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1926); and Malte Bardt, *Geschichte der Feldjägertruppe* (Ms Feldjägerbataillon 740, Mainz, 1980). I am grateful to Major Hans Konze for providing me with a copy of this manuscript. See also Carl E. Kielmann, *Die Entstehung der Jägertruppe im deutschen und preussischen Heere* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1883); Claus von Bredow, *Historische Rang- und Stammliste des deutschen Heeres*, 2 vols. (repr. Osnabrück: Biblio, 1972), 1:256–57; and Paret, *York*, pp. 29–31.

28. A short biography of Des Granges can be found in Kurt von Priesdorff, *Soldatisches Führertum*, 10 vols. (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt [1936?]), 2:242–44.

29. Paret, *York*, p. 40.

30. Quoted in Wilhelm Dürr, "Deutsches Blut für die Verteidigung fremder Rechte," *Die Frankenwarte* 40 (1938): 1.

31. Saxony even placed its *jäger* under the direction of the Interior Ministry, not the War Ministry. See *Der Feldjäger. Zeitschrift der Kameradschaft der Feldjäger e.V.* (1989) 22, p. 1. Ewald, for whom *jäger* as light infantry were combat troops, did not mention this additional duty in his *Treatise*.

32. For Bückeburg, see Georg Wilhelm von Düring, *Geschichte des Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburgischen Karabinier- und Jäger-Corps; Ein Beitrag zur Lehre des Kleinen Krieges, in Beispielen ausgezeichneten Waffenthaten dieses Korps, während des siebenjährigen Krieges* (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1828); for Nassau, see Siegfried Mol-

denhauer, *Geschichte des Kurhessischen Jäger-Bataillons Nr. 11* (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1913), 1. Teil: Geschichte der Stammtruppen bis 1866, pp. 11–15; for Brunswick, see Otto Elster, *Geschichte der stehenden Truppen im Herzogtum Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1899–1910), 1:388–95.

For other states, see Jähns, *Geschichte*, 2:1235. On August 18, 1761, Russian Field-Marshal Rumyantsev ordered the establishment of a corps of 1,040 light infantry, modeled after the Prussian *jäger*. Just like in Central Europe, the rank and file of these troops were to be drawn from hunters and be employed "in woods, villages, ravines and similar broken terrain where they could take advantage of the ground" (Christopher Duffy, *Russia's Military Way to the West* [London and Boston: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1981], pp. 120–21). Initially organized in two battalions of five companies each, these regular light troops were organized in six battalions in 1774. By the end of Catherine's reign they had been augmented to forty battalions. See also Bruce W. Menning, "Russian Military Innovation in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," *War and Society* 2 (1984): 23–42.

33. See Wilhelm Rüstow, *Geschichte der Infanterie*, 2 vols. (Nordhausen, 1864; repr. Wiesbaden: RTL Verlag, 1981), 2:281–82. For British experiments with sharpshooters, see Stephen G. Strach, "A Memoir of the Exploits of Captain Alexander Fraser and the Company of British Marksmen 1776–1777," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 63 (1985): 91–98, 164–79.

34. Rothenberg in Király and Rothenberg, eds. *War and Society*, p. 378. On the reasons for and consequences of these policies, see in particular Kunisch, *Kleine Krieg*, p. 34.

35. For the early history of the Hessian *jäger*, see Georg Heinz Wetzel, *Die Hessischen Jäger* (Kassel: George, 1987), pp. 12–17. Besides Wetzel see also Moldenhauer, *Geschichte*, pp. 3–10; von Lepel-Spangenberg, *Geschichte des kurfürstlich hessischen jägerbataillons* (Kassel: n.p., 1853); Carl von Stamford, "Das stehende hessische Heer von 1670–1866," *Das Hessenland* 14 (1900); and Bredow, *Rang- und Stammliste*, 1:608–10; 2:1041–64.

36. Wetzel, *Jäger*, p. 8. See also Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg Bestand 4 h 3488, fol. 5. (Hereafter referred to as HSM).

37. Jähns, *Kriegswissenschaften*, 2:1235–36.

38. "Autobiography of Thomas Raymond," *Royal Historical Society Camden, 3d Series* 28 (1917), p. 39.

39. Carl Friedrich Gumtau, *Die Jäger und Schützen des Preussischen Heeres*, 3 vols. (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1834–1838), III, Nachtrag 1, places the first Prussian *jäger* in the years 1656/1657. Like their Hessian counterparts they were commanded by their chief foresters and disbanded at the end of hostilities.

40. HSM Bestand 4 h 3425.

41. These *Chasseur* companies were reconstituted, on a temporary basis, during the American war. See Peter F. Copeland and Albert W. Haarmann, "The Provisional Chasseur Companies of Hesse-Cassel during the Revolutionary War," *Military Collector and Historian* 18 (1958): 11–13.

Johann Gottlieb Rall (d. 1776) joined the Hessian regiment von Donop as a cadet in 1740, and became a lieutenant in 1745 and a captain in 1753. During the Seven Years' War he took part in every major battle from Hastenbeck to

Wilhelmstal. A major in 1760, he led the "Chasseurs d'Armée" for the remainder of the war. In 1763 he transferred to the Regiment von Stein as a lieutenant colonel and received the regiment von Mansbach in 1772, to which he had transferred the previous year. From September 1771 to August 1772 he took part in the Russian war against Turkey. In 1776 he left with his regiment for the American colonies, where he fell at the Battle of Trenton. See *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (1888), 27: 191-92. (Hereafter referred to as *ADB*.)

42. HSM Bestand 10a/69, fol 369ff. The deliberations on the project began in April 1774; eventually the corps was to be four companies strong.

At the same time additional light troops in the form of a *Carabinier Corps zu Fuß* of 6 companies were raised on September 2, 1774, under Lieutenant Colonel Carl Levin von Wintzingerode, numbering 234 men at the time of its dissolution on January 1, 1783. On November 11, 1777, a *Chevaux Legers Corps* was formed, which was 74 men strong when it was dissolved on December 1, 1785. See HSM Bestand 4 h 3425.

43. HSM Bestand 4 h 3425. In December 1777, the authorized strength of the Hessen-Kassel *jäger* was increased from 2 companies (4/12/108 plus a 12-man staff) to 1,067 men in 5 companies on foot and one mounted of 175 men each (plus staff). It never reached that strength, but usually had some 500 men on active duty. Only in cooperation with *jäger* troops from the other German states did the *Jäger Corps* exceed 1,000 men. A return for September 5, 1781, showed 624 fit for duty in New York, 274 serving in the South, 184 sick, and 16 prisoners. The total strength for the corps, not including the troops from Ansbach, was 18 officers, 17 servants, 13 staff, and 1,047 NCOs and privates (Atwood, *Hessians*, p. 137, note 88). Brunswick sent one company 4 officers and 143 men strong, Hessen-Hanau 3 companies with a strength of 342 officers and men, Anspach 3 companies, 12 officers, and 291 men strong. After Yorktown it was reconstituted 339 men strong. In the HSM, see in particular Bestand 4 h 3118, *Journal des verstorbenen Obersten von Donop vom Feldjägercorps*; 4 h 3779, *Konvention über das zu überlassende Jägercorps, 1776/77*; 4 h 3782, *Briefe König Georgs III von England betreffs Stellung des Jägercorps, 1776/77*; 4 h 4069 I and II, *Recruitment of jäger 1776 and 1777*. Part 1 includes a printed recruiting poster dated November 19, 1776. Handschrift E 195/2, ca. 1786, contains watercolors of the uniforms of all Hessian troops employed in America, including the *jäger*.

Georg Heinz Wetzel, *Das Hochfürstlich Hessische Feld-Jaeger Corps im Operationsgeschehen des Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1776 bis 1783)* (Kassel: George, 1991), p. 112, gives the designated strength of the Feld-Jäger Corps in November 1777 as 1,028 officers and men, its effective strength before Yorktown as between 800 and 1,000 men, and after that date as around 700 officers and men. At its arrival in Portsmouth, England, on February 28, 1784, it mustered an effective strength of 580 officers and men or a little more than half its designated strength. He estimates the total number of all men who served at some point with the corps as about 1,600.

The literature on Hessia and the Hessians in America is vast; the best recent analysis of Hessia is Charles W. Ingrao, *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II, 1760-1785* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 122-63. A detailed description of the Hessian *jäger*

during the American Revolution, besides Ewald's own diary, is Hans-Friedrich Konze, *Das Feldjäger Corps von Hessen-Kassel im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1776–1783. Versuch einer historischen Skizze* (ms 1983, Ehemals Kurfürstliche Bibliothek im Staatsarchiv Marburg, (StMarburg) XIV B 151 bfa); and Elliot W. Hoffman, *The German Soldiers in the American Revolution* (Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1982).

Immediately after the death of Landgraf Frederick II on October 31, 1785, his son and heir William IX of Hesse-Hanau raised an additional company of *jäger* in 1786, to which were added the two Hesse-Hanau *jäger* companies. In 1789 the *Feldjägercorps* was again reduced to two companies; the other two companies formed the Light Infantry Bataillon Lenz as part of the standing army of Hesse-Kassel. See HSM Bestand 10a/69, fol. 369ff.

44. The statistics are taken from Wetzel, *Hochfürstlich Hessische Feld-Jaeger Corps*, pp. 112–14. Casualty rates for other Hessian troops can be found in Hoffmann, *German Soldiers*, Appendix II, pp. 562–70. Of 29,867 troops sent, 13,961 died or deserted (*ibid.*, p. 570).

45. Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, p. 33, quotes the journal of a German *Jäger Corps* that reports how it was "almost impossible to ever surprise the enemy. . . . Every farmer or his son or his servant, and even his wife and daughter will fire a gun or use secret paths to report the approach of the enemy."

46. Tactical ideas similar to those of Ewald are also expressed in Wissel, *Der Jäger im Felde*; Carl von Seidel, *Vom Dienst der leichten Kavallerie im Felde* (Dresden: n.p., 1784), and Gerhard von Scharnhorst, *Militärisches Taschenbuch, zum Gebrauch im Felde* (Hannover: Helwing, 1793), which also deals extensively with the little war.

47. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 64.

48. Of the fifty-four examples in his book, thirty-six are taken from the American war, sixteen from the Seven Years' War, and two from other wars. Scharnhorst's *Militärisches Taschenbuch* contains only four examples from the American Revolution, all taken from Ewald's 1790 treatise, and over sixty from the Seven Years' War. All four examples in Ewald's appendix are taken from the American Revolution.

49. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 64. On the previous page he writes that "in diesem Theil des Krieges ist ein solcher [an officer] sich oft selbst überlassen, und muß dasjenige im kleinen verrichten, was der General im großen thut." His contemporary, Dietrich von Bülow, *Neue Taktik der Neuern wie sie sein sollte*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1805), 2:24, also predicted that all infantry would eventually become light infantry. Skirmishes rather than traditional battles would become the main features of modern war, not, however, irregular warfare.

50. Willerd R. Fann, "On the Infantryman's Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia," *Military Affairs* 41 (1977): 167.

For the change in Ewald's thinking see *Treatise*, p. 68. When he recruited his company in 1776, he preferred older soldiers because of their experience, but the campaigns in America taught him that younger soldiers more than made up in resilience to tropical diseases and eagerness for their lack of experience.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 79. In 1790 Ewald greatly elaborated upon these ideas. "My own

experience has taught me, during the American war, that an officer can live without horses, and all this depends upon prejudice or custom. . . . No officer in the Hessian and Anspach yagers [sic], during the whole of the American war, ever carried with him any tent, or bed, table or chair" (A. Maimburg, *Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops*. By Colonel Johann von Ewald [sic] [London: T. Egerton, 1803], pp. 27-29).

54. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 86. Ewald uses the German proverb "Wie der Herr ist, so sind die Knechte." In 1790 he wrote: "The commander must be the first to give a good example" (Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 30).

55. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 86.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72. Ewald acknowledges the need for bayonets when he comments on the lack of their use by the commander of Robinson's Corps during their marches in Virginia in early 1781. The quote is from Atwood, *Hessians*, p. 132. On the American side Baron Steuben in 1780 also insisted on the light infantry having bayonets, and they proved their use in the storming of Redoubt # 10 at Yorktown.

59. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 65. The Jungkenn papers in the Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, contain a short unpublished paper by Ewald entitled "Abhandlungen von dem was ein Officer von der Reuterey im Felde zu wissen nöthig hat."

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74. In 1790 Ewald suggested a strength of 1,381 men for his model corps (Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 20).

61. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 75.

62. These lists are based on Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, pp. 33-35. Paret (*York*, p. 38), points out that "the one notable difference between infantry fighting in Europe and in the colonies lay in the greater emphasis placed on small unit operations and, at least in America, on marksmanship."

63. The priority of the political leadership over the military is vital in revolutionary war. Where it is weak or missing as in Thomas Jefferson's Virginia after 1780, the results are aimlessness and confusion. See Mark A. Clodfelter, "Between Virtue and Necessity: Nathaniel Greene and the Conduct of Civil-Military Relations in the South, 1780-1782," *Military Affairs* 52 (1988): 169-75; and Robert Selig, "Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's Kommando in Virginia (1780/81)," in *Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. Leben Zeit und Zeitgenossen*, ed. Werner Giesebrecht (Würzburg 1980), pp. 115-25. See also Jac Weller, "Irregular but Effective: Partizan Weapons Tactics in the American Revolution, Southern Theatre," *Military Affairs* 21 (1975): 118-31; and Ronald Hoffman et al., eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985).

64. John Shy, "The American Revolution. The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in *Essays on the American Revolution*, eds. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 121-56. See also John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 815-62, where "revolutionary war" is defined as "the seizure of political power by the use of armed

force." A clear line, however, is drawn between revolutionary war and guerrilla war: "revolutionary war includes guerrilla warfare. But the guerrilla tactics . . . are simply one means of carrying on revolutionary war. . . . Vital to any definition of revolutionary war, however, is the existence of a revolutionary objective; the specific means to be employed are a secondary matter" (p. 817).

65. John I. Alger, *Definitions and Doctrines of Military Art*, West Point Military History series I (Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1985), p. 69. These paragraphs are based on Werner Hahlweg, *Typologie des modernen Kleinkrieges* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967), p. 11 and his *Guerilla*, p. 21. See also Peter Paret and John W. Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960s* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

66. Paret, "Colonial Experience," p. 58. Later Paret conceded that even if the "soldiers may not yet have been conscious of fighting for a nation," nevertheless "everywhere in Europe the idea of nation was announcing itself," and the "military institutions of eighteenth-century Europe contained within their native cadres the seed of the future nation in arms." But the American model only "inspired some Europeans, it was not a model that European societies followed" (Paret, "Relationship," pp. 147-48).

67. Peter Paret, "The Relationship Between the Revolutionary War and European Military Thought and Practice in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*, ed. Don Higginbotham (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), pp. 144-57.

68. Gruber in Higginbotham, *Reconsiderations*, p. 22. The Hessian leadership submitted plans that attempted to defeat the guerrilla war of the rebels in counter-guerrilla operations. In March 1781, General Riedesel submitted a plan to General Philipps that sounds surprisingly modern. In it he expands the boundaries of a traditional little war to include the civilian population to an unprecedented degree, both as far as winning their political support as well as systematically destroying the economic base of the guerrillas (Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, p. 34).

69. Bribing is mentioned in the *Treatise* on pp. 76 and 77 the need for good relations with the locals on pp. 69, 70, 76, 78, 85 *et passim*.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 119. See also the example of an ambush against marauding Indians in upstate New York by Simcoe and Emmerich on p. 119.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 93. On p. 87 he recounts a similar incident during the campaign in Pennsylvania.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

77. York uses this unidentified quote from Ewald in his *Instruction* for 1811. Quoted in Gumtau, *Jäger und Schützen*, 3:119.

78. This characterization of the war was found in a letter from New York to Germany, dated September 19, 1777, quoted in Atwood, *Hessians*, p. 130.

79. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 80. See also pp. 73-77.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

83. Paret, "Colonial Experience," p. 54.

84. For Clausewitz, see Hahlweg, *Clausewitz*, p. 38. For an earlier attempt by a Hessian officer, see Major Friedrich Leopold Klipstein, *Versuch einer Theorie der leichten Truppen, besonders in Bezug auf die leichte Infanterie* (Darmstadt: G. F. Meyer, 1799). A brief historical overview is given in Otto Zwengel, "Zur Theorie des kleinen Krieges," *Allgemeine Militärwissenschaft* 13 (1969): 397-404.

85. Kunisch, *Kleiner Krieg*, pp. 41-42.

86. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 124.

87. Paret, *York*, p. 43.

88. This verdict is by Joshua Goodenough, who had fought in Rogers' Rangers. Quoted in Beattie, "Adaptation," p. 71. For the opinion of the American leadership on the effectiveness of militia and irregular troops, see Paul David Nelson, "Citizen Soldiers or Regulars: The Views of American General Officers on the Military Establishment, 1775-1781," *Military Affairs* 43 (1979): 126-32.

89. This characterization is from LaFayette, quoted in Orville T. Murphy, "The French Professional Soldier's Opinion of the American Militia in the War of the Revolution," *Military Affairs* 33 (1969): 193. Similarly Jacques Godechot, "L'Influence de la Tactique et de la Stratégie de la Guerre d'Indépendance Américaine sur la Tactique et la Stratégie Française de l'Armée de Terre," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* 41 (1979): 141-47.

90. Adam Ludwig (von) Ochs (1759-1823) started his military career with the *Jäger Corps* in America. In 1797/98 he edited *Das Hessische Dienst-Reglement und das Exercir-Reglement der Infanterie*, which included the "Instruction für sämtliche Infanterie Regimente und das Füsilier-Bataillon. Das Exerciren der Scharfschützen betreffend." HSM Bestand 4 h 4193 contains a number of memoranda by Ochs, dating from the 1790s, concerning improvement of the training of the *jäger*. The emphasis in all of them is on marksmanship and independence of action.

91. Johann (von) Hinrichs (d. 1834), in America with the Hessian *Jäger Corps*, later became a major general in the service of Prussia. In 1813 his *Anweisung zum Felddienst für die Landwehr* was published in Stargard. His diary is published in Bernhard Uhlendorf, ed., *The Siege of Charleston* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938), pp. 103-364. Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, p. 35, calls Hinrichs "one of the leading European practitioners" of the partisan war. Hinrichs' role in Prussian military reforms is discussed in Werner Hahlweg, *Preussische Reformzeit und Revolutionärer Krieg* (Frankfurt: E. S. Mittler, 1962), p. 43.

92. Lieutenant Colonel Andreas Emmerich led a loyalist corps and is frequently mentioned by Ewald in the *Abhandlung*. His *Partisan in War, or, The use of a corps of light troops to an army* (London: n.p., 1789) was translated into German and published in Berlin and Dresden in 1791.

93. John Graves Simcoe, commander of the Queen's Rangers, was convinced that the lack of qualified light troops had cost the British their colonies. In a letter to the king March 15, 1789, he urged the establishment of a special corps of light infantry, "but his plea was not accepted." Quoted in Robson, "British Light Infantry," pp. 221-22.

94. Tadeusz Kościuszko served as an engineer throughout the American Revolution. In 1789 he returned to Poland and became supreme commander in 1794 of the Polish insurrection. Béla K. Király writes of him: "Nowhere

perhaps was the experience, the strategy, and tactics of the American Revolution so exactly applied as in the Polish insurrection in general and the Battle of Warsaw in particular" (Király, "War and Society," p. 27).

95. Quoted in D. von Cochenhausen, "Vor 150 Jahren. An der Wiege neuerzeitlicher Infanterietaktik," *Wissen und Wehr* 14 (1933): 220-21.

96. Paret, "Colonial Experience," pp. 55-56. The reforms Paret discusses in particular concern the integration of light infantry into the standing army, the restructuring of the army into divisions, modifications in the supply system, and increases in the number and mobility of artillery and changes in doctrine, especially speed, coordination, and search for battle.

97. Paret, "Relationship," p. 153.

98. Paret, "Colonial Experience," pp. 55-56.

99. Hahlweg, *Guerilla*, p. 35. Paret, "Colonial Experience," p. 48, note 3, disputes any influence of the American war on Neithardt von Gneisenau, arguing that he arrived too late in Canada to have seen any action. His memoranda of 1808, before the Tyrolean and Spanish Rebellions, concerning a national insurrection against Napoleon do envisage a war similar to that waged in America.

100. Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 433.

101. Walter Laqueur, "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975): 341-82.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 376.

103. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Essay* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976), p. 18. For none of these writers was the contribution of American irregular forces decisive for independence. It was won primarily because of "Washington's political genius and . . . the many mistakes committed by the British" (Laqueur, "Origins," p. 348) or was "not mainly won by guerrillas but by regular soldiers and sailors" (Gann, *Guerrillas*, p. 92).

104. The most recent works are Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., *Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984); Peter E. Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness. British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740-1760," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35 (1978): 629-52; Ira D. Gruber, "British Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth-Century Warfare," in Higginbotham, ed., *Reconsiderations*, pp. 14-31; Sylvia R. Frey, "British Armed Forces and the American Victory," in *The World Turned Upside Down*, ed. John Ferling (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 165-84; and the review essay of Paul David Nelson, "British Conduct of the American Revolutionary War," *Journal of American History* 65 (1978): 623-53.

105. J. A. English, "Thinking about Light Infantry," *Infantry* 74 (November-December 1984): 24. Here can also be found a brief background to the *jäger* tradition.

106. Steven L. Canby, "Light Infantry in Perspective," *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 28-31; Steven L. Canby, *Classic Light Infantry and New Technology*, Contract No. 903-81-C-0207 (Potomac, Md.: C. and L. Associates, 1981); William S. Lind, "Light Infantry Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 (June 1990): 42. The Army's emphasis on mobility as the central criterion for the classification

as "light infantry" is found in U.S. Army, *Independent Evaluation Report (IER) for Certification of the Light Infantry Division, Main Report* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms Center, 1989); and David Lee Poston, "Light Infantry Augmentation to Heavy Divisional Forces in Europe: A European Heavy-Light Primer" (MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), pp. 4-19.

107. Poston, "Light Infantry Augmentation," pp. 6-12. For a discussion of the role of the light infantry in the NATO environment, see John R. Galvin, "The Heavy/Light Concept," *Armed Forces International* 119 (July 1982): 66-80; Galvin, "Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission," *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 10-14; report of a general officer symposium entitled "The Employment of Non-Mechanised Infantry," *RUSI* 125 (December 1980): 56-68; William E. DuPuy, "The Light Infantry: Indispensable Element of a Balanced Force," *Army* 35 (June 1985): 26-41; Huba Wass de Czege, "Three Kinds of Infantry," *Infantry* 75 (July-August 1985): 11-13; John A. Adams, "Heavy versus Light Forces: A Middle Ground," *Military Review* 66 (October 1986): 65-73; William W. Hartzog and John D. Howard, "Heavy-Light Operations," *Military Review* 76 (April 1987): 25-33.

108. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1, *Warfighting* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, 1989), p. 3.

109. John F. Schmitt, "Light Infantry Tactics at the Company Level and Below," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 (June 1990): 49.

110. Scott R. McMichael, *A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*, Combat Studies Research Survey No. 6 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army and General Staff College, 1987), pp. 219-20. Light infantry tactics receive detailed treatment in U.S. Army FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1987).

111. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 68.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

113. See, for instance, Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 76.

114. Ewald, *Diary*, p. 204.

115. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 80.

116. Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 106.

117. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, p. i.

118. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 2, p. 5. Since U.S. Army manuals are not numbered consecutively throughout but only within each chapter, the 2 here refers to the chapter of the manual rather than the volume.

119. FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 44.

120. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, p. 48.

121. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, p. 51.

122. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 101.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 108. See also Paul David Nelson, *Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 54-58.


125. Ewald, *Treatise*, pp. 97-98; FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, pp. 48-49.

126. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 124.

127. *Ibid.*, p. 132.


128. Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 66.

129. FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 51.
130. Ewald, *Treatise*, pp. 113-14.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
133. U.S. Army, FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989), *passim*, especially 4, pp. 6-31.
134. Ewald, *Treatise*, pp. 97-100; the quote is from p. 85.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
137. Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 192.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
139. Ewald, *Treatise*, p. 118.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 118. Ewald even speaks of how one "can bait" the enemy into a trap (*ibid.*, p. 119). On the modern doctrine of "baited attacks," see FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, pp. 34-39.
141. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, p. 3.
142. FM 7-72, *Light Infantry Battalion*, 3, p. 49.
143. FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 64.
144. Ewald, *Diary*, p. 314. In his *Belehrungen*, 2:140, Ewald recounts another ruse of American troops. On January 2, 1777, American riflemen walked up to the Hessian position claiming to be deserters. When *Stabskapitän* von Grothausen left his position despite warnings from Ewald to receive them, he was shot and mortally wounded.
145. Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 197.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 229.
147. *Ibid.*, p. 228.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
149. FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, p. 62.
150. DuPuy, "Light Infantry," p. 30.
151. Galvin, "Heavy/Light Concept," pp. 66-80; Galvin, "Heavy-Light Forces," pp. 10-14; Hartzog and Howard, "Heavy-Light Operations," pp. 24-33. See also Howard G. Crowell, Jr., and Jared L. Bates, "Heavy-Light Connection: Division," *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 15-18; John R. Adams, "Heavy versus Light Forces: A Middle Ground," *Military Review* 66 (October 1986): 65-73; and Scott R. McMichael, "Proverbs of the Light Infantry," *Military Review* 65 (September 1985): 23-28.




The western theater of operation during the Seven Years' War (1756-63).

From Reginald Savory, *His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), by permission of the Oxford University Press.



Ewald's map of New Jersey. Apparently adapted from William Faden's map of 1777 entitled *The Province of New Jersey*, Ewald drafted this map in the back of his manuscript diary. The Keith Line was made in 1687, not 1787, as stated on the map.

From Johann Ewald, *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 113.



Ewald's map of southern Virginia. Copied from an unknown map and transcribed in a German hand other than Ewald's, Ewald inserted the locations of Great Bridge and "Camps" (Kemp's) Landing as well as a notation "ein sehr guter posten" ("a very good post") under "Malbon" (Malvern) Hill.

From Johann Ewald, *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 257.

Abhandlung
über
den kleinen Krieg

von

Joh. Ewald,

Hauptmann bey dem Hochlöblichen Infanterie
Regiment von Dittfurth in Hochfürstl.
Hessen Casselschen Diensten.



Cassel,
verlegt Johann Jacob Cramer.
1785.

The title page of Johann Ewald's *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg*, published in 1785. (English translation on facing page.)

Courtesy of the Newberry Library, Chicago.

Treatise
on
Partisan Warfare

by
Joh. Ewald,

Captain in the Infantry
Regiment von Dittfurth in the Service of
the Prince of Hesse-Cassel

Cassel,
Published by Johann Jacob Cramer
1785.

Preface

Ever since the miserable prejudice that only low-level officers need to concern themselves with the drill and training of troops¹ has been abandoned, very many learned men, especially in our age, have excelled in the most superb works on the science of war and thus have given the officer the opportunity to study the war during peacetime in his room. Indeed, to the benefit of the officer even a Royal Prussian Inspector General has taken pains to transform the drill of the soldier into a science and has published a very useful work on that subject, in order to make it easy and understandable also to the young officer. It would be desirable that this book were in the hands of every officer. That it has received the approval of that part of society learned in military matters can be seen from the fact that it has already been translated into French.²

Despite all of this, however, that group of officers who love their vocation is still very small, those who find a true liking of this science, and who take pains to educate themselves into a useful officer in the service of their prince through diligent reflection and the reading of good books on military subjects. People constantly complain about boredom, yet nobody looks for means to chase it away, which would be in one's own interest. During war one wants to learn everything—that is the time when one can see something and learn something! Nobody ponders on how many campaigns would be necessary for one to see all eventualities that can happen in war actually taking place, and how can experience help someone who has done nothing on the theory of war beforehand? He will come back from the campaign as blind as he went into it.

It is demanded of a soldier that he do his duty, and that he know what he has been taught. Can the soldier not with the same justification demand this of his officer, since it is only the officer, who in all enterprises during the war which end successfully will earn the laurels, while the soldier has to pay with his life, health or freedom for the ignorance of his officer? How many hundreds have not become victims that way? Does not anyone think that the blood of those, who have thus been sacrificed through our ignorance, will scream for revenge before the great judge? And how indelible remains the censure before the world that one has lost so many honorable citizens, through one's own fault, for one's prince and state.

Since peace gives us more than enough leisure is it not our obligation to learn something, so that we can escape such accusations during the war? And even if luck in its stubbornness should be against us, the satisfaction that one has fulfilled one's duties to the utmost will be the biggest reward.

One sees with surprise, once a war breaks out, how many officers try to serve with the light troops. However, they do not consider how much skill is demanded from an officer who wants to do his part with the light troops. In this part of the war an officer is often left to himself, has to do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale. How will he fare in the field if he does not have the slightest idea of this kind of war? The dilemma which he will find himself in as a result of his ignorance will make him the laughing stock of the soldiers, which will happen the faster with light troops since there are enough people in such a corps who know their trade. Just walk amongst them unnoticed after a skirmish and you will certainly hear the judgment they pass on you.

An officer who does not think right, will of course object that not every officer has to know about the service in light troops. But he is wrong since he does not know that light warfare is the school in which already very many great generals have been trained. Besides, has one not seen during the Seven Years' War and the American War, especially during the first campaigns, when, as usual, the number of light troops to cover the army was insufficient, and how detachments and whole regiments were taken out of the army to serve as light troops? How will an officer keep his reputation intact when he is sent against the enemy with cavalry and infantry and has not learned beforehand to properly integrate the two of them, and to post each section and to use it at the right moment?

Even though I know that I am not writing anything new, I nevertheless believe that my comrades will not be displeased if I briefly present to them those rules which the leader of a light corps or a detachment, composed of cavalry and infantry, has to consider during the major

events of a campaign. I have collected those rules during twenty-four years of service, and not without effort and reflection. To those whose interest has been aroused by my little book, I recommend especially the works of Captain Tielke³ and of General Lloyd.⁴ The latter has been translated by Mr. von Tempelhof from English into German and has been improved by instructive notes. Both can serve as the complete library of an officer and are written in a way that each line, if read carefully, will help to train good officers. This is true especially of the first work, in which one can find all parts of the science of war dealt with in the greatest detail.

I have divided the present work into eleven chapters and one appendix. The first chapter deals with the recruitment and discipline of a light corps composed of infantry and cavalry, the second with the strength and arms which such a corps has to have in order to be useful, the third with the drill of light troops. The fourth chapter explains how the leader of a corps composed of infantry and cavalry is supposed to act when meeting the enemy while on a march. The fifth chapter explains the duties of the leader of a light corps on an outpost, the sixth explains the service in walled towns. The seventh chapter deals with the rules of reconnaissance, the eighth with raids. The ninth chapter explains how to act when the enemy retreats, the tenth chapter explains ambushes, and the eleventh chapter deals with retreats. The appendix contains three sections dealing with the three most important duties of an officer of the cavalry in a campaign. This was written upon the request of one of my good friends of the American War, and since it received some approval it is added after the end of this book.⁵

On the Recruitment and Discipline of a Light Corps Composed of Infantry and Cavalry

In many services there prevails the very bad habit that during the establishment of light troops the officer ordered to raise a light corps receives permission to confer the companies as well as the commissions of officers in return for a certain number of recruits. If the recruiting officer thinks very selfishly this practice makes it impossible to get able and honorable officers since, if he is without money, the most capable has to come after the most ignorant.

And what can you expect of a corps in which the merits of an officer are considered irrelevant? The necessity of light troops in war is completely understood; one knows that they are necessary for the safety of the armies, that an army without them can not survive against an army which is well equipped with light troops—but nevertheless little consideration is given to the selection of officers for such a corps. A Wunsch,¹ a Mayr,² a Kleist,³ a Luckner,⁴ a Scheiter,⁵ and a Conflans⁶ have shown the world during the late Seven Years' War what such corps can do if led by good officers.

Every army officer who shows interest in this part of the war, and who has prepared himself through the reading of good books for it, should be allowed to serve with light troops during a war. He should be encouraged through rewards, and through that many a good general more would appear in this world. But quite the contrary happens. These kind of troops are made odious in their eyes for fear of losing a good officer from the line regiments. In order to scare them, those officers who show interest are given to understand that the light troops will be dismissed after the conclusion of the war without any provision, a prophecy which then is usually also fulfilled. Yes, I know that there

are foolish people in the armies who do not comprehend the necessity for this harsh and painful service. They hardly ever, if they do not have to, get out of their tents or quarters, and they look down upon such troops.

Every experienced officer knows how much is demanded from an officer who faces the enemy every day. He has to do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale. How can such an officer, who frequently is far away from the main army, receive instructions? How can he get instructions covering all eventualities when circumstances can change at every moment? Quite to the contrary, he would often have to let the most beautiful opportunity slip away if he were bound by instructions or maybe commit such errors that might have the most sad consequences. How many examples could not be given where the ignorance and negligence of an officer on an outpost, or of one who had been sent against the enemy to gather information, resulted in the ruin of whole armies? In other words, such corps demand the most agile, skillful and valiant officers.

Would it thus not be fair if the great princes would maintain in peacetime a certain quota of such corps, relative to the size of their armies, or that they, in the event of a war, would take care of those corps as well as they take care of the regular troops, so that these newly established corps might be filled with good officers? And after the war has ended, and after they have served well, such officers must not be sent away destitute but be provided for. And if these corps can not be maintained, the officers have to be transferred to line regiments and rewarded according to their merits. Just like my most gracious prince and lord did not let a single officer go without a living after the late Seven Years' War, and after the American War was kind enough to install the officers of the *Jäger Corps* in the line regiments according to their seniority.⁷

It is just as necessary that during their establishment such corps receive a quota of capable non-commissioned officers and privates, which have to be drawn from the line regiments, so that these corps can be drilled to the utmost, and that the day to day service will be introduced right from the start with the greatest order. Here it is also very necessary that the commander of such a corps be not too casual about the selection of his privates, otherwise you will get a very bad rabble.⁸

If the corps has a rush of applicants, one has to consider height and age and not accept anyone under four *Zoll* and over thirty years of age.⁹ Between the ages of sixteen and thirty, a man is in the bloom of life and fit to endure all the hardships of war. Do not believe that the old and experienced soldier is always the best. When my most gracious prince and lord entrusted me with one of the two *jäger* companies which were designated for America, I followed the custom of looking for ex-

perienced soldiers. But how quickly did I become conscious of my mistake in the first campaign. The young people of sixteen to eighteen years of age were those who best withstood the climate and the strain, while the older ones, who had already been worn out during previous campaigns, had to be sent to the hospital. In addition the young people, since they did not yet know the dangers of war, were the ones who attacked best, and upon whom one could rely in critical circumstances.¹⁰

Discipline as well as orderliness even in the most trifling cases has to be enforced to the utmost in such newly established corps. A commanding officer can never be too strict with a gang composed of people gathered from all corners of the world. He has to enforce to the utmost everything once he has given his orders. Not the slightest infringement upon discipline, orderliness and service must be tolerated, especially not in the beginning. Once a German has gotten used to strict discipline and order it eventually becomes a habit with him. The best thing to do is not to choose a medium in rewards as well as punishments. One has to praise those who through their good behavior or conduct, whatever that may be, distinguish themselves before their comrades, and encourage them through promotions and presents. On the other hand, however, those who deserve to be punished have to be disciplined most severely. Above all one can not deal harshly enough with those villains who mercilessly torment the peasants who are innocent of the war. The best thing to do is to chase such rabble away, since those who once stooped to plundering can never be trusted again, and they spoil the good soldiers as well.

Do not believe that you can gain the love of a soldier through an unpermissible kindness and indulgence at the expense of the poor peasant and by a policy contrary to all human nature. The soldier will try everything, if he gets away with it; all irregularities will eventually increase so much that they can not be corrected any more. Honor and everything else are lost, and one is exposed to the revenge of the locals, which often has the saddest consequences. On the other hand, with a strict discipline and a congenial behavior one makes friends in the heart of enemy country. The famous French partisan Monsieur de La Croix attributes his frequent and successfully completed raids solely to his affable behavior and very urgently argues his case in his treatise on irregular warfare.¹¹ The genial behavior of Messrs. von Scheiter and Monkewitz¹² was certainly the reason why these two could maintain themselves during the Seven Years' War for two years in the area around Munster even though they were separated from the allied armies. Because of their good behavior the peasants of the area liked the soldiers of these two corps so much that they came of their own free will to report the approach of the enemy. And how well do we know how the

kind behavior of Colonel von Wurmb during the American War brought him many friends among the greatest rebels.¹³ On the day before the Battle of Germantown one of the most eminent citizens of Philadelphia, who was by no means a friend of the war, but whose house and home the colonel had received anyway, and confidentially reported to him the approach of the enemy army.¹⁴

But you also have to show the soldier that you love him and take care of him. Everything that you can bestow upon him legally you have to grant him, especially toward your soldiers you have to show yourself to be unselfish. If you do that you can do virtually anything with a German, and once an officer through his good qualities, skill and valor has gained the confidence of the common soldier, he can certainly count on him in all cases. Yet most important one must not let the grumbling of the soldier go unpunished, no matter how hard the inconveniences of the war may be.

2

Of the Strength and Arms of a Light Corps

It is most important that such a corps be composed of cavalry and infantry since the strength of these arms consists in the mutual support of one through the other.

If anything is to be achieved, such corps must never be much less than a thousand men, at least a third of which have to be cavalry, because if it is weaker he who is entrusted with such a corps will not be able to perform any great and brilliant enterprises. Since it constantly has to be close to the enemy, it can easily happen that such a corps will suffer considerable losses through which it can be forced into inactivity for a whole campaign. We have seen this all too often with the English, whose light corps rarely consisted of more than a few hundred men, and which usually, once heavy desertions occurred, could hardly be used at the end of a campaign. What follows is an approximate outline of the strength of such a corps.

1. Two companies of *jäger* on foot, each consisting of

- 1 captain
- 3 lieutenants
- 16 noncommissioned officers
- 1 bugle horn
- 150 privates

Each company has 171 men.¹

The two companies together are 342 men strong, that captain whom the commander considers capable enough will command them both. With the *jäger* one can not worry about the height but more important

has to ensure that they are hunters by trade, good shots, and young people. Their arms consist of a rifle, a short hunting knife, and a good ammunition pouch with a metal lining which holds forty rounds.

2. Two companies of fusiliers, each of which has the same strength as a *jäger* company. Thus the whole infantry consists of 684 men.

Their arms consist of a musket with a good stock for firing, a bayonet, and an ammunition pouch just like the hunters have them. I omit a sabre because it is only inconvenient during marches, adds additional expense, and gives opportunity for vicious quarrels.

3. Two squadrons of light cavalry, of which each has the following strength.

1 captain
4 lieutenants
16 noncommissioned officers
2 trumpeters
150 privates
Total 173 men

Both squadrons total 346 men.

They have to be mounted and armed as light as hussars, only that each squadron has to have twenty-five good shots, armed with rifles, since those people are very useful on rearguards and in skirmishes. They can also be used in case a pass needs to be occupied and defended quickly, and the like.

If we add to this corps an auditor, a regimental quartermaster, a regimental surgeon and his 6 aids, a wagon master, a staff bugle horn, a gunsmith, a blacksmith, and a provost, the whole corps amounts to 1,044 men.

The commander and two additional staff officers are sufficient for 1,000 men, but one of the latter has to be from the cavalry in order to command the two squadrons, since a skillful officer will always be able to lead infantry and cavalry in combat. But he can not know sufficiently the day-to-day service if he has only served in one of the two. In addition all officers which serve with the infantry have to be taken from the line regiments and all those who serve with the cavalry have to be taken from the line cavalry so that the men can be drilled most accurately and that the day-to-day service can be introduced into the corps most meticulously.

3

Of the Drill of the Infantry and the Cavalry

Since every service has its own drill manual I will only touch upon the most necessary points. You have to train the infantry well in marching, quick loading and firing. One has to let them frequently march in platoons and in line so that they can attack the enemy in the best order and in closed ranks. You also have to train them well in their various deployments so that they can make these moves in the greatest speed and without the least confusion.

If you have to march with right about face or left about face then it will be best if at the command right about face all even files fall out to the right, and at the command left about face all odd files fall out to the left, and as soon as the order Stop! is given, the files fall back into line. This way the soldiers march freely and the files do not lose their distances.

The infantry also has to be taught to march in line in the best order through thickets; between two files there has to be an opening of a good pace. During all of this the men hold their rifles in the middle with their right hand and carry them on their right side, so that the branches of the trees do not impede their march.

The infantry, especially the *jäger*, have to be well trained to fight dispersed, since in most cases they will cover the front and the flanks. But they must also be trained to assemble with the greatest speed at the place of the commanding officer of the detachment as soon as the bugle horn calls them. This manœuvre is one of the most important with light troops through which, if you know how to skirmish around the enemy, the enemy can easily be brought into disarray, especially if you are dealing with regular troops in wooded or very divided terrain.

Since the loading of the rifles goes very slowly, the *jäger* in particular must be well taught that always one of two, or two of four, have loaded guns, so that they can support those who have fired already. The fusiliers, however, have to be taught that they have to take the bayonets off their rifles as soon as they also have to fight dispersed, so that they take good aim and fire well-aimed shots at the enemy. They, as well as the *jäger*, have to be trained to fire at targets as often as that is possible.

If this manœuvre has to be performed during a retreat, one of the two, two of the four, or three of the six, retreat 50 to 100 paces after they have given fire, while the others save their fire until the retreated party has reloaded. This is the way how to retreat alternately. During all of this the officers and non-commissioned officers of the platoons have to constantly call to their men and give the necessary support so that the platoons do not get mixed up, causing disarray.

All evolutions of a light corps have to be made at the command of the trumpet, drums, or bugle horn, and the men have to be assiduously trained in this so that they know every command. Since light troops have to fight *à la débânde* (which is their true strength), each soldier has to know by heart whether the charge or the retreat, left wheel or right wheel, or summons have been sounded.¹

The cavalry has to be taught first on foot what they have to do on horseback. One has to teach them to mount and dismount in good order, to sit erect and composed in the saddle. They also have to be taught well how to raise themselves in the saddle and give a blow. One has to constantly train them in fours, in half squadrons and complete squadrons how to wheel. One also has to frequently practice attacks with them over a distance of 2,000 paces and then unexpectedly order Stop! so that one sees whether the men can ride. The *jäger* on horseback too have to be taught to fight scattered so that they will well understand the art to skirmish with the enemy. One has to teach them well to fall back into line with the greatest speed at the sound of the trumpet. The riflemen of each squadron need to be taught to give good and well-aimed fire from horseback. Because of this they have to be given the calmest horses.

How Such a Corps or Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Ought to Act Upon a March and When It Meets the Enemy

The march of such a corps either has the purpose of occupying a post in the face of the enemy, to cover a certain distance of an area, or to maintain communications between two armies or corps, to safeguard the stores or convoys from the reconnoitering of the enemy, to take the same away from the enemy or to destroy them, to search out, destroy, and disperse those detachments of the enemy which linger on our flanks or in our rear, to ambush an enemy corps, to take hostages or to levy contributions, or to quickly take and occupy a given town or pass.

These are all undertakings of great importance and difficulty which demand an exact knowledge of the terrain involved. One has to be able to judge correctly all eventualities that may happen and have a deep insight into and aptitude for this kind of war.

Only general rules can be given for this multitude of reasons for the march of such a corps and for the number of incidents which may happen at any moment. They are more like guesswork than principles since one is always bound by circumstances which can never all be predicted in war.

An officer who has been entrusted with the leadership of such a corps or detachment can gain fame and honor through such undertakings if they are well planned and executed with the necessary skill. On the other hand he can also sacrifice his honor and his whole corps if he loses sight of the necessary caution.

Most of all one has to be secretive and determined in such cases. At the most two officers of the corps, of whose insight, knowledge, and valor the commanding officer is certain, must be informed of the enterprise planned. But it is inevitably necessary that he share the secret with

someone, since it is easily possible that the commanding officer may get wounded or even killed at the slightest incident. Subsequently, if no one else is informed of the plan, the enterprise may fail.

In order to execute such raids, safe and good guides are necessary, and if one has gotten hold of such, trustworthy non-commissioned officers who watch over them must be attached to them. At all events one has to treat such people kindly, and when they are exchanged for others and discharged, they have to be paid well. On such marches one also has to show a humanitarian behavior toward all peasants. If you do that you will find in all countries people who will help you and you will not be betrayed easily.

The main security of such a corps on a march rests solely on the good order and precaution with which it is led. The leader of it can never insist too much that each officer remain with his platoon to constantly keep it in the best order. Another good thing is it if all servants are led by an officer or a trustworthy non-commissioned officer between the corps and the rearguard so that they can not ride about and pillage, since this often has the worst consequences, thwarting the best plan. Thus failed the raid near the Pon Pon-Bridge in South Carolina, where Colonel Abercrombie with the English light infantry was to surprise 400 American dragoons when the servant of an officer who was to buy bread for his master lost his way and fell into the hands of the enemy. Thus the whole plan was discovered. What is most surprising in all this is that neither the officer nor his servant were punished.¹

Once the march starts one officer with 30 horses has to form the advance guard. He is preceded by a non-commissioned officer with 6 horses at a distance of 100 paces. The latter has 2 men in front of him at the same distance, who diligently look about themselves and who have to report everything they notice of the enemy to the officer. On either side of the advance guard there also have to be 4 or 5 men who ride on the nearby heights and who watch well so that nothing may escape their eyes. Two trusty non-commissioned officers, each with 10 to 12 men, have to ride on either side of the corps and search all covered areas so that one does not meet the enemy unexpectedly. After the 30 horses of the advance guard comes an officer with 30 *jäger* on foot, and if the march goes through an open terrain they are followed by the cavalry, then the *jäger* on foot and the fusiliers. An officer with 20 horses, who has to make certain that no soldier or servant remains behind, forms the rearguard. If the terrain is very divided, the cavalry follows the infantry and an officer with 30 *jäger* on foot forms the rear-guard.

One always has to march in such an order and with as much precaution as if one could meet the enemy at any moment. Otherwise one runs the risk of falling into an ambush or being beaten. The advance

guard and the side patrols have to be taught that they stop the people whom they meet along the way and send them to the leader of the corps who has to question them. When they pass villages they must inquire about the enemy but never dismount and enter house. If this should happen and is noticed it has to be punished to the utmost.

If one meets a road crossing another or a point where various roads meet, then they have to be searched out before one proceeds. The detachment of *jäger* of foot which follows the advance guard has to wait here until the corps arrives, and then the commanding officer will relieve them with a different detachment which will remain at the place until the corps has passed.

If one encounters a gorge or a bridge which has to be crossed, the detachment of *jäger* on foot which follows the advance guard deploys on our side, occupies in the case of the gorge the surrounding heights or in the case of the bridge divides into two parts and remains on either side of it. The advance guard crosses the bridge and searches the area beyond up to a half-hour's distance so that no one of the enemy can hide there. The corps itself deploys until the officer of the advance guard reports that everything is safe.² Then the gorge or the bridge is crossed by the corps and the march is continued.

If an enemy detachment should be encountered beyond the river, the advance guard will give timely notice of this. Through spies, which one can always find when one is not stingy, one will try to collect sound information concerning the strength of the enemy and also whether some of his detachment should linger in the vicinity which could quickly come to the aid of the one found, and on the basis of this information the decision concerning attack or retreat will be made.

If the decision is made for an attack, one must not ponder long but immediately cross the bridge with the fusiliers and attack the enemy with the bayonet. At the same time the *jäger* deploy along the river on either side of the bridge to support the attack of the infantry and to bring the enemy into disarray with well-aimed fire. The cavalry follows the infantry at a distance of 300 paces and tries to beat up the enemy. If the enemy should have more infantry than the cavalry and thus be superior, one can let half of the cavalry, especially the riflemen, dismount in order to support with them the attack of the infantry.

If the enemy is forced to retreat the cavalry has to try to take advantage of its turmoil and pursue the fleeing enemy as hotly as possible. The dismounted *jäger* will mount immediately and follow the cavalry, and if it is possible one should try to cut to pieces the detachment of the enemy. It has to be impressed upon the cavalry, however, not to pursue the enemy much farther than a half-hour, especially if the terrain is very divided and one can not see very far around. As soon as it is convinced of the flight of the enemy, the cavalry has to return. De-

pending upon his orders, the commanding officer will then decide whether to retreat or to advance further. If he has been sent to search and destroy an enemy detachment in a certain area, he has certainly achieved his purpose and can retreat.

If the march should be through mountainous areas, the hills on either side of the road have to be occupied by the *jäger* on foot, so that the corps, which is forced to remain on the road, is covered by them. During the march the officers of the *jäger* have to inquire of the locals of the footpaths and diligently search those which run into the main road so that an enemy party cannot sneak by nearby and attack unexpectedly from the side or in the rear.

If a wooded area has to be passed, the *jäger* on foot have to cover the corps at a distance of 300 to 400 paces on either side. Here as well as in the mountains the *jäger* have to split up into sections and let single *jäger* walk on their flanks. In this case the cavalry marches between the two fusilier companies.

If the path gets so narrow that one can not march with the infantry other than left wheel or right wheel and with the cavalry in pairs, the surrounding hills have to be occupied even more so, but as soon as the paths get wider one has to line up again in platoons so that one is at any time ready to meet the enemy.

If the march is during the night, which is the best time for secret enterprises, one does well if, in a flat area, two squadrons of cavalry, and in mountainous or wooded areas two platoons of fusiliers, form the advance guard. They remain about fifty paces apart from each other, so that the first platoon, should it meet the enemy, can be supported by the second. During a dark night you can not provide flankers; instead the officer of the advance guard has two men ride ahead a little distance and in the utmost silence. They have to stop frequently and listen if they can hear someone walk, ride or talk in the vicinity. If the advance guard should unexpectedly meet an enemy party, there is no need to challenge it. Instead it has to attack the enemy immediately with the sword, but, if the enemy retreats, never to pursue it. An unexpected attack startles the enemy, and the leader of the corps gains time to deploy his corps in good order and to wait for daybreak. In the same manner the officer of the fusiliers has to react if he forms the advance guard in wooded or mountainous areas and meets the enemy. He must not give fire but only use the bayonet. If the commanding officer of Robinson's Corps had acted this way during the march from Hood's Fort and Petersburg in Virginia, the Americans, who had deployed on a crossroad, would not have been able to apply their fire as well as they did. By a single volley of about 100 men, some 30 of our men were killed or wounded. Besides, the moon was bright, and the Americans could be seen, and they had challenged our troops.³

If one is forced to stop on a march or to make camp, one has to act according to the circumstances. As long as the season permits, however, no matter how far the enemy is away, one must not take up quarters, but camp in hidden areas where water is close by. If you do not have bread with you, or if it has been consumed because of the length of the march, a competent officer with select men has to be sent to the nearest village to fetch whatever is necessary. During the time that the men rest sentries are deployed, and patrols are sent in the direction where the enemy is suspected. The most prominent of the villagers will be brought to the commanding officer who inquires about the enemy or whatever else he wants to know.⁴

If one becomes aware of an enemy detachment nearby, whom one does not want to give battle because it is superior in strength or for any other reasons, one must not remain in the area where one has been forced to collect food and forage any longer than absolutely necessary, but move out a few hours away to the side so that the peasants get confused. Because if the march goes through enemy territory the enemy will certainly be informed that one of our detachments is in the neighborhood, especially since one has been forced to demand food from the people. One might be relieved however of this necessity, which often enough has spoiled the well-contrived design, if on secret marches zwieback is distributed instead of bread. The soldier can easily carry it for eight days or longer,⁵ especially since this small weight is reduced daily, and if the soldier has his bread⁶ he has to be content. During the American war we received zwieback for years instead of bread, and when our soldiers finally got used to it they preferred it to bread, because they realized themselves that if they carried zwieback with them they would rarely ever lack bread.

If the march has the purpose of occupying a certain outpost that the general expects a great advantage of, or to levy hostages, or to rob the enemy of a convoy, which may also be of great importance to the general, all engagements have to be avoided, even if an advantage may be gained. One must not deal much with the enemy who may be attempting to prevent the march, so that the purpose of the march may not be fulfilled, which would be acting against one's orders.

If one should be forced, however, to give battle despite all attempts to avoid this mistake and despite all precautions used, one must not hesitate for long but speedily make one's dispositions and attack him with the sabre in hand and bayonet mounted, even if the enemy be twice as strong as one has in troops oneself. Because he who attacks first has the victory already half in hands and fortune is usually on the side of the most decisive and courageous. If this happens on a plain, one should attack with the larger part of the cavalry and the fusiliers one of the flanks of the enemy, while the *jäger* and the rest of the cav-

alry are held back in an oblique line, where the *jäger* have to try to harm the enemy with well-aimed fire. Once the enemy has been thrown into disorder and his ranks have been broken on his flanks, this will result in the flight of the rest, and the enemy will feel the blow sooner than he sees the lightning.

This disposition will always have to be made in the greatest speed and with the greatest order, because every commander of a squadron or a company knows what he has to do. All that is needed is that the officers or non-commissioned officers know how to keep their men under control and to lead them against the enemy. Which is why you can never train such corps, which have often been raised quickly, too much in their arms, if there is time during the war, so that the officers can get a sufficient idea of everything.

If this should happen in a divided terrain, the *jäger* will be deployed in the most covered parts where they disperse according to their own inclination and try to attack the enemy from the flanks and the rear, whence often an officer or noncommissioned officer with a few men can completely chase away the enemy. I have seen this particularly in the affair of Williamsburg in Virginia, where a non-commissioned officer by the name of Sippel got into the rear of the enemy with 6 to 8 men. The result was that 300 men, Englishmen, Anspach, and Hessian *jäger*, who were almost in the hands of the enemy already, beat back an American corps of 1,000 men, the elite of their army.⁷ But while the *jäger* are doing this you have to attack the enemy with your cavalry and fusiliers vigorously from a different side.

If the terrain is so mountainous that you can not get the whole of your corps at the enemy, then the odds are even, even if the enemy is twice as strong as you. Since the enemy can not offer a large front for an attack the best method to use will be to attack the enemy valiantly with your fusiliers while the *jäger*, which cover the flanks of the corps during the march, will try to outflank him, attack from the rear and try to cut off the retreat of at least some of them.

If one is fortunate enough to defeat the enemy at such an opportunity in a divided, mountainous or wooded area, one can not be careful enough in the pursuit, as I have mentioned already. Since one can not see too far ahead in such an environment, one can easily fall into an ambush or encounter a second detachment of the enemy which lingers in the vicinity and which comes to the aid of the first. For example, if Colonel Simcoe had pursued the American corps, which had been beaten back near Spencer's Plantation near Williamsburg in Virginia another quarter of an hour through the thicket, it would have been supported by the army of the Marquis de LaFayette, which was approaching and of which nobody knew, and the whole detachment of Colonel Simcoe would certainly have been lost.⁸

If there is certain knowledge of the area where the enemy detachment to be beaten stays, a different disposition can be made. The corps or detachment is divided into two, maybe three groups, each of which is instructed as to where to retreat to in case it is attacked by the enemy. However, the location of each of them has to be such as to allow the easy support of it by the other two if it should be attacked, or so that the group attacked can lure the enemy to the vicinity where the other groups are, which will bring the enemy into a crossfire where it will certainly be defeated. If time and area permit an attack on the enemy from more than one side, this opportunity must never be lost sight of. Thus during the Virginia campaign Colonel Simcoe was sent by General [Benedict] Arnold from Portsmouth⁹ across the Elizabeth River into Princess Anne County to search for and destroy an enemy detachment which had badly mistreated the royalist subjects.¹⁰ It also often interfered with the foraging of Arnold's corps and made communications on land and water between Portsmouth and the great bridge very unsafe. The colonel took his way across Kemp's Landing and the London Bridge while I was sent with another detachment on Simcoe's right toward the great bridge. From this post I turned left and passed Dauge's and Brock's swamps, which were considered impassable by the enemy, especially for cavalry, in order to cut off the retreat of the enemy toward Northwest Landing or in the direction of North Carolina. Both parties met the enemy detachment at two different times, through which it was completely cut to pieces, and what was left retreated through pathless swamps toward North Carolina.¹¹

Sometimes it also happens that during such a march one receives notice that just now an enemy detachment has occupied a certain post. This is usually a fortunate moment to give the enemy a beating. After a long march men and horses are tired, a part of them is usually sent out for food and forage, everyone tries to make it as comfortable as possible for himself. If this happens during the daytime, there is even less caution. One comforts himself with the thought, impermissible in war, that this is unnecessary here, this is a good post, the enemy is far away from us. Yet often these words have barely been spoken when the punishment for such carelessness is right there. Here is an example. After Colonel Simcoe had foraged on Lewis' Plantation in Gloucester County during the Virginia campaign, he was informed, while on the way back, that a few hours ago an American detachment of 100 horses and as many riflemen¹² had taken up post near Turas Plantation, four English miles from Abington's Church in order to prevent in this area the foraging of Cornwallis' army, of which a part stood near Gloucester. Colonel Simcoe immediately took his cavalry and hurried to raid the American detachment and ordered me to follow with the infantry as quickly as possible. Just as he had expected the Colonel found the en-

emy, cut many of them down, and took many of them prisoners, among them a number of officers.¹³

Sometimes it happens during a march that one finds out through good and trustworthy scouts that a hostile detachment is approaching and at a certain point has to pass a defile or a long dam. If one is free to do as one pleases and is not bound by any orders, one has to approach the area under as much cover as possible, and if the enemy should lack the necessary precaution in the passing of the ravine, gorge or dam, as many as are convenient are allowed to pass, and then they are gallantly attacked. Under such circumstances the enemy may be twice or more often superior in number, yet he is nevertheless lost since those who are beaten throw themselves upon those who are behind them and carry everything with them into disarray. This way the Hanoverian Colonel von Scheiter defeated a considerable corps of French cavalry during the Seven Years' War in the campaign of 1761 near Birkenbusch.¹⁴

During a war there are also cases in which only cavalry can be used because of the speed with which the raid has to be made. In order to ensure a safe retreat, the infantry is left behind at a pass that can not be circumvented. This was done for example when the Colonels von Wurmb, Simcoe and Emmerich raided, near Tarrytown, one of the hostile parties which swarmed about in the Province of New York, and which approached our advance posts all too often. They left the Anspach and Hessian *jäger* on foot behind in Trenton and carried out the raid with the cavalry.¹⁵

During such marches one has to know the area that one has to go into so well that one knows more than one way of how to get back again. Because if one deals with an agile enemy he will make all efforts to cut off such a detachment which is far away from the main army. I want to illustrate this section more closely with a very instructive example from the Seven Years' War between the French and the allies. In order to gain more from this, one should take a map of the Eichsfeld to hand.

The now deceased Colonel von Wintzingerode, then Major and commanding officer of the Hessian *Feldjäger Corps*, left in the Spring of 1761 with 500 horses and 400 *jäger* on foot from Dassel in order to levy a number of hostages in Heiligenstadt and the surrounding areas. In order to carry out this raid he had to completely circumvent a French Corps of 16,000 to 20,000 men, which was quartered between Göttingen and Einbeck, since Heiligenstadt lay in the rear of this corps.

Mr. von Wintzingerode departed the above-mentioned town around noon, took his way via Nörten, despite the fact that this town was patrolled by the enemy from Göttingen, crossed the River Leine here, took his march via Lindau, Gieboldehausen and Duderstadt, where he

arrived toward evening. He had the town occupied by his *jäger* on foot in order to keep his rear free. Then he himself continued his march with the cavalry to Heiligenstadt, where he arrived that very same night.

As soon as the raid was carried out he began his way back, but he did not march back the same way he had come, but went by daybreak toward Wormsthal, where he remained for a few hours in order to feed his horses. From there he took his way via the Ohmberg through the most covered area and arrived in Duderstadt in the afternoon, where he united with his *jäger* on foot. From Duderstadt he turned right and marched via Lauterberg, which is a pass into the Harz Mountains from this side, Andreasberg, Clausthal, Wildemann, Gehrenrode and Kalenberg, and arrived after this well-executed raid safely again in Dassel.¹⁶

This example shows that for such enterprises an exact knowledge of the country, great precaution, and skill are needed. If you take the map of the Eichsfeld you will see that there is almost a straight line from Duderstadt to Göttingen. If the French had received knowledge of the march of this corps and if they had wanted to cut off the retreat of Mr. von Wintzingerode, they would have first had to attack Duderstadt. Since the patrols from Duderstadt to Heiligenstadt were constantly covering the road, Mr. von Wintzingerode would have been informed there in time if the enemy had undertaken something against Duderstadt. In case the French had detached two corps, of which one had attacked Duderstadt and the other the cavalry under Mr. von Wintzingerode, the enemy would nevertheless have failed in his attempt. Because Mr. von Linsing,¹⁷ who commanded the *jäger* in Duderstadt, would have been informed by his scouts and patrols early enough, since he could have easily discovered the approach of the enemy through his post on the hill near Kerstlingerode, from where one can see for more than two hours.¹⁸ And if he had had to retreat because of the superiority of the enemy, he would have taken his way via Rhumspringe, which is only one and one half hours from Duderstadt and a ford across the Rhum, where he would have been safe from all attacks by the enemy. Unless they were overwhelmingly superior, the French must not have gone too far from Göttingen, since the *jäger* could then have retreated across the Rothenberg and cut off the French retreat. For Mr. von Wintzingerode the way via Obernfeld through the forest via the Rothenberg into the Harz to the left of Goslar would always have remained open. And since this area is wooded throughout he did not have to fear that the enemy would pursue him.

Of the Selection of an Outpost, and How the Leader of a Light Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Infantry and Cavalry, Has to Conduct Himself in This Case

The ultimate purpose for occupying a post consists in observing an enemy facing you or who is roaming the area and in watching all his undertakings so that he can not approach or retreat without your knowledge. Anyone who has been entrusted with such a post, upon which often the safety of a whole army rests, has to use all precaution and, like a lion, sleep with his eyes open, so that he will notice the movements of the enemy in time and is able to report to his general the necessary rapport even of the smallest incidents happening in the enemy camp.

As soon as one arrives at one's post, after one has personally checked out all approaches if the surrounding area is not familiar, the most prominent people of the surrounding villages have to be sent for. They have to be asked for the roads that lead to the enemy, and immediately one also has to try to gain some people who can serve as spies, so that the strength of the enemy can be found out, and who will spy out everything that happens with the enemy, since one remains completely in the dark without such people. One has to know where the enemy posts are, how far they are away from us, and where and how far his patrols go.

Never reject even the least bit of information that you get from deserters or from well-disposed people, no matter how impossible it seems. I remember well how various information that had been received concerning the approach of the enemy, which was considered impossible, was discarded, and how such an imprudence once cost us a strong detachment and another time almost a whole army. I am determined not to insult anyone, otherwise I could list various examples where this neg-

ligence and laxity have cost the Crown of England the best posts and whole corps during the American War.¹

After one has found out everything that is necessary, small guards are placed on all the roads that lead to the enemy, which for their own safety have sentries before them. Cavalry posts are placed at those places where they can see far and operate freely, infantry posts are placed in the most covered places. The cavalry posts have to be supported by infantry, behind which they can retreat during the night since a person on foot can see farther at night than one on horseback. It is best if guards can be placed so that they can not be seen by the enemy, and if the terrain permits it is well if the sentries are placed at night in a position that they face uphill.

Patrols have to be constantly sent in the direction of the enemy so that its approach is learned of in time; especially at night they have to be continually on the road and always overlap. At night and during the daytime too, if the terrain is divided, small ambushes of one non-commissioned officer and four to six men can be laid at a certain distance before the outposts according to one's own decision. During the daytime or when the moon is bright the *jäger* on foot can be used for this and they can make prisoners of small parties or patrols of the enemy. However they have to do this without firing and without any noise. If they fail in this and the enemy notices them, they have to try and score some hits. This prevents the enemy from killing or taking one or the other sentries prisoners. This ensures one's own safety from hostile parties and scares the enemy so much that he will approach our outposts shaking with fear. The Americans are very skillful in placing such small ambushes for their own safety in front of their outposts, which has cost many an Englishman or German his life or his freedom. At the same time strong patrols of cavalry and infantry also have to be sent frequently against the enemy to confuse him and to punish him for believing he could catch one of our small patrols. Frequently whole squadrons and companies can be placed between the outposts and the enemy at night and in covered terrain, who can cut off and take prisoner those detachments of the enemy which have been sent out to capture our patrols, all of which will make the enemy fearful of approaching us.

During the daytime the corps is allowed to enjoy some rest as much as that is possible. However, one has to forbid the officers as well as the privates to wander even one step away from their companies. During the American War I have seen many a corps where no more than three officers were in camp during the afternoon, and once the commanding officer of such a corps has been too indulgent in this matter, the officers will find it an imposition to be deprived of their daily diversions. The cavalry dismounts during the daytime, the infantry takes off their

equipment, but as soon as the night falls everyone has to pick up his equipment and remount so that they are ready to receive the enemy no matter what happens. I have to admit without any prejudice that in the corps that I had the honor to serve in it did not take a minute at any hour of the night for the cavalry to be mounted and for the infantry to stand to their arms.

The officers and non-commissioned officers on outposts must be instructed well that they report to their commanding officer everything they hear or notice of the enemy, so that they do not make a mistake similar to the one who had heard strong artillery fire against one of our posts but who thought the fire to be too far away to be necessary to report.

Circumstances permitting, it is best to place one's posts as close to the enemy as possible. A soldier who can see the enemy will be twice as much on his guard and does everything willingly, and if the enemy be careless at any given moment one can quickly deal him a blow.

If one reaches his post during the nighttime one deploys in a little distance, remains under arms, and waits for daybreak. Meanwhile the most prominent inhabitants of the surrounding villages will be sent for again and the already cited rules are to be followed. Subsequently according to the information of these people sentries are mounted and the necessary patrols are sent out. Since it is not known yet, however, where one is going to stay it will be beneficial to send small parties of the infantry on reconnaissance patrols. Maybe they can take a few prisoners by which one can do the general a favor. I can remember from the campaign in Pennsylvania² that everything was risked to take a few prisoners since the inhabitants of whole districts had fled which made it impossible to find out anything about the enemy. Those people, however, who are in one's hands during the night must not be allowed to leave before daybreak.

One must also remember different places in the rear of one's posts where one can retreat to in case a superior enemy should attack and force us to retreat. In the direction of those places too patrols have to be sent constantly, and they may also be inspected in case one is posted too far in front of one's own army so that the enemy may not unexpectedly attack from the rear.

If, for the safety of the army or for other reasons, one is placed so far in advance of the army that one can not easily hope for support but must not lose sight of the enemy, one must never attach oneself to the same fortified place during the night. In this case one must never remain during the night at the same place where one stood during the daytime. Instead, each night either sideways or forwards or backwards a covered place has to be chosen for a camp. The outpost, which one is forced to maintain during the daytime, has to be manned by a guard

of constantly varying strength, and detachments have to patrol frequently from the outpost to the camp. This way any given district can be covered constantly and one can not be betrayed easily by the peasants and chased away by the enemy. If one had been ordered to man a post for example around Bettenhausen near Cassel to observe a strong enemy corps situated near Walburg so that it could not approach closer without the knowledge of the commanding general, one camp can be made near Orleshausen, the other near Heiligenrode, the third in the woods of Kaufungen, the fourth near Helsa, the fifth close to the enemy. This will confuse the enemy so much that he will ultimately desist from all further searches, since he has already made so many unsuccessful attempts to catch us.

If there happens to be a deep creek or a ravine in the rear of one's post one has to retreat behind it as soon as night falls. If, for example, we stood in the Waldau and the enemy was in Dörnhausen, the Forstbach would be in our rear. In this case one has to deploy during the night in the forest behind this creek.

No matter how far away the enemy may be, one must never relax in vigilance and precaution, something that frequently happens on fortified posts and in winter quarters. A daring enemy can easily make a strong march during long nights and be at one's throat at daybreak, since he who considers himself too safe is half lost already. How many sad examples are there not in the older and more recent history which are the result of this feeling of safety and indolence of a commanding officer on an outpost. Often enough, during the Hannoverian campaign of the late Seven Years' War, the French had to pay dearly for their indolence.

If, because of the harshness of the weather, one can no longer remain in the open terrain and is forced to give shelter to one's men, caution and vigilance have to be doubled. As many horses of the cavalry as possible are put in one place, and, just like out in the open field, the horses remain saddled during the daytime and the bridle-bit in during the night. The men are ordered to remain with their horses so that the cavalry can set out immediately. As soon as night falls, the infantry retreats in half or whole companies to their respective alarm houses, which have to be situated near the exits of the town. These houses as well as the locations where the cavalry is situated have to be inspected at different times by the leader of the corps. During those visits he has to talk loudly with his men so that they can hear him and see that he shares their hardships with them. Generally speaking he always does well who changes day into night and night into day. It would be a great misfortune for such a corps if its leader were a friend of comforts, since the old proverb is always true: Like master like man, and habits are everything with us human beings. While on such posts, alarm stations

also have to be assigned. The infantry can take theirs in the gardens near the exits of the village, the cavalry will be assigned a place either to the sides or the rear of the village on a free terrain where it can play its part.

It does not mean much if the enemy should appear during the day-time, since in this case one can survey the strength and deployment of the enemy. If the enemy should attack us during the night, and if one has no knowledge of its strength, one has to withdraw to the place chosen for a retreat, or where one has orders to retreat to in the face of a superior force. But one must not be too quick and rather estimate the strength of the enemy too low so that one does not give unnecessary alarm and later be ashamed of oneself.

If one has orders, however, to defend the village, as happens in winter quarters, one will try to barricade the exits of the town as well as possible with wagons and barrels filled with manure and defend oneself until help arrives. In this case the cavalry can dismount and also be used to defend the post.

If the enemy is beaten back, a detachment of cavalry will be sent after it to tease him on his retreat, to capture stragglers, and to follow the enemy, however slowly and carefully, until it is known whether he has really retreated and where to, so that a correct report can be given to the general.

If information concerning the approach and the intentions of the enemy have been received in time, and that he considers to undertake something against our post under cover of darkness, then one can easily lure him into a trap. As soon as the enemy is believed to be close, the sentries are called in and the exits and all advantageous locations of the post are manned. The enemy will not be challenged, rather complete silence is maintained, and once he is close enough a well-aimed volley will be given. The very moment that the enemy becomes disconcerted you undertake a sortie from a number of places with a party of infantry and cavalry, you throw yourself with the greatest vigor upon the enemy, cut down everyone who resists, and do not waste any time with taking prisoners so that the enemy gets scared off somewhat and will not return too quickly. However, once you have received information concerning the intentions of the enemy from your spies, you have to man well all exits of the village a few hours before the coup, so that no one may steal from the village and warn the enemy.

Once information has been received concerning the approach of the enemy one can also deploy outside the town at a given and covered locality which has been inspected in advance and only leave a cavalry guard at its post which will give fire at the advance of the enemy and then retreat to the side opposite one's own deployment. The enemy will certainly hurry to reach the place where he expects you at the same

time as you do. If he does that you attack him from all sides with a lot of noise. This will frighten the enemy so very much that he will search his luck in flight and in that case you will certainly get a good reward for your troubles. The Brunswick Major Hausmann who was deployed in the winter of 1761 at Raden in the area of Hildesheim did just that to a party of French who wanted to raid him and which had already captured an outpost. In this incident he took almost 200 French prisoners with his detachment, which was itself only 150 men strong.³

If you know exactly the route the enemy has to take in order to surprise you, you can also lay a party of your cavalry in an ambush on the side of the route, which must attack him from the rear and try to cut off his retreat once he is attacked from the front. It will certainly have a very good opportunity for this since the enemy will already be confused and have lost its courage because of his failed attack.

In general, an officer who is in charge of such a post will constantly have to be active and work on how to ensure his safety from all attacks of the enemy and he will be able to bring to naught even the best plans of the enemy. An officer who is concerned about his honor will do everything to not have to experience the shame of having been raided. Such an officer does not deserve any compassion and only a woman will feel sorry for him.

Vegetius writes thus: "A general who has been beaten in a pitched battle, although skill and conduct have the greatest share in beating him, may in his defense throw the blame on fortune. But if he has suffered himself to be surprised or drawn into the snares of his enemy, he has no excuse for his fault, because he might have avoided such a misfortune by taking proper precautions and employing spies on whose intelligence he could depend."⁴

What the Leader of a Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Has to Do When He Needs to Occupy and Defend a Fortified Town

As soon as he arrives at a town that is surrounded by a wall he has to observe all the rules given in the previous chapter. Immediately after his arrival he has to call together the most important members of the community, walk around the town with them on the inside and the outside, and personally inspect all entrances while patrols are out against the enemy to gather information about him. Should a river run through the town or close by, he has to be shown the spillways, or, if there are any, the floodgates, in order to lock them. If there should happen to be a monastery or an old castle near one of the entrances to the city you have to be doubly careful, since they usually have secret entrances and exits. One has to try to find out about them in order to avoid the misfortune which hit the French in Cremona and the Russian garrison in Cracow during the recent Polish unrest.¹

If you are in enemy country it will be wise to take hold of the magistrate of the town or the leadership of the monastery and to place them under guard in their homes as long as you are in the town. They are made to understand that the guard has orders to cut them down at the slightest alarm in case the enemy should enter the town through a concealed passage which has been kept secret. They also have to be forced to supply spies if it should prove impossible to get some volunteers, for whom they will be answerable with their properties and lives. If those people should be found to be malicious and obstinate, those threats can also be made in the presence of their wives and children, who will certainly urge them not to conceal anything with the intention of committing a hostile act.

After this the gates are occupied by guards; a double sentry is placed

on the highest tower of the town, from where everything suspicious that is noticed in the environs has to be reported to the commander. It is best if two good noncommissioned officers upon whom one can trust are chosen for this. Once the dispatched patrols return without any new information the men are dispatched to their quarters. The infantry, in half or full companies, is shown their alarm houses, which have to be close to the exits of the town; the cavalry gets its assembly point, which can be in the center of the town; and in general every officer is shown his post where he has to be in case of an attack.

As soon as the town has been well inspected from the inside as well as from the outside, and once those places where the enemy could approach unnoticed under cover of darkness have also been found, scaffolds are made behind the walls from carriages, saw horses, and high barrels upon which boards are laid, and which serve as a path along the ramparts. The sentries will stand on them so that they can see over the walls into the terrain, and the infantry will fire from them across the walls during an enemy attack. Above all one has to make certain that these scaffolds are made so high that the walls cover the soldier no farther up than to his navel so that he can not hide behind it. If the wall, which serves as a parapet, is too high, the soldier will stoop as much as possible, put his gun on the parapet, and fire into the air. If he is only covered half, however, he sees himself forced to fire well-aimed shots and to defend himself, since the bullets of the enemy can hit him too. In this case the *jäger* have to be completely distributed amongst the fusiliers, so that in the defense of the wall the riflemen are covered through bayonets from the storm of the enemies.

All gates with the exception of one, or two at the most, have to be completely closed off with manure or barrels that have been filled with soil. Those gates which remain open for entrance and exit have to be prepared in a way that allows them to be well closed off during the night or during an enemy attack. On the inside they also have to be covered by cross-girders in front of which deep trenches are dug, so that they can still be defended if the enemy has blown one open. The best means of securing the exits well is to place two strong trees with their branches crosswise on the inside, which can easily be pulled back if one wants to use the exit oneself. The branches of the tree have to be hewn to a point. The best trees for this purpose are apple trees. They are better than *chevaux-de-frise*² and can be easily prepared for this purpose.

If there happen to be apartments or towers on top of the gates, they have to be well manned during an enemy attack. Since the enemy will try in this case to make himself master of the gates, a number of big stones and wooden blocks can be laid at hand on them which are thrown at the enemy.

If there are openings in the wall they are closed with strong beams which are placed close together and dug deep into the ground, or also with pointed trees, whose trunks are buried in the ground.

If you are in enemy country you also have to confiscate the guns and ammunition from the inhabitants, which however can be secured in a safe place, so that everyone will get his property back. The pealing of church-bells has to be completely forbidden so that one can not be betrayed by the inhabitants to the enemy through a signal given with them. Nobody must be allowed to climb the towers as well, and after a certain hour in the evening everyone must remain in his house and not be suffered to leave it except in the greatest emergency.

Even though the rules which are given here are absolutely necessary for a good defense, they would nevertheless be without the least chance of success if the organization of such a post were not also carried out with the necessary order, precaution, and vigilance. Among them are that the guards and sentries be alert at all times and know well what they have to do. At times false alarm can be given so that one can see whether the officers and men are ready. Those however who arrive late at their assigned post have to be punished immediately, since in war not even the slightest mistake against the rules must be left unpunished.

Every day, 1 captain, 2 officers, and 100 men from the infantry and 40 to 50 horses (i.e., cavalry) have to be placed on reserve, who are always ready to depart at an instant. The captain and the two officers from the infantry check alternately the guards and sentries during these twenty-four hours to make sure that they are in order and alert.

As soon as night falls, the gates are closed and barricaded, and they are not to be opened before it is completely day, when the dispatched patrols return. During the night the gate must not be opened for anyone, no matter who he might be. The infantry has to be under arms in its alarm houses, the horses of the cavalry have to be saddled. One or two hours before daybreak the guards may be relieved, but since this is one of the most dangerous times, both guards have to remain under arms and the old guard must not retire before broad daylight.

The best means to defend oneself against raids and to discover the arrival of the enemy in time is to maintain, during the night, scouts and small parties on foot and mounted in the field at about one hour's distance from the town, who continually patrol all roads and paths in the whole area, and who do not return until broad daylight. While on post near Portsmouth³ in Virginia this was the only means to discover the approach of the enemy in time, because the inhabitants of the city as well as the people of the whole area were rebels, and those few who could be called royalist were so frightened off by the enemy that they did not dare to give the least bit of information.⁴ In addition, every

morning with daybreak strong patrols on horseback and on foot, but never of the same strength, have to be sent out to collect information on the enemy. They often have to go as far as possible so that one is informed of everything that happens in the whole area. It has to be well impressed upon the leader of this patrol that he advance cautiously, not to stop at a place where he can not constantly survey the surrounding countryside, and that he also not make the grave mistake of entering a house with his men to eat a meal with relish. Should something like this happen anyway and one finds out about it, exemplary punishment has to be meted out without any leniency.⁵

If a patrol should stay gone beyond the usual time, or maybe even have fallen into enemy hands, a second patrol has to be sent out immediately, which then has to use all precaution to find out what happened to the first patrol. And if the former is lost, the latter has to return as speedily as possible after it has gained certain knowledge of it. During this time the commander of the town has to place his men under arms and man all posts well in order to be prepared to receive the enemy. The men must not be allowed to disperse again until he has been convinced by the information from the second patrol that the enemy who took the first patrol has retreated again.

But if the small parties or the dispatched patrols should meet the enemy at night, they have to retreat to the town with lots of firing so that one can hear in time that the enemy is coming. On the other hand they must not be too fast in this and find out whether it be not just a small party of the enemy so that there is no false alarm. More than once I have heard the horrible news that nothing but sky and people could be seen, but at a closer investigation it turned out to be but a small enemy party. The men have to be reprimanded for such false reports, and if it should happen more than once they have to be punished.

The parties which are sent out at night have to receive a password, with which they have to identify themselves with the guard if they want to be admitted. In this case the guard has to stand to its arms, no matter how convinced they may be that it is one of our parties, and then one after the other is admitted. If the approaching party is composed of cavalry they have to be made to dismount before the gate is opened and the riders have to lead their horses at the entrance.

The guards at the gates also have to be ordered to keep a sharp eye on all who come and go, so that no stranger can steal into the town without their knowledge. All covered wagons or those who are loaded with hay or straw have to be stopped at a certain distance from the gate and must not be allowed to enter until they have been searched diligently as to whether people or arms might be hidden in them.

During market days and important holidays the men have to stand

to their arms, and it is best if the former are prohibited altogether. During the latter the inhabitants have to be ordered by the magistrate of the town to keep things very quiet.

If it should be the season of thick fogs, the gates must not be opened until they have completely dispersed.

If the enemy should try to cause frequent alarms or if he alarm another post nearby, one has to be twice as careful and never count on it being a false alarm, because it is better to stand to arms unnecessarily than too late.

If these rules are obeyed one hardly runs the risk of having the enemy at one's throat unexpectedly. However, if he appears one has to consult one's orders, and if those specify that the post be defended as long as possible or until help arrives, then one has to be firmly determined to rather die with honor than to grow old covered with shame, because the desire for true honor diminishes the love of life. However, it is well, if, once you run the danger of being caught with bag and baggage even after the best defense, the cavalry, with the exception of a small detachment with the worst horses, is sent from the town in time. If they have to fight their way through, and even if they should lose half their strength in it, it is nevertheless more honorable that a corps of cavalry try its best to escape rather than be caught in a fortified town without striking a blow.

The late Hannoverian Colonel von Diemar showed the world during the campaign of 1761 what a brave and determined officer can do in a town that is surrounded by an old wall. This brave man defended the town of Horn in Westphalia with 400 Hannoverians and Hessians for more than 48 hours against a French corps of 3,000 to 4,000 men so valiantly that they were forced to refrain from their enterprise and to retreat.⁶

In just as valiant a way Colonel Udam with his battalion of the British Legion defended the city of Meppen in the area of Munster. This skillful and brave officer did not surrender to the French until the heat from the flames of those burning houses which stood close to the city walls forced his men to leave the walls. His enemies, however, with their innate magnanimity, honored the conquered and granted him an advantageous surrender because of his valiant defense.⁷

And who of us Hessians does not know the brave and gallant defense of Hoboken under the English Captain Ward?⁸ This post lay on the right side of the Hudson River in the Province of Jersey, consisted of a blockhouse surrounded by a trench and an abatis, and was occupied by this venerable man with sixty refugees⁹ with orders to protect the woodcutters of the army. General Wayne¹⁰ attacked this post on July 20, 1780, with 2,000 rebels and 6 cannons and had almost 60 cannonballs fired at this blockhouse, thereby killing 4 refugees and wounding

10. When the Americans saw that the cannonade had no effect on such determined people, they stormed the abatis and penetrated it in various places, where they were received very warmly, however by the refugees. Captain Warth, who preferred the bed of honor to life, admonished his men to a valiant defense with the following words: "Gentlemen, you see that we will have to fight to the last man, because if we should get caught you know how badly the rebels treat us royalist Americans. Let us prefer death to a disgraceful captivity, because here is the place to die honorably for one's king."

After a stubborn battle of three hours, these brave men forced the enemy to retreat with shame and maintained the post during the whole campaign.

O friends, let us worship these men, let us take them as an example, and with Xenophon let us remember these words at each and every opportunity in war: "And what age must I myself wait to attain? For surely I shall never be any older, if this day I give myself up to the enemy."¹¹ And even if fortune should not smile upon you and even turn its back on you after you have done everything possible you must nevertheless not become discouraged but never stop trying to perform miracles.

On the Rules to Be Observed in Reconnaissance

That officer who has been sent out on reconnaissance with a detachment either is supposed to reconnoitre the approaches to the enemy camp, or the position and strength of the enemy, or to protect a general officer in the vicinity. This is not one of the easiest undertakings in war. One has to proceed very carefully and acquire beforehand an exact knowledge of the area to be covered.

If an officer is sent into an open terrain for these purposes, the detachment assigned has to consist of cavalry. The most important point is not to approach the enemy with the whole detachment, which can cause the whole enterprise to fail for two reasons. If you approach with your whole detachment and the enemy finds out your intentions, he certainly will not suffer such a detachment for long in his vicinity but attack and try to chase you back. If he reaches you he will most certainly beat you because of his superiority in numbers, and you have to seek your safety in flight, especially if you are too far away from the army and can not hope for support.

However, if you have divided your detachment into two or three groups and made your disposition *en échelon* formation,¹ you can easily retreat with that part with which you approach the enemy, since you still have a reserve force. Once the enemy notices that you still have a reserve behind you, he will certainly be taken aback and not pursue too hotly. I have always followed this rule in the American War and have always had good success with it.

Let us assume that you are to reconnoitre an enemy post with 300 horses. You divide them into three groups. The first is left behind at the place where you assume you will be able to see the enemy post. The

commander of this party has to send out patrols to the left and the right, who inquire from the peasants about the enemy and who have to report everything they find out. In a distance of about one quarter or half an hour you leave the second group behind in the same way, and its commanding officer has to act in the same way as the first.

With the third group you now approach the enemy as close as possible. These last 100 horses are divided into four troops, two of which should spread out to skirmish with the advance posts of the enemy and to drive them back. You can unconcernedly take a risk here, since before the enemy will have found out that this is only a small detachment you will have seen everything that you want to see. During reconnaissance in East Chester in 1776, I came, by accident, with 100 *jäger* so close to the camp of General [George] Washington that the whole army stood to arms. Since the whole terrain was covered with forest the enemy noticed too late that it had been only a detachment which had come so close to him.²

Once you have seen what you want to see and as soon as the enemy approaches, you retreat with the greatest order. Once the enemy finds out that you still have troops in reserve, and since he can not know how strong you are, he will let you go in peace and only pursue you from a distance.

In the spring of 1762, now General von Riedesel, at that time lieutenant colonel and commander of the Brunswick Regiment of Hussars, was sent with 500 horses from Dassel to Göttingen to find out how much French cavalry was in that city and in the area. One evening he set out from the above-mentioned town and arrived the next morning with daybreak in Esebeck, a village that is a little less than an hour away from Göttingen. Behind this village he left four squadrons. Then he took two squadrons with him and took prisoner a picket and a detachment of infantry of the enemy near the Farbemühle close to Göttingen. It did not take long, however, for a corps of French cavalry of more than 2,000 men to arrive, with which the two advance squadrons skirmished for a while. Once they were pressed by the enemy, Mr. von Riedesel ordered two of the squadrons that were standing behind Esebeck to advance, and after a short while the two others were also to show themselves. As soon as the French noticed them they became cautious and did not press as hard any more, since they could not know what else was hidden behind the village. Mr. von Riedesel retreated after he found out what he had been looking for, and the French admired his retreat.³

As you can see, this example contains all the rules which I have presented in this chapter. If Mr. von Riedesel had approached Göttingen with his complete detachment he would certainly have been defeated by such a numerous cavalry. Since the enemy saw support come twice

from behind the village he suspected Riedesel's retreat to be a ruse and he nourished the distrust that a trap had been laid for him behind the village in which he was supposed to be caught.

If the terrain which you are to reconnoitre is divided, your disposition does not have to be changed, only that your detachment has to be composed of cavalry and infantry. Since the majority of our officers know the area around Cassel, I want to illustrate these rules, for the benefit of my comrades, more closely with an example which is based on this district. Let us suppose that the enemy is in Röhrenfurth, and the detachment which is to reconnoitre the enemy is sent from Cassel.

In this case you depart from Cassel with 300 horses and 200 men on foot one hour before daybreak, and since we also suppose that our patrols go beyond Dörnhagen you can go safely up to this area.

As soon as you get into the area around Schwarzenbach, and after you have had this area searched well by your advance men and are certain that no one of the enemy is hidden in this area, you leave 100 men infantry and 20 horses under an officer in the ravines and the thicket on either side. They can easily hide in these places, which also form a pass, and patrol to the left and the right in order to collect information about the enemy from the peasants of Wellerode and Guckshagen.

On the height this side of the village Heyerode you leave 80 horses behind which break up into two troops and patrol to the left and the right. They can be accompanied by 20 *jäger* on foot who patrol the forest on the left and occupy the houses along the road.

In the forest near Körle you leave 30 men infantry who, on their left, have to occupy and patrol the footpath to Röhrenfurt. On the open terrain next to the road near Melsungen you deploy 100 horses which act like those near Heyerode.

With the remaining 100 horses and 50 men infantry you approach to the enemy outpost as closely as possible in order to reconnoitre it. As soon as you have achieved your purpose, and once the enemy approaches with a superior force, which he will certainly do, you retreat from one post to the other. Though he should closely pursue you to Körhle, or even to Heyerode, you can bait him into the fire of the infantry which you have hidden in the area around Schwarzenbach, and as soon as he has found that out he will certainly refrain from any further pursuits.

On Raids in an Open Terrain and Against Walled Towns

Raids are among those actions of war which, if successful, will dishearten the enemy, cause him lots of trouble, and gradually wear him down. They also demand lots of cleverness and speed in their execution though, great prudence and knowledge of the country and a safe retreat, in a word, a thorough acquaintance with war.

The best time for their execution is the night, since then the enemy can neither observe our movements nor our strength. He is also thrown much easier into disarray. Such a raid will strike terror in him, he will imagine your strength to be twice its actual size. You also have to arrange it so that your attack is one hour before daybreak at the earliest, since this is the time in which sleep most tempts those who have remained awake throughout the night.

For such undertakings you need good scouts and sure guides, which can lead you to the enemy via circuitous routes so that you can attack from more than one direction. You have to know the strength of the enemy, how and where his posts are deployed, where and how far his patrols go, how strong they are, and how soon a neighboring post can come to his support.

You can raid the enemy once you have found out or realize which post in our vicinity he has to occupy. If the terrain be divided, you lay an ambush in the rear of the enemy before he occupies the post. While occupying the post he will least expect a raid from the rear and will direct his attention more to his front than his rear, and this way you can raid the enemy as soon as night falls. This way 100 men can surprise a detachment of 1,000 men.

You can also approach the posts of the enemy during the night with

a party of cavalry as closely as possible, and as soon as they challenge you, fire at you, and retreat, you gallop back with them and attack the enemy before he knows what happened. General von Luckner thus raided the Corps of Monet in the campaign of 1762 near the Fasanenhof in the vicinity of Cassel. These people lay next to their horses with the reins in hand, yet Luckner's hussars attacked the French so rapidly that only a small part of them could mount their horses.¹

Since, in an open terrain, such raids have to be carried out with the utmost speed, you can only use cavalry for them. You divide it into two or three groups, bravely attack the enemy from various directions, and retreat as speedily as possible after the raid.

If you are not far away from an enemy post you can also alarm it daily, by which you can lull him into a false sense of security, and then attack him unexpectedly, which is usually most successful around noon-time.

If you have to cross a pass or a river in order to carry out such an attack, and if you are forced to return via the same way, you occupy it with a party of infantry until your return. Let us suppose you want to attack the enemy in Oberkaufungen or Helsa from Zwergen, and you cross the Fulda River near the new mill. In this case, in order to secure the retreat of your cavalry, you have to occupy the new mill and the adjacent houses with infantry, from where you can easily cover the retreat of the cavalry though small arms fire, especially rifle fire.

This was done by the Ducal Brunswickian Major von Speth on the day after the Battle of Wilhelmstal. During broad daylight he crossed the Weser near the monastery of Herbertshausen with 200 mounted *jäger*, where he stationed a party of *jäger* on foot to cover his retreat. Then, in full view of a strong French corps encamped near Dransfeld, he raided the escort of the Saxon hospital at Volkmarshausen, took 150 prisoners and a sizable booty, and returned safely to the left bank of the Weser without the loss of a single man.²

You can also raid, during a very dark night, a party of cavalry with a party of infantry, even if the latter be three times as strong in numbers as you are, as long as it is posted close to a forest or in an otherwise covered terrain. In order to carry out this raid, you crawl up to them as closely as possible via a circuitous route. Then you fire a salvo of small arms fire at them so that man and horse be startled, attack the enemy with mounted bayonet, and quickly cut everyone down who wants to put up resistance. Then you take along with you everything in prisoners and horses that you can haul away and, your blow completed, retreat as speedily as possible.

All of this shows how much knowledge and skill are required for raids in an open terrain, yet those against walled towns are even more demanding. Besides all other difficulties connected with scaling walls

and opening gates you have to remove a lot of additional obstacles as well.

You attack such towns once you have been informed by your scouts or deserters that the enemy is negligent in his guard duty and does not use the necessary precautions, or if you are in connivance with the inhabitants of the town, who can lead into the town through an opening which has been left unguarded by the enemy, or you scale the walls with ladders which you try to lean on that side of the town which the enemy left unmanned.

Such enterprises demand especially good spies and scouts who inform you of everything and who can lead you through the most covered terrain. They have to know how high the walls are so that you can build your ladders accordingly, also, where the wall is lowest, and where it is not guarded by sentries of the enemy. They also have to well know their way around inside the town, so that you know where the headquarters are and where the most important officers, especially the commanding officer, live. Because if you can get secretly into the town this way, if you can surprise the sentries at the gate without any noise, and raid the headquarters and take the commanding officer prisoner, you can be certain of the best success of your undertaking.

In the campaign of 1760, while still hereditary prince, His Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick raided the French in Zierenberg in such a secretive way. A certain number of soldiers were distributed in all the streets of Zierenberg without the garrison of the town noticing anything. Thereupon His Serene Highness let beat the French signal for assembly, and as each Frenchman wanted to run from his quarters to the alarm station he was either cut down or taken prisoner. I am certain that this trick is unparalleled in history.³

In just such a secret way the Royal Prussian Colonel Mr. von Bülow raided the town of Marburg. In 1760, the allied army under Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick stood on the left bank of the Diemel, and the French army stood in the vicinity of Cassel. Mr. von Bülow, who was posted with the British Legion in Stadtbergen, left this town, crossed the Diemel, and took part in the raid on Zierenberg. After this well executed raid he took his retreat to Volkmarsen, crossed through the Principality of Waldeck, forded the Eder near Frankenberg, crossed the Lahn, and raided Marburg. He arrived at the town at daybreak, personally took the guard at the gate, and after he had it under control made his infantry follow him. He then surprised the main guardhouse in such a secret way that they did not notice anything until he was in the guardroom with a number of soldiers, where the officer of the watch was found in his pyjamas. Thereupon he disarmed the guard and locked them up and took his way to the castle which he intended to surprise in the same secret manner. On the way there he met an enemy patrol

coming from the castle which became suspicious, opened fire, and hurried back to the castle, whereupon the commander of the castle immediately opened fire on the town with cannons. Thus he [Bülow] had to let it rest at that and retreated the same day to Frankenberg. Along the way he had also sent a detachment of cavalry under the Hannoverian Captain von Padewitz against Butzbach, who had raided there two French mounted grenadier companies and come away with a lot of cattle, which joined Mr. von Bülow again in Frankenberg. He had planned on taking his way back via Corbach, but since he was informed that a French corps had marched there which threatened to cut off his retreat, he directed his march toward the hills of the Sauerland via Brülen and safely joined the army again.⁴

Generally speaking you will find that the farther you are away from the enemy the more successful your raids will be, because many a man deems himself safe because of the great distance to the enemy. He becomes lax and is least prepared for an attack, something that is again proven by the attack of the French on the island of St. Eustatius. Since it contains very many lessons for an officer, let me quote this example here.⁵

After the conquest of the Dutch island of St. Eustatius, the British admiral Sir Rodney had the island fortified. On the rampart overlooking the landing site 70 cannon were mounted, in the fort in the upper town were placed 32 guns, and the 13th and 14th regiments under Colonel Cockburn were left there as garrison. It was believed that 1,000 men, if they did their duty, could defend the place against 10,000 men. An attack by the enemy seemed quite impossible, especially since the islands of Antigua and St. Christopher lie in the vicinity of St. Eustatius, and since the English maintained strong fleets in these waters, and everyone slept here in the greatest safety.⁶

At St. Pierre and Case Pilote on November 15, 1781, the Marquis de Bouillé,⁷ who had been informed of the negligence of the English, embarked under various pretexts and as secretly as possible a detachment of land troops on the following ships: the frigate *Amazone*, the *Galatee*, the corvette *The Eagle*, the two sloops of war *St. Louis* and *Diligent* and the two schooners *La Felicite* and *La Charmante*.⁸

The detachment of land troops consisted of 400 men of the Regiment Auxerrois, 320 men of Royal Comtois, 400 men of the Irish Brigade, 50 grenadiers of the Regiment Martinique, and 24 men of the artillery.⁹ Along the way a number of pilots were taken on board in order to give this expedition a different appearance. The canal of Dominique was passed, where the fleet lay still for four days, and on the 20th it sailed to the lee of Martinique, where it tacked for a few days. In the night of the 22nd this little fleet pursued its course on the leeseide

of the islands, and toward 9 o'clock at night it sighted the island of St. Eustatius.

The two sloops, each of which was equipped with a large boat, after some problems, cast anchor in the entrance to Jenkins Bay northeast of the island, while the frigates remained a short distance away.

Count Dillon, who was on board the *Diligent* with the *chasseurs* of his brigade, landed first.¹⁰ The sea was so rough that their boats were thrown so hard against the cliffs that some of the men fell out of the boats and perished in the water. Later the Marquis de Bouillé landed with the same great danger. In his boat, which capsized, he had a part of the Irish Brigade, but fortunately the men were saved. Those who had landed first, had to try to climb the 700- to 800-foot high cliffs and to gain the height, since no other route was available. This was safely done with the Marquis de Bouillé in his usual fearlessness setting the example for his troops. One hour before daybreak 400 men were thus safely landed and the thought of landing more troops was out of the question, since almost all the boats would have been blown to pieces on the rocks. Thus the Marquis had been placed in the position of either winning or dying. It was known that they would have to deal with a numerically superior garrison, and a safe retreat was out of the question. Thus the Marquis de Bouillé gave his orders, placed himself at the head of this handful of brave men, and set out against the enemy ramparts, from which he was still one and one half miles¹¹ away after everything possible had been done.

Count Dillon with the Irish Brigade had orders to divide his detachment into two divisions and to take a direct route to the barracks. One of them was to conquer the battery to the right of the city, while the other was to surprise the governor in his house. Mr. de Fresne, major in the Regiment Royal Comtois,¹² was detached with 100 *chasseurs* to scale the fort if necessary if he could not gain the gate of it. The Vicomte de Damas had orders to support this attack with the rest of his troops.¹³

Count Dillon arrived at the barracks around 6:00 A.M., in front of which a part of the English garrison was drilling. Initially they did not suspect anything because of the red coats of the Irish Brigade. The moment they were fired on from about a pistol-shot away they became aware of the reality and Colonel Cockburn, who was drilling his men, was taken prisoner.

Mr. de Fresne, who at the same time arrived at the fort into which the English wanted to retreat, took control of the bridge the moment the English wanted to raise it. In this attack Mr. de la Motte, *capitaine en seconde* in the company of *chasseurs* of the regiment Auxerrois,¹⁴ who forced the enemy to desert the chains of the bridge, distinguished him-

self very much. He pursued the garrison, which wanted to flee in groups to the fort, so hotly that they laid down their arms once the *Sieur de Fresne* had raised the bridge. Afterwards all prisoners were collected in the fort, and the loss of the French consisted only of ten men.

This example shows how careful an officer has to be who is in charge of such a post, and that he has to be most careful there where no danger is apparent. It also shows, however, what miracles can be performed in war through secrecy, determination, and skill. Nevertheless, the whole affair could have ended for the French in a misfortune if the English colonel had attacked the French with the bayonet the moment they opened fire on him. If he had been defeated anyway, he probably would have been fortunate enough for his person not have survived the shame of having been surprised.

You can also raid walled towns if a river runs through them or close by them, where there are drainage ditches or weirs which the enemy has fail to give any attention to. On February 7, 1772, during the Polish riots, the Royal French Colonel Mr. de Choisy surprised the Russians in Cracow this way.¹⁵

The corps of the confederacy which had been ordered to carry out the attack consisted of 600 men, led by Mr. de Choisy, Colonel of the *Legion de Lorraine*. They set out at 2:00 A.M. from Tiniec. As soon as they were before Cracow, which was around 3:00 A.M., he divided his corps into two divisions. One of them was 420 men strong and led by Mr. de Choisy himself, the other was 180 men strong and was led by Messrs. Saillant, Vioménil, and Charlot.¹⁶ The latter crossed the Vistula, since it was frozen solid, from where he reached the canal that went from the castle to the Vistula, passed a small opening through which a man could only crawl with a lot of difficulties, and from there entered the castle. There he found the Russians asleep, cut 120 of them down, and took 91 prisoners. After this fortunate success had been reported to Mr. de Choisy, he hurried with his division to support the other division, which had fought since 9:00 A.M. against 800 Russians who formed the garrison of the city. He overran a cavalry unit which was superior in numbers to his, and united with the other division, which brought the raid to a successful end. During his brave action Mr. de Charlot broke a thigh, and even before one of his men had joined the *Sieur de Vioménil* the latter had already killed two Russian sentries and a captain.

You can also surprise the enemy in such posts with the help of covered wagons or wagons loaded with hay or straw, especially if you know that the enemy has called for forage. You take a certain number of wagons, hide three to four men in each of them, harness six horses to each of them, and put three soldiers on the wagons who are dressed like peasants and who carry a pistol and a sword hidden under their

clothes. If you have young men in your corps who do not yet have a strong growth of beard you can dress them up like peasant girls in order to better avoid any suspicion. These are followed by a detachment of cavalry and infantry which approaches the town as closely as possible under cover of darkness and remains hidden there. At day-break the wagons approach the town, and if they should get to the guard at the gate without being stopped, they fall on the guards and cut everyone down who resists. Then one of them has to give the agreed-upon signal to the leader of the detachment which is hidden near-by, which will hurry up immediately to support the attack and to help conquer the town.¹⁷

At the beginning of the campaign of the year 1762, Colonel von Wintzingerode wanted to raid the castle of Sabbaburg, located seven hours from Cassel, this way. But an enemy patrol, which came to meet these wagons, fired at them without much attack or searching, which prevented this well thought-out plan.¹⁸

You can also approach a town which is occupied by the enemy with cavalymen at night, each of whom has a second man behind him on the horse, and who dismount as soon as you reach the gate. To the guard at the gate you claim to be members of a defeated party which is pursued by the enemy and you ask the officer of the guard to open the gate as quickly as possible, otherwise he would have to bear the responsibility if this detachment would fall into enemy hands in front of his very own eyes. If the commanding officer of the guard does not know his duty and opens the gate, the raid has been successful, and if he does not want to concur and opens fire and makes noise, you retreat without having lost anything. Thus in 1632 Duke Bernhard of Weimar raided the town of Mannheim, and the Spanish commander of the town had to pay with his head for the negligence and ignorance of the officer on guard at the gate who had opened the same.¹⁹

As far as the order of marching in such undertakings is concerned, I refer the reader to the fourth chapter, where I have dealt with secret marches. The soldiers have to be prohibited under penalty of death, once you have entered the enemy post, to fall into the houses of the enemy, to rob and to plunder and to disperse, all of which can be of severe consequence and which has quite often already contributed to the failure of the best-planned design.

In such cases you also have to completely prohibit all firing to your men and attack the enemy with an unloaded gun. The less noise you make the more you can check the order and the soldier will not get too agitated. To prevent this you make the soldier clean out his gun, which is what His Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick had done in the raid on Zierenberg, and which rule was also followed by General Grey in the raid on Whitemarsh in Pennsylvania, where he surprised a corps

of 2,000 rebels under General Wayne with 400 men of the English light infantry.²⁰

Even though these examples of meritorious officers contain all the rules which have to be considered in raids I nevertheless think that my comrades will not disapprove my giving an example which is based on a terrain which is known to many of them.

Let us suppose that one part of the army is quartered in Cassel and in the villages on the right bank of the Fulda, and the enemy has covered his quarters by the Diemel. He also has occupied Volkmarsen with 1,000 men, but we do not want to suffer him in this village any longer. Since we have also found out through spies that the enemy is very lax in his guard duty, we want to take this town away from him through a raid.

Since we assume that it is winter, when it gets dark at 5:00 P.M., we unexpectedly order the gates closed one afternoon, so that no one can leave and inform the enemy. But everybody who wants to enter Cassel will be allowed to pass unmolested. At 5:00 in the afternoon orders are given for 600 men infantry and 300 horses, which are already assembled on the market square, to take bread and forage for one day with them.

At 6:00 in the evening we leave Cassel, and since Volkmarsen is six hours away from there, we can safely count on being in the vicinity of the enemy post by 4:00 A.M. the next morning.

Two hundred men infantry and 100 horses under the leadership of an experienced officer of our detachment are sent in the direction of Warburg. At daybreak they have to make their appearance on the height on the right bank of the Diemel to attract the attention of the enemy. This way the officer of the enemy in charge in the area of Warburg will not be able to send support to Volkmarsen if he should find out that Volkmarsen has been attacked. But even if despite all of this a strong detachment should come to the aid of Volkmarsen from this corner, our detachment still has nothing to fear, since that district is so covered with forests that you can always make a safe retreat. The commanding officer of this detachment, however, has to report in time everything that should happen in his area to the commanding officer in charge of the raid on Volkmarsen.

That detachment, which by now consists of 400 men infantry and 200 horses, and which is to carry out the raid, takes its march in the utmost silence via Dörnberg, to the left of Zierenberg, and takes the road on its left to Nieder Elsungun through the forest, from where it is only a good quarter of an hour away from Volkmarsen. Here the corps assembles, and each officer checks his platoon to make sure that no soldier is missing. Because if that should have happened you must call

in the detachment that has been sent toward Warburg and cancel everything.²¹

The advance guard consists of one officer with thirty men infantry, followed at a distance of fifty paces by an officer with thirty horses, followed by the rest of the infantry and the cavalry. On this occasion the officer of the advance guard must not be on horseback but lead his men on foot so that he can the better hear and notice everything. He himself plus two men constantly have to be ten to twelve paces ahead of the men and stop and listen frequently. If he should notice an enemy patrol he reports this immediately to the officer of the cavalry who reports it farther back. He himself lies down with his men on either side of the street and lets the enemy patrol pass. As soon as it has passed he blocks off the road with his men and calls upon the enemy patrol to surrender, at which moment the officer of the cavalry charges the enemy with his troop and receives the enemy patrol. There are two alternatives here: You either have to be able to let the enemy patrol pass back and forth without being noticed, or you have to try to catch it without noise and without a single man being able to escape. The first alternative is the best, because it will make the enemy feel even safer.

As soon as you reach the height near Nieder Elsung, you immediately detach 3 good noncommissioned officers with ten to twelve horses each, of which the first will patrol the roads on this side of the Erpe toward Warburg, the second does the same toward Welda, and the third passes Volksmarsen on the left and watches the roads to Rhoden and Stadtbergen, which are also occupied by the enemy.

These patrols have to pretend to be patrols of the enemy in the neighboring villages in order to find out from the peasants everything noteworthy about the enemy. They have to place sentinels on the highest locations so that they can discover from afar whether the enemy be approaching, and have to report immediately to the commanding officer as soon as they can make out the strength of the enemy. If they should discover a weak enemy patrol they have to hide and try to catch it. Those patrols, however, have to be urgently instructed not to distance themselves farther than one half-hour, three-fourths of an hour at the most, from Volksmarsen.

The infantry is divided into five divisions, of which four will make the attacks on the four gates of the town. Each division gets its guide and a number of ladders, which have been brought along from Cassel. With them we will try to scale the walls of the town, counting six men for each ladder.

Each leader of a division has to be given strict orders to approach the walls, to lean the ladders to, and to try and scale the walls in the utmost silence. As soon as he has entered the town on the other side of the

walls, without having been discovered by the enemy, he has to assemble his men, try to surprise the guard on the gate, and open the gate immediately so that the cavalry can enter. As soon as that has taken place everyone marches toward the center of the town in order to surprise the main guardhouse or to put it out of action. All enemies who put up any resistance are attacked with the bayonet, without firing, while calling out loud that those who surrender will be given quarter. One officer of these four divisions has to be selected to hurry to the quarters of the commanding officer as soon as he has gained a safe footing in the town and to take him prisoner.

The cavalry is also divided into five divisions, each of which is assigned a gate in the vicinity of which they have to stop and through which they have to enter as soon as it is opened. That troop which enters the town first immediately sends some riders to the other troops to instantly lead them through the gate that was opened first. Thereafter the cavalry will try to disperse everyone who resists, to cut them down or to take them prisoners.

The fifth division of the cavalry as well as that of the infantry serves as a reserve which is deployed on the height before the forest near Nieder Elsungen. Since you can view all of Volkmarsen from this height it can always provide timely support. Which is why this reserve has to be entrusted to an officer who has courage and skill. He will also continuously send small parties of cavalry and infantry to the town which will receive the prisoners so that they can not become a burden to those who have taken them prisoners in the town. This officer will take all arms away from the prisoners with the exception of their knives and force them to sit down in a group and guard them on all sides with his men. Amongst the prisoners officers and noncommissioned officers are separated from the men so that they can not talk to each other.

As soon as you are in charge of the town you have to consult your orders: you either occupy it or you leave it again. In the former case I refer to the sixth chapter; in the latter you call assembly and march with your whole corps to the height of Nieder Elsungen, where you hand out some refreshments, which you have brought back from the town, to your men. During this time you take care of the wounded of both sides, and those who can be transported are carried along on wagons just like everything else in horses and other booty that you have taken away from the enemy. Your small parties are called in and orders are given to the officer who had been deployed toward Warburg to retreat on the quickest route toward Dörnberg. In case he should hear firing on the road from Cassel to Volkmarsen, however, he has to retreat to the latter town in order to support the party near Volkmarsen.

As soon as the small parties have been called in and the transportation of the wounded is taken care of, they are sent the direct route to

Cassel, together with the prisoners. For an escort they are given all those men who have suffered the greatest exertions in the raid. As soon as the wagons have one hour's head start you follow them with the rest, and since the reserve has not suffered much it will form the rearguard.

If the commanding officer of Warburg should have received news of the raid and if he should try with all his might to push back the detachment that has been deployed toward Warburg in order to reach us on our retreat, that detachment has to retire, firing constantly, via Breuna toward Volksmarsen in order to unite with the detachment which has carried out the raid here. Since the enemy will try everything to cut off the retreat toward Zierenberg, you take your march through the forest along the Erpe and retreat via Niedenstein between Nothfelden and Altenhasungen.

You can also make a different disposition in order to carry out such raids. The following especially is very good in case you can not reach the enemy in one march.

In order to carry out the raid you divide your corps into groups of fifty or sixty men. They set out in all directions from the town that serves as your base. These small groups are given an assembly point which is not far away from the enemy post which is to be attacked. Concurrently you spread the rumor that these detachments have been sent out to levy forage and food. Each of these small parties, however, has to be accompanied by an officer who can be secretly let in on the plan.

Such small parties which have departed on all sides confuse the enemy and can not give the enemy reasons for suspicion for great undertakings. You have to remember, however, that the execution of the raid depends on those groups which have the farthest distance to go. An example: if you want to surprise Marburg or Corbach you can designate the forest near Frankenberg as the assembly point, but each group has to have a good guide who will lead these troops through the most covered terrain.

The famous French partisan Mr. de La Croix has often used this method of surprising the enemy, and he proves in his writings through examples that they often contributed to the success of his very many tricky ventures.

This excellent treatise on the little war can be found in the *Breslauer Kriegesbibliothek*. It is a book which covers all aspects of the science of war. It can not be recommended enough to an officer who loves his vocation and who wants to learn something.²²

How the Commanding Officer of a Corps or a Detachment, Composed of Cavalry and Infantry, Who Holds the Advance Post of an Army Has to Act if the Enemy Retreats

The retreat of the enemy may occur either after a lost battle or other misfortunes which may force the enemy to it. In this case it is the duty of the leader of a light corps to pursue the enemy closely, to harass him on all sides without endangering his corps too much, and to take advantage of the slightest disarray which can be detected during these movements of the enemy.

In all of this you have to take into consideration that people who retreat are always discontented. The common soldier, who rarely can guess and understand the secret plans of the general, believes, as soon as he has to take a few steps backward, that everything is lost. Added to this has to be the panic, which is rarely missing in a retreat, which is really inexplicable but shows that the courage of a man is periodic.

Those, however, who pursue the enemy are full of courage, and dream of great booty. In this situation you can achieve everything with the soldier. He believes, since the enemy is retreating, that his whole fate and fortune will improve.

This is the time when the leader of a light corps or a detachment can perform the most brilliant strokes, often before a great audience, especially if his own army is following him on his heels, which can easily support him in all cases. Here an officer can show his skills if he can take advantage of the confusion of the enemy and deal him a blow at a time when he is still dismayed over his previous loss. Here he can seize a chance of a lifetime.¹

If the retreat of the enemy should lead him through mountainous or divided terrain, and if he carry it out with all precaution, never neglecting his flanks, occupying in advance the defiles in his back and cover-

ing his rear, then he can easily cause the one who pursues him so many problems that he will not gain much. He will use all precautions in every step he takes in order to avoid falling into a trap in those environs which are suitable for an ambush. Which is what happened during the retreat of the English army under the general Sir [Henry] Clinton from Philadelphia through the province of Jersey to Sandy Hook. During this retreat, which lasted for three weeks in the hottest season of the year, and which led through the most impassable forests, Colonel von Wurmb with the Anspach and Hessian *jäger* continuously formed the rearguard. It was supported by the English light infantry, and despite the fact that Count Pulaski and the Marquis de LaFayette harassed the rearguard daily and tried everything to deal it a blow, nevertheless the excellent dispositions of Mr. von Wurmb were made so well that the enemy was constantly repulsed with a black eye.²

If you should notice any confusion in the retreat of the enemy, however, or if you see that the enemy in a mountainous terrain neglects the heights towering over the valleys and roads through which he is marching, this is where you can carry out the best raids. You constantly harass him with the infantry, which is supported by light cavalry. With the help of the peasants and good scouts you have to try to throw a party of infantry, which is using those paths which have been ignored by the enemy, into his flank. They have to try to hide close to the defiles which the enemy will be passing, attack him from all sides when he arrives, cut off whole detachments, and corner the rearguard, which already fears the enemy in its back, so much that its retreat is turned into flight. What can people do who retreat through a valley or a ravine if the surrounding heights are occupied? You can pinch him on all sides, roll huge stones on him if the circumstances permit, and force whole detachments to ask for mercy. If General Washington had attacked the rearguard of the English near Bonhampton more determinedly with the advance guard of his own army during the retreat of the English army from Raritan Landing to Amboy in the Province of Jersey, which happened in the beginning of the campaign of 1777, the day would have cost the English even more men than it actually did, since the English did not use the necessary precautions on their right flank.³

If the leader of a light corps believes he has certain information of an impending battle, and if he knows the terrain, he can place himself in a way that, if the enemy loses the battle, he has already occupied the main pass which the enemy has to cross—before the enemy can get there.

In 1759 the Hannoverian General von Freytag did just this to the French during their retreat after the Battle of Minden. He detached a number of companies from his *Jäger* Corps which occupied those passes

between Minden and Bückeburg which the French had to cross. Here the *jäger* killed many men, and if not, fortunately for the French, a heavy rain had started to fall, it would have cost them even more men, since the *jäger* had made themselves completely masters of the steep cliffs at the bottom of which the French had to march by. Each *jäger* could choose his man whom he wanted to kill, and the French had to become sad sacrificial lambs without being able to prevent their disaster.⁴

The French met with same harsh fate one more time during this same retreat between Niederscheden and Volkmarshausen, where they found again the *jäger* of Freytag in the bushes on either side of the defiles which they wanted to pass, and which created a very warm day for the French.⁵

If the enemy has to retreat through great forests you can also embitter his life very much. You divide your *jäger* on foot into small groups of thirty to fifty men, provide them with knowledgeable scouts, and send them into both flanks of the route of the enemy, because the forests are the right places for them. Here they can perform miracles. They can sneak in small groups between the columns of the enemy, harass him on all sides, embitter his every step, and scare the enemy so much that in the end he perceives to see enemies everywhere. What can you not achieve with such small bands who have learned to fight dispersed, who know how to use every molehill for their defense, and who retreat as quickly when attacked as they advance again, and who will always find space to hide. Never have I seen these manœuvres performed better than by the American militia, and especially that of the Province of Jersey. If you were forced to retreat against these people you could certainly count on constantly having them around you.⁶

If the retreat of the enemy is through an open terrain, you follow him with your cavalry and support it with your infantry, so that you can rely on the infantry in case the enemy turns around and wants to attack you with a superior cavalry force. It is best to deploy your cavalry in two lines *en échiquier*.⁷ The troops of the first line have their flankers who skirmish with the enemy and harass him. They fire constantly with their pistols and do a lot of yelling now and then in order to confuse the enemy. For that you can take those mounted *jäger* who are armed with rifles, since they can easily bring one or the other enemy detachment into disarray with very well-aimed rifle shots.

As soon as you notice that an enemy detachment is in confusion or has wandered too far from the rest, you have to fall on it immediately yet be well alert in the attack since in an open terrain the enemy can keep his eye on everything. Thus the nearest detachments will come to the rescue as speedily as possible, and a small temporary advantage can end up as a great harm.

You also have to keep well in mind not to be too ardent in your pursuit since the enemy can perform a fake retreat in order to lure you into a trap by which he can play such a nasty trick on you that you can not put in an appearance in the near future, which is what happened to the Marquis de LaFayette in the Virginia campaign near Jamestown. He knew that Lord Cornwallis wanted to retreat with his army across the James River in this area, and thus placed himself as closely to the English army as possible in order to attack it during the fording of the river. However, Lord Cornwallis grasped the intentions of the Marquis de LaFayette very well and let only a few of the light corps plus the heavy artillery and baggage cross the James River and kept the core of his army together as closely as possible. The Marquis, who had received false reports from his scouts, believed that the larger part of the English army had crossed the river and hotly attacked with his best troops. But he was beaten back with such great losses that Lord Cornwallis could cross the river quite undisturbed the next day. In this action the regiment von Bose under the command of Lieutenant Colonel du Buy performed miracles of good discipline and bravery.⁸

When the enemy retreats it is most important that you are not hasty when you pursue him. As soon as he settles down you simply keep him under observation. But as soon as he marches off again you have to hang on to him. No matter how much precaution and discipline the enemy displays in his retreat never a day must pass when he does not have to pay a price. Just follow him in cold blood and do not lose your head.

10

On Ambushes

However much has to be censured he who falls into an ambush, it adds just as much to the reputation of an officer if he knows how to lay them with skill and to lure his enemy into them. There is rarely a terrain in which you could not lay ambushes. There are fields grown with fruit, forests, bushes, ravines, banks, old buildings and others more, which are all locations where one can easily hide a number of people if you are only enterprising, know the area, and know how to use each location. On how to behave on the march to the location where you want to lay the ambush I refer the reader to that section where I deal with secret marches, but I want to remind you here that you have to march to the place of the ambush from the direction opposite to where you suspect the enemy, so that the tracks of many men or horses will not arouse the suspicion of the enemy.

You can deploy cavalry or infantry or both together, depending only on the location as to which kind of troops can act there, just like you have to determine the number of troops depending on the strength of the enemy. Most important in this are well trained troops which do not tend to desert, troops which obey orders and remain calm. Nobody must be allowed to smoke and no one must be selected who has a cough or a cold, and among the horses there must be no stallions, since the least noise may betray the ambush to the enemy. Bread, forage and water for the people also have to be taken along if none should be close by so that no one can complain about daily necessities.

The reasons for laying an ambush in war are manifold. Partly they are laid to attack, destroy, or seize an enemy convoy of which you know, partly to hinder the enemy in his foraging, partly to capture couriers

with important information or distinguished personages from the enemy army, to beat a party of the enemy, and to keep the area free of such detachments.

In the first case you have to lay the ambush in three different locations so that you can attack the enemy unexpectedly from the front, the center, and the rear at the same. In this you must not fire but bravely attack the enemy with the bayonet.¹ The sentinels which report the approach of the enemy are located on near-by trees or are lying flat on the ground. They give notice of everything they see through pre-arranged signs, and it is best if officers or very good non-commissioned officers are used for this.

If you have information as to when and where the enemy is planning to forage you enter the area during the night and hide as well as possible. Then you attack the enemy while he is busy foraging and take with you everything you can carry away, all of which has to be done with a lot of noise in order to frighten the servants (who do the foraging), who will certainly run away and abandon the forage and the horses. I have seen this wretchedness during foragings in New Brunswick in the beginning of 1777: if the enemy had better taken advantage of the fear which he had caused through his ambush I am certain that very few wagons and horses would have returned to Brunswick. Because after the enemy had been beaten back, the servants had to be rounded up again through beatings.²

One can also place ambushes close to enemy outposts if you are not too far away from them, from where small parties are sent as frequently as possible against the outposts of the enemy, which have to alarm them until they get tired of it and attempt to chase one away. Then these people have to retreat slowly and try to lure the pursuing party beyond the ambush, which will then attack and try to defeat the hostile party or to take it prisoner.

If the area where the enemy is deployed is surrounded by forests, you can have a herd of cows or sheep driven along the fringe of the forest around daybreak toward the enemy outpost in order to lure the enemy with this bait into the trap. At a small distance from the outpost you hide a party of infantry supported by cavalry. The former will give well-aimed fire at the enemy when he is busy driving the cattle away, while the latter will break out of its ambush to finish off the enemy. Those who drive the cattle have to be soldiers in disguise which run away to the side opposite to the ambush as soon as the enemy is close enough. At the beginning of the campaign of 1777 in the first camp near Millstone in the province of Jersey the Americans tried this game a couple days in a row against the outposts on the left of the army. As long as everything was plentiful nobody was tempted by the cows, yet after a few days, once the roast beef became rarer, all precautions were

forgotten and they fell into the trap even though a number of them had been warned.³

If villages, farms or mills happen to be located between the two armies which are occupied by neither side, you have to lay small ambushes in their vicinity to catch the marauders, especially during the time when the fruits are ripe. During these occasions officers will also fall into your hands now and then, among whom there are always some who, despite the strictest prohibition, will risk everything to look for a girl or to do themselves a favor. This way two English officers were caught in the above-mentioned camp near Millstone.⁴ And since you protect the locals from the marauders through these ambushes, you will make them your friends, and they will give you a hint when a good catch can be made.

If the enemy should try to constantly alarm you through strong detachments, you can easily get such guests off your back through a well-planned ambush. In order to achieve this you place your infantry at a certain distance before your post to the side of the road that the enemy has to take. Your cavalry you place between the ambush of your infantry and your own post. The former will let the enemy pass quietly and then follow him at a distance, whence they will try to give well-aimed fire into the back of the enemy. This will have to be the sign for the cavalry to break out from their ambush and to use the disorder of the enemy and to cut down whoever puts up resistance. This way the Indians of the Stockbridge nation, which constantly lay before our outposts and harassed them, fell into an ambush near Mile Square in the province of New York. This ambush was so well planned by Colonels Simcoe and Emmerich that hardly one of the Indians escaped with his life to tell what had happened to his fellow warriors. Since even their chief Sachem Ninham and his son lost their lives in this, this nation became so intimidated that it lost all inclination to send again fresh troops to the army of General Washington.⁵

You have to be very careful, however, not to lay too many ambushes in vain, or, even worse, that the first ambush might miscarry so that you do not annoy the soldier and lose his trust. But if you are fortunate at times you will find out that the soldiers enjoy this kind of action. During our march to Charleston through South Carolina in the year 1780 every day some of our *jäger* volunteered for ambushing, and by these ambushes we were so successful that the American cavalryman no longer dared to show himself before our posts.⁶

On Retreats

The leader of a corps which has to retreat has to have great knowledge of the art of war. Not only does he have to try to avoid a superior enemy, but he also has to know how to encourage his despondent soldiers who become scared because of their small numbers. Everything that is done in such a retreat has to be based on pure conjectures, since the attack of the enemy, when it happens, will not come with our exact knowledge and one does not have time to consider and connect everything in advance.

The retreat may be voluntary or forced. The leader of a corps or detachment nevertheless has to know the area through which he retreats so that he may not in the least become engaged with the enemy unless he is absolutely certain of his advantage. If the retreat is through mountainous districts the cavalry will be at the head and the infantry, divided into sections which occupy the heights which control the roads. During the march they must not leave uninspected, for a certain distance, the smallest footpath so that the enemy can not unexpectedly attack from the flanks or may appear unexpectedly where our path has to lead us.

If you are attacked in such a ravine you have to retreat using the so-called defilade fire. This means that while the infantry retreats in a column, the first platoon gives fire and then turns left and right from the center and quickly retreats on either side of the infantry behind the last platoon. There it converges again, loads while marching, should the guns, and keeps on marching until it is its turn again to fire. As soon as the first platoon is ready to fire, the commanding officer of the second platoon has to order: "About Face! Ready!" This way a great

distance can be covered through all the defilades, and if you should not be able to keep the enemy away through your fire, then, since the enemy can not display a larger front than you yourself provide, you have to attack with the bayonet and chase him back. Thus you gain some time and your men become encouraged again.

If you have a river in your back which you have to cross either by way of a bridge or a ford, you have to send there a detachment well in advance to take control of this crossing before the enemy gets there. The mounted riflemen can be well used for this. But these men have to be accompanied by an officer who has already given various proofs of his courage and abilities, because if that officer is a resourceful and determined man you can depend on the enlisted men no matter what happens.

As soon as they arrive at the opposite side of the crossing, the mounted riflemen have to dismount and disperse along that side in order to cover the retreat of the corps with their fire. If the enemy should attack this detachment too, the commanding officer has to try everything to avoid being driven back by the enemy, since the well-being of the whole corps depends on his steadfastness. But if you only determine to stand fast and to defend yourself, you can achieve a lot before you are forced to retreat.

As soon as the leader of the corps arrives at the crossing, the cavalry passes the bridge or the ford, after which the *jäger* on foot follow. They quickly disperse on the opposite bank to cover with their fire the fusiliers which form the rear. They will also cross in column using the defilade fire, and since they are covered by the fire of the *jäger* on foot, the enemy will be very careful not to lose men unnecessarily. The leader of such a corps has to remain with the rear to encourage the men through his presence and exhortations. You will hardly believe how much the presence of the commanding officer will contribute to success in critical circumstances, if he shares the greatest danger with his men.

If the retreat leads through forested areas the infantry marches through the thicket on either side of the cavalry. The rear is formed by half a company of *jäger* on foot which can easily hide in the thicket, since the enemy will certainly avoid this area.

As dangerous as the mountainous and forested areas may seem, as many advantages can be drawn from them, if you know how to use them. If the enemy pursues too hotly, you can lay an ambush for him and lure him into it through a fake retreat. And if one party which should pursue too quickly gets too far away from the main body of troops you can defeat it before the rest can come to its support.

It also happens that the leader of a light corps has to form the rear-guard of a retreating army or cover one of its flanks. In this case he can easily lure the enemy into a trap through ambushes. Here he can

risk a lot, especially if the march leads through divided areas, since he is always supported by the main army. In general, if the partisan¹ is familiar with the area through which he retreats, and if, in addition, he has that kind of knowledge which such an officer has to have, he has to remain a danger to the enemy even in a retreat and can delay the pursuit by the enemy for days. After General Washington had been defeated in the campaign of 1777 on September 11 at Brandywine, he was afraid that General Howe would certainly attack him on his retreat once he tried to cross the Schuylkill. So he detached General Maxwell with 2,000 Americans which had to attack the marching English army on the left flank and in the rear near Puds House near Goshen Meeting House on the 16th. This delayed the march of the English army for twenty-four hours and Washington could cross the Schuylkill unhindered, and if a strong rain had not started while the rebels made their attack on the corps of Donop, which caused their guns to malfunction, we would certainly have lost many men that day, especially since the rebels had occupied a forest to the side which was not noticed until it was too late. Even though these people were attacked by the core of the English army once they were discovered, their losses still were barely forty men in dead and wounded.²

If the retreat should lead through open areas and in view of the enemy, only the correct dispositions, coupled with the necessary courage and determination, will allow you to pull your neck out of the noose.

In this case your infantry forms a line, and between each company you leave enough space for the two companies of *jäger*, which have dispersed along the line and fire at the enemy, in case the enemy should chase them back with a superior force. The cavalry is divided into eight troops and covers the infantry.

As soon as the sign for the retreat is given, the infantry plus the first, third, fifth, and seventh troops of the cavalry turn right about face and march back a few hundred paces or however far the commanding officer wants, and then faces the enemy again. Hereafter the second, fourth, sixth, and eighth troops of the cavalry and the *jäger* on foot perform the same maneuver, but each troop has its flankers in its front, and the troops on the flanks have them on their flanks, which, together with the *jäger* on foot, skirmish constantly in case the enemy should follow. They march through the openings in the first line and deploy again at the same distance and call in their flankers, with the only difference that the infantry of the second line continues its march again while the *jäger* will always remain with that line which confronts the enemy. In all of this you have to remember that the flankers of the second line come to the aid of those of the first line and to take their place as soon as they are about forty to fifty paces from the openings in the line since this is the moment when a skillful enemy can try something.

Should some of the enemy parties wander too far from the rest you have to try to cool such heat and attack them. But once you have driven them back you must never pursue them but always keep in mind that a safe retreat is the ultimate purpose.

Should you find on your retreat a ravine, bushes, or other covered areas on one side or the other, you throw your infantry or at least your *jäger* on foot into it and pass it very closely under their protection.

If the enemy should come so close, however, that you can not honorably retreat, you must not wait until you are attacked but attack the enemy with the bayonet as if you were completely desperate, because desperation has already often saved a lot of men who were close to ruin. In this case the *jäger* on foot can draw their hunting knives and attack the enemy together with the fusiliers. This is what Captain von Wrede had his *jäger* on foot do in the affair of Cooch's Mill in Delaware,³ and what Lieutenant Colonel von Prüschenk had done near Fort Independence in the Bronx, and through this decision, forced upon them by necessity, both beat back the enemy with great loss, while bringing the greatest honor to themselves.⁴

If you have to cross a plain and see superior cavalry approach you from which you do not think you can escape, this forces your cavalry to leave you so as to not lose it unnecessarily, which is what happened to the Grenadier Battalion Schlotheim on the plains of Fritzlar in the Seven Years' War.⁵ Then you have no other alternative but to retreat in a *quarree*.⁶ In this case you have to mix the *jäger* with the fusiliers in sections so that the one is covered by the other, but you have to practice this with your infantry in advance for this to work out. During the march the *jäger* will try to do some damage to the enemy from the distance through their rifle shots. But if the hostile cavalry should prove determined to attack, you have to fire in lines making certain that the first line will hold its fire until it can give its powder, lead, and paper right between the eyes of the enemy. You only have to instruct your men well not to aim for the man but the chest of the horse. And even if the cavalry should achieve its purpose and break the *quarree*, you have nevertheless sold yourself dearly enough. I myself am certain that it would be very good if, once the cavalry is close enough to strike, you go down on one knee and fire one last time, since a man can more easily fend off in this position a horse with his gun than if he were standing. And the cavalryman who is forced to strike his blow downward loses his balance and can easily wound his own horse. During the American War I often wanted to get in such a situation to test this idea, especially in the Virginia campaign, where the *jäger* were constantly supported by the English light infantry, because in war everything depends on well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers.

Appendix: On the Three Most Important Tasks That an Officer of Light Cavalry Has to Perform in the Field

Part 1: On the Outposts of the Cavalry

Since a corps or detachment of light troops which occupies an outpost can not constantly be under arms, advance posts are deployed according to strength or circumstances, which have to provide security for the whole corps, and which have to observe the movements of the enemy.

Such an advance post places its own sentinels, so that it does not have to be on horseback all day long yet is able to watch everything. They always have to be deployed 300 to 400 paces from the outpost on the highest and most open places close by, so that they can detect everything from afar. Here one has to take special care that they are not placed close to a wooded area or another covered locality by which its security could be compromised. This advance post is placed best, terrain permitting, if it is situated behind the ridge of a height so that the enemy can not watch it constantly.

To improve security, these advance posts are best manned by two men, so that, as soon as something is discovered about the enemy, one of them can hasten back and report his observations to the officer or non-commissioned officer of the outpost. The officer does well if he constantly keeps his eyes on these advance posts, and as soon as he sees one of them hurry back he immediately has to give orders for the outpost to mount and he himself has to hurry to the place where the reporting advance post is located so that he can see everything for himself. Generally speaking, the officer of the outpost has to be on his horse most of the time and ride about in the vicinity of his advance posts.

If he is to relieve another outpost, the officer of the (relieving) detachment has to ride with his advance posts as soon as he arrives, to make sure that his men are instructed properly. He has to inspect the whole area of his advance posts so that he knows the terrain, and the roads which lead to the enemy and by which the enemy could approach. He also has to know the terrain in his rear through which he has to retreat in the event of an enemy attack.

Once he has done everything that has just been mentioned, he can let his outpost dismount and rest, if it be during the daytime. But he must not permit any one of his men to wander away from the outpost, and even less to unharness a horse without his orders. The cavalryman has to place the bridle on the back of the horse and tie it with its halter to a post or a bush or whatever is close by, so that he can mount at any moment and be ready to meet the enemy.

Once feeding time arrives, the commanding officer of the outpost must never allow feeding for all at the same time, but divide his outpost in two groups, of which one group must not commence feeding before the other is done, and if the advance post of the enemy should be so close as to be able to watch ours, one group has to mount while the other feeds behind them.

If the approach of the enemy is reported to the commanding officer of the outpost, he has to immediately give orders to mount and move toward the area from where he can best observe the movements of the enemy, and if he sees that the enemy is approaching he has to report everything that he has seen with his own eyes to his commander.

Should the vanguard of the enemy come so close that he has to give way with his outpost, then he retreats with his men in one group while his advance posts cover his flanks and skirmish with the enemy during the retreat. During all of this the officer constantly has to watch the movements of the enemy so that he can make the most informed report to his commander. But he has to be very careful in this so that an enemy detachment does not pass him by and cut him off.

This is just about what the officer of an outpost has to do during the daytime.

As soon as night falls the officer and his men have to mount and never must he allow one of them to dismount except in the greatest emergency. In this the officer must never mind the complaints of the soldier, which are rarely missing during the hardships of war. He rather must harshly punish the least grumbling and threaten to shoot in the head with his pistol the one who complains most. Even if the common soldier should complain about the strictness of the officer you can nevertheless be certain that the majority of them prefer the officer who is too strict to the one who is too lenient, and that the soldier would rather attack the enemy with the former, if he is convinced of his courage and understanding, than with the latter. If you want to throw in

the weak objection here that the soldier could also do a lot out of love for his officer, I will laugh at that and assure you that the love of a German soldier is nothing but a shadow and worth nothing if he is not kept in the strictest discipline, and that officer who is called a good officer by the soldier is certainly nothing more than what the French call a *honnête homme*.¹

As soon as night falls the officer of the outpost also has to order frequent patrols and checks on his advance posts so that they are always kept alert. During the night the advance posts must never stand still but constantly ride back and forth between the adjacent advance posts so that no one can steal through the gap. Their relief has to always also serve as a patrol and return to the outpost via a circuitous route.

Should the officer hear a shot fired in the vicinity of his advance post he has to send a patrol there immediately to find out what has happened or why the advance post has fired.

Should the advance posts rush back during the night and report that the enemy is here, the officer has to move laterally away from the outpost and send some trustworthy men toward the enemy and report to his commander what his men have reported to him. Should he be forced to retreat, he has to do so under constant firing of pistols or rifles so that his commander notices that the enemy approaches in force. However, the officer of the outpost must in no way take his route directly to the main corps but move as much as possible toward one of the flanks of the corps so that he does not hinder the movements of the main corps.

If the main corps or detachment from which the officer has been detached should, however, have the misfortune of being attacked in the rear, and if the enemy should not have taken any precautions with regard to his detachment, he can, unless he has become dizzy by the misfortune that has befallen the main corps, change events completely around and perform miracles with his twenty or thirty horses. He can attack the enemy, who has already gotten in disorder because of the raid he has performed, with great shouting, and take away again everything from the enemy that has been lost. He only has to be firmly resolved to either win or die, and then everything will turn out well.

Part 2: On the Advance- and Rearguard, or of Lateral Patrols, Which an Officer of the Cavalry of a Light Corps or Detachment Has to Lead

An officer who leads the advance guard of a corps has to have a few cavalymen in front of him as well as to his sides for his own security so that he does not meet the enemy unexpectedly. He must not pass a

height unless he has sent a few men onto them to see whether they can not discover anything of the enemy, and it would be well if the officer himself would ride onto the highest places so that he can see everything for himself. He must not pass a covered area which he has had not inspected, because the safety of the whole march depends on him, and he must never neglect to report everything that he has seen at the right place.

If an officer has to lead an advance guard during the night he has to be twice as careful. Since he can not use his flankers, he has to use his ears. About 5 or 6 men have to ride ahead at a distance of 20 to 30 paces, and it is best if he himself is among them. He often has to stop and listen whether he can not hear anything in the distance.

If he should see a large number of men approach he has to report it to the proper place, and if the enemy should unexpectedly come too close to him then there is nothing else for him to do but to attack the enemy with the sword. As soon as he has driven him back he has to stop, however, because there is not much to worry about in such an event during the nighttime, since the enemy has been taken aback by the unexpected attack and the commander of the main corps usually has gained time enough to make his dispositions. It is hard to believe how easily just a few men, if they don't lose their composure, can turn a large detachment to flight. I have seen this more than once, especially near Hood's Point in Virginia, where General Arnold debarked 500 men during the night in order to defeat a corps of rebels under General von Steuben, which was to occupy this post and hinder the retreat of Arnold's corps to the James River. As soon as I had debarked with some 50 men, I took 4 *jäger* and Captain Schmidt of Simcoe's corps with me to reconnoitre the road for about half an hour's distance so that I would know at least what the terrain around us was like. I had hardly gone about a quarter of an hour when I suddenly saw a group of horsemen approach us. We hid behind a few trees on the right side of the road to find out exactly who they were and to let them pass in case they were enemy cavalry and to fire into their backs through which some of them would certainly have fallen into our hands. But the American officer discovered one of us, because the moon shone very bright, and since we could be certain now that he would attack us with his men, who numbered about 30 or 40, I shouted, "Attack and fire!" The four *jäger* discharged their guns into the group which was no more than 6 paces away from us, which confounded the Americans so much that they fled head over heels. If a whole column had been approaching behind them it certainly would have been thrown into confusion by these fugitives. What horrible report will not this officer have made to his general?! Therefore it is of the utmost importance not to entrust just any officer with the command of an advance guard during a nighttime march against the enemy.²

If an officer has to provide with his detachment the lateral patrols of a corps, he has to inspect all suspicious localities on that side which he has orders to cover, and where men could hide, with the greatest care.

If such an officer has to lead the rearguard, he divides his troops up into two groups. One of them he keeps together, the other disbands in groups of two around him and they remain behind him and on his sides at a distance of about 100 to 200 paces. If the enemy should be following, they constantly fire with their pistols or rifles at those who come too close. Since the main corps is close by he can easily get support, he only has to be careful not to wander too far away from it or to deliver into the hands of the enemy all his troops just to save one cavalryman.

Part 3: Of the Patrols against the Enemy

As many reasons there may be for a general to send patrols against the enemy, as easy are the rules for an officer who has been sent with 20, 30 or more horses against the enemy. Above all he has to know the area through which he is to proceed and not for once lose sight of caution. He has to send ahead a small group under a non-commissioned officer as far as he can see them, and also individual cavalymen on either side which try to inspect all suspicious localities that he has to pass. This includes for example villages, outworks, bushes, hidden and sunken roads, so that no one of the enemy can hide in such localities and cut off his retreat. They also have to inquire of the locals which they meet concerning the whereabouts of the enemy.

If such an officer has to pass a village or another covered place, he has to stop on this side of it and send one non-commissioned officer with two men, who ride singly and at a distance of 50 to 100 paces behind each other, into or through that locality in order to inspect it. They have to ride with the pistol in their hands in order to announce in time to the officer through a shot if they should discover the enemy. And since they ride individually never more than at most one of them can be lost.

Should such an officer meet the enemy, whom he will discover early enough if he should follow the prescribed rules, he must in no way deal with the enemy if he can avoid it, but only observe the strength and the march of it, because he has not been sent out to engage with the enemy but to collect information concerning the enemy.

As soon as he sees the enemy arrive in strength he has to send two well-mounted men to his commander to report to him the approach of the enemy. In important cases it is better to send two cavalymen instead of one, since a misfortune can befall one of them which may cause

the commanding general to receive too late the information concerning the arrival of the enemy.

While he sends off this report, the officer has to try to place himself in a way that he can not be discovered easily by the enemy but at the same time so that he can observe the strength of the enemy as he approaches, and this information the officer of the patrol reports as he goes along. But he better use his eyes so that he does not repeat the mistake of a certain officer who mistook a big herd of sheep for a column of Frenchmen.

If such an officer should, however, discover a detachment of the enemy which starts to flee as soon as they discover him, he has great cause to follow it step for step with the utmost precaution, because such a detachment has most certainly been sent into an area to lure another party into an ambush. It is especially dangerous to follow such a party of the enemy if it passes close by a wood, village, or ravine where a large number of people could be hid easily.

Should an officer, however, meet a superior enemy detachment so unexpectedly that he can not avoid it, which can either happen because of the treason of the locals or another coincidence that is not his fault, and if he finds himself forced to defend himself, or if such a detachment has even cut off his retreat, then he must not wait for the attack but throw himself with the greatest vigor at that enemy party which threatens to cut off his retreat and try to fight his way through. You may have to die anyway, but still this happens easier while you are standing than while you are running. In this case you have to follow the example of the late brave Captain Merz, who as a lieutenant made the praiseworthy decision during the American campaign of 1778 to fight his way through two escadrons of Americans with his twelve mounted *jäger*. This happened near Dobbs Ferry in the province of New York, and despite the fact that he had been severely wounded by a sword-cut he certainly would have gotten through if he had not fallen with his horse.³

There is another means by which you can save yourself once you see yourself and your small detachment surrounded by the enemy on all sides. You divide your detachment in groups of two and tell them to break off and away in all directions to save themselves, but each and everyone has orders that he who gets through has to report what happened to the commanding officer. Every one of these people will certainly do their utmost to save themselves, and it is probable that some, especially those who are well mounted, will get through. I have seen this done twice by an American partisan in Virginia who escaped each time except for a few men which he lost. Especially once, when Lieutenant Bickel with the advance guard had come so close to him near the Tales Plantation, it was impossible to believe that he could get away,

but he was successful anyway except for a few men who were captured.⁴ Everything is possible in war as long as you do not lose your head and if the officer informs his men beforehand of what can happen and if he familiarizes them in advance with all dangers.

Once an officer has successfully reached the terminal point of his patrol without any obstacles, and once he has carried out all orders given to him, he gives orders for a brief stop, sends a few men to the nearest village, and has the most prominent inhabitants brought to him and inquires of all of them of the enemy. It is well to remember here that such an officer keeps his men under arms and in no way considers going into the village for his men to refresh themselves, because this impermissible mistake has already cost many a man his honor, liberty, or life.

Should the officer while on the road that he has to patrol find out that an enemy patrol has returned a short while earlier, he can follow the patrol since a few stragglers might fall into his hands. Should he even find out that the enemy patrol has dismounted in the next village or outwork, has entered the houses, and is taking some refreshments, then he has to be quick, tear into the village with his party and try to take them prisoners. In this case he must not worry whether the enemy might be a little stronger than he is. It is enough if he knows sufficiently and with certainty of the negligence of the enemy.

As soon as he knows all that is necessary he begins his retreat. To facilitate this he orders a rearguard of about six to eight horsemen who follow him at a distance of about 200 to 300 paces and who have to turn around frequently to make sure that an enemy detachment does not sneak up on them from behind and attack unexpectedly.

In order to clarify the rules given here I want to give an example, in which I assume that the enemy is located in the vicinity of Eschwege and it is expected that he may approach Cassel any day. So an officer with 40 horses is dispatched from Cassel to patrol in Walburg and Lichtenau and to gather information about the enemy.

As soon as the officer arrives at the forest, he detaches a non-commissioned officer with twelve men as his advance guard, who during the march must always be only so far ahead as his commanding officer can see them. Of these twelve men two are sent 100 paces ahead and four to six to the right and the left at a distance which is determined by the already mentioned rules.

The officer himself, however, takes his way across the fields to the right of the two villages of Kaufungen, which are inspected by the side patrol, and uses the road between Oberkaufungen and Helsa only. It is one of the main rules to circumvent the villages if that is possible, since you can not observe anything while you are in them. Since you have to pass many woods between Helsa and the height of Walburg, the ad-

vance guard has to be very careful. The two to three men who are to remain on the right flank can patrol from Helsa toward Lichtenau, and those on the left can do the same toward Almerode. For this task you have to choose people that you can rely on and who do not carelessly walk into these villages. These men have to have orders to meet the main body as soon as possible on the height this side of Walburg.

The officer himself orders a stop on this height, from where one can see very far, and sends a noncommissioned officer with a few men to Walburg to fetch the postmaster, preacher, or mayor, and as soon as he has talked to these people he sends a non-commissioned officer with a few men to Hausen to collect even more information on the enemy. As soon as the officer has found everything he needs to know, and as soon as the men who patrolled toward Almerode and Lichtenau have reunited with him, he begins his retreat according to the above-mentioned rules.

Should the officer find the enemy approaching once he reaches the height of Walburg, he can observe him very well from this height, and since the forest is close, he can remain until the very last.

Even though this appendix only deals with what an officer of the cavalry has to do while on an outpost, while patrolling or while leading the advance and rearguard, an officer of the infantry can nevertheless use these main rules in similar cases, since he will also often be forced to do this kind of duty in a mountainous or wooded area. Just like for example the two first *jäger* companies, which under Colonel von Donop for all practical purposes did duty like hussars on foot in the first American campaign, and where for lack of light troops the grenadiers had to be used to do similar duty.

Thus I repeat one more time at the end that an officer will do very well if he learns in peacetime so much that he can be used for any kind of service when in the field.

Notes

Preface

1. Ewald uses the term *kleinen Dienst*, by which he means the peacetime training for war, here particularly for the *kleinen Krieg*, which is the topic of his treatise.

2. The Prussian general is Major General Friedrich Christoph von Saldern (1719–1785), whose *Taktische Grundsätze und Anweisung zu militärischen Evolutionen. Von der Hand eines berühmten Generals* was published in Frankfurt and Leipzig in 1781. The French translation, *Elemens [sic] de la tactique de l'infanterie; ou, Instructions d'un lieutenant-general prussien, pour les troupes de son inspection*, appeared in 1783. See also *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (1890), 30:213–15 (hereafter *ADB*); and Kurt von Priesdorff, *Soldatisches Führertum*, 10 vols. (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, [1936?]), 1:475–79.

3. Johann Gottlieb Tielke (1731–1787) was a Saxon officer best known for his manuals for field engineers. Ewald spells the name as “Thielcke.” What Ewald most likely is referring to here is his *Eigenschaften und Pflichten eines Soldaten zur Prüfung derer, die es sind und derer die in diesen Stand treten wollen, nebst einem Auszuge aus Xenophon's Rückzuge der zehntausend Griechen, von einem Officier* (Dresden: J. N. Gerlachs Witve und Sohn, 1773), or his *Beyträge zur Kriegskunst und Geschichte des Krieges von 1756 bis 1763*, 6 vols. (Freyberg: Barthel, 1775–1786). They were translated as *An account of some of the most remarkable events of the war between the Prussians, Austrians and Russians from 1756 to 1763* . . . , 2 vols. (London: J. Walter, 1787/88). On Thielke, see the *ADB* (1894), 38:286–88.

4. Major General Henry Lloyd (1720?–1783) was best known for his *The History of the Late War in Germany; between the King of Prussia, and the Empress of Germany and Her Allies* (London: n.p., 1763), translated into German in 1779; the revised edition appeared in two volumes (London: For the Author, 1766–1781). The work was translated by Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof as *Geschichte*

des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem könige von Preussen und der haiserin königin und ihren alliierten, 6 vols. (Berlin: J. F. Unger, 1783–1801). What Ewald probably had in mind, however, was his *Abhandlung über die allgemeinen Grundsätze der Kriegskunst* (Frankfurt: P. H. Perrenon, 1783), first published in London in English in 1781. On Lloyd, see *Dictionary of National Biography* (1892), 11:1301–2 (hereafter *DNB*).

5. Ewald's wording is ambiguous here. The term *während*, if applied to the preceding *Freunde*, would mean that he wrote the appendix at the request of this former friend; if applied to the *Americanischen Krieg*, it would mean that he wrote it during the American War. The editors assume that the latter is the case.

This assumption is based on the fact that the *Abhandlung von dem, was ein Officier von der Reuterey im Felde zu wissen nöthig hat*, some fifteen handwritten pages, in the Jungkenn Papers (7:17) of the William L. Clements Library at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, seems to be an early draft of the appendix. Its location in the Jungkenn Papers makes it highly probable that this *Abhandlung* was mailed to Jungkenn from America and used as a basis for the 1785 appendix. Since the appendix is in large part a verbatim quote of this *Abhandlung*, minus the examples from the American War, the editors have decided against the translation of this manuscript and its inclusion in this volume.

We have not been able to identify the "good friend." Our guess is that the friend is either John Graves Simcoe or Banastre Tarleton, since they both co-operated frequently with Ewald and were experts on cavalry.

John Graves Simcoe (1752–1806) was educated at Eton and Oxford and entered the 35th regiment as an ensign in 1771. A captain in 1775, he was nominated major commandant of the Queen's Rangers, a loyalist light infantry unit, in 1777. Taken prisoner at Gloucester in 1781, he returned to England and was promoted to colonel in December. In 1791 he became the first lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, but returned to England in 1797. Lieutenant general in 1798, he was appointed commander in chief of the British forces in India in 1806, but fell ill on the voyage and died shortly after his return to England. See *DNB* (1889), 18:253. The latest biography of Simcoe can be found in Frances G. Halpenny, ed., *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 5:754–59.

Sir Banastre Tarleton (1754–1833) became a cornet of dragoons in 1775 and left almost immediately for North America. He is best known for his capture of General Henry Lee in December 1776, but took part in almost every major battle of the war. In 1779 he took command of the British Legion, a mixed force of cavalry and light infantry, and became a major in August of the same year. From the spring of 1780 onwards, Tarleton's "Green Horse" scoured the southern colonies in highly successful raids until he, a lieutenant colonel from June 1781, was captured at Yorktown. On half-pay between 1783 and 1788, he sat in the House of Commons from 1790 to 1812 with only one interruption in 1806. A full colonel in 1790, Tarleton saw action in Portugal and Ireland and became a full general in 1812 as well as a baronet in 1815. See *DNB* (1889), 19:364–69.

Chapter 1

1. On Johann Jacob (von) Wunsch (1717–1788), a general in Prussian service, see Albert Pfister, "Johann Jacob Wunsch," *Beihefte zum Militärwochenblatt* (1895), pp. 77–104. Wunsch was a locksmith by trade who in 1745 became a Bavarian officer of hussars. In 1756 he joined the Prussian military, was ennobled in 1757, and became a major general in 1759. His *Freiregiment* was mostly composed of former Austrian prisoners of war. On Wunsch, see *ADB* (1898), 44:315–17; Priesdorff, *Führertum*, 1:497–500; Günther Gieraths, *Die Kampfhandlungen der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Armee, 1626–1807* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964), p. 340. Short biographies of most leaders of *Freikorps* can also be found in Fritz Redlich, *The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce*, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964/65), 2:139.

2. On Major General Johann (von) Mayr (1716–1759), who raised a *Freibataillon* in Prussian service in 1756, see Priesdorff, *Führertum*, 1:479–80. Ewald spells the name as "Meyer."

Mayr, the illegitimate son of a Viennese count, entered the Austrian service in 1736 and became one of the most famous leaders of irregular forces. In 1756 he joined the Prussian army as a lieutenant colonel but died in January 1759. A contemporary account is Carl Friedrich Pauli, *Leben grosser Helden des gegenwärtigen Krieges*, 4 vols. (Halle: Christoph Peter Francken, 1758–1764), 3:145–88.

Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben served as an aide to Mayr in 1758 during the latter's raids into Franconia. On these raids, which provided Steuben with valuable experiences for his American service, see Klaus Treutlein, "Friedrich Wilhelm von Steubens Dienstzeit in der preussischen Armee (1746–1763)," in *Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben: Leben Zeit und Zeitgenossen*, ed. Werner Giesebrecht (Würzburg: Handelsdruckerei, 1980), pp. 25–58.

3. Major General Friedrich Wilhelm Gottfried Arndt von Kleist (1724–1767) was the only native Prussian to lead a *Freikorps* in the Seven Years' War. He joined the Prussian army in 1744 and became a major in 1756. As a colonel he raised a *Freiregiment Husaren von Kleist* in 1759, a *Freibataillon Grüne Kroaten* in 1760, and a *Freiregiment (leichte) Dragoner* in 1760 (all disbanded in 1763), which were mostly composed of deserters from the Austrian army. In 1762 he became a major general. His *Regeln und Anmerkungen für Officiers überhaupt und Husaren-offiziers insbesondere über den Dienst im Felde* was published posthumously in 1789. See Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland*, 3 vols. (New York/Hildesheim: Johnson and Georg Olms, repr. 1966), 3:2714. See also *ADB* (1882), 16:123–24; Priesdorff, *Führertum*, 1:520–21; and Gieraths, *Kampfhandlungen*, pp. 331–32.

4. Nikolaus (von) Luckner (1722–1794) joined the Bavarian army in 1737 as a cadet and became a hussar lieutenant in 1741 in Austrian service. In 1756 he joined the Hanoverian army as a major and raised a company of hussars in 1757 that was later expanded into a regiment. Luckner became a colonel in 1758 and a major general in 1759. In 1762 the regiment had 671 men but was disbanded in 1763. Luckner, now a lieutenant general, went into the service of France and became a *maréchal de France*. A baron from 1778, he settled in Holstein after his discharge and was made a count by the king of Denmark in 1784.

During the French Revolution he joined the Republicans but was forced to resign. While in Paris to demand his back pay in 1794, this "rapacious man . . . came to an end on the scaffold" (Redlich, *Enterpriser*, 2:140). See also *ADB* (1884), 19:359-61.

5. Major General Georg Heinrich Albrecht von Scheiter (1731-1789) joined the Brunswick army in 1745 and became a lieutenant in 1754. As a captain, he raised in May 1758 a *Jäger Corps* composed of one company on foot, one mounted, and one company grenadiers for a total of 420 men, in the service of Hannover. In 1760, he had 300 men mounted in 4 companies, in 1761, 2 companies on foot and one mounted, 440 and 460 men strong, respectively. In 1762 the corps was 900 men strong but disbanded in 1763. Scheiter was discharged as a major and did not become a colonel in the army of Brunswick until 1777 and a major general in 1787. He died in 1789 as chief of the Fourth Regiment of Cavalry in Hannover (*ADB* (1890), 30:729-31).

6. Louis Gabriel de Conflans, Maréchal d'Armentières (1735-1789), joined the French army as a musketeer in 1750 and rose rapidly through the ranks. A lieutenant in the cavalry regiment Orleans in 1752, he was already a brigadier in 1759, and became *maréchal de camp* in 1763 and lieutenant general in 1781. In April 1761 he took over the Chasseur de Fischer, some 1,200 men strong, and renamed them Dragons-Chasseurs de Conflans. Johann Christian Fischer remained first lieutenant colonel of his outfit until his death in July 1762. On Conflans, see *Dictionnaire de Biographie Française* (1939), 3:742 (hereafter *DBF*). On Fischer, see Edouard de Ribaucourt, *Etude du dossier complet concernant les premiers chasseurs à pied et à cheval sous Louis XV. La vie militaire et les exploits de J.-C. Fischer, brigadier des armées du roi Louis XV, fondateur et commandant le corps des chasseurs (1743-1761)* (Paris: Librairie Universelle, 1928); and Capitaine Oré, "Fischer et l'origine des Chasseurs," *Revue de Cavalerie* 26 (April 1910): 45-55; (August 1910): 512-61; (October 1910): 49-63; (November 1910): 174-191, 538. Here also a comprehensive history of the development of French light troops from their beginnings until 1815. The *maréchal de camp* corresponds to the rank of major general.

7. The "most gracious prince" is Friedrich II, Landgraf von Hessen-Kassel (1720/1760-1785). A Hessian colonel at age seven, he had extensive military experience in his youth and took part in the Battles of Culloden (1746) and Rocoux (1747). With the crown of Poland in mind he converted to Catholicism in 1749. He was actually offered the crown in 1771, which he declined. In 1769 he established the order *pour la vertu militaire*, and in 1776 he signed the treaty with the Crown of England that sent the Hessian troops to America. A short biography emphasizing his military career can be found in Priesdorff, *Führertum*, 1:306-7.

Here Ewald does not tell the whole truth, since he complains bitterly at the end of his diary that the soldiers and officers were discharged in 1784 without "a single special, gracious glance on any officer. . . . Thus ended the American war, and thus was the soldier treated by his sovereign in Hesse." See Johann Ewald, *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 361. Of the twenty-two officers of the Hessian *Jäger Corps* who returned from the American war, sixteen were transferred to line regiments, one, Captain Hanger, remained *à la suite*, while

three second lieutenants and two first lieutenants were discharged with six *Reichstaler* pension per month for a second lieutenant and eight *Reichstaler* for a first lieutenant. This constituted a rather generous pension and considerably more than that of a line officer, where a lieutenant received only 4 1/2 *Reichstaler* and a captain eight *Reichstaler*. Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg, Bestand 4 h 4011 and 4 h 3486 (hereafter HSM Bestand). The slight was obviously more to the honor of the troops than to their purse.

8. These lines stand in contradiction to Ewald's background as a *jäger* officer, an outfit that always considered itself an elite, and shows how much Ewald was still tied to the eighteenth-century concept of light troops. Ewald himself, however, did not always practice what he preached. In his *Zweite und letzte Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg* (Schleswig: J. G. Röhl, 1803), pp. 31-32, he admits that one of his men by the name of Bauer had formerly been a member of a band of poachers in the Prince-Bishopric of Bamberg. Nevertheless, he greatly praises Bauer for his valor and courage in battle and his daring in recapturing his (Ewald's) hat after it had been left behind on the battlefield. See also Ewald, *Diary*, p. 63. It is unknown whether Bauer is identical with Georg Johann Bauer, who was promoted to second lieutenant on February 3, 1782 (HSM Bestand 4 h 4011).

9. The editors have been unable to ascertain the measurements used by Ewald. The Hessen-Kassel *Fuß* had 12 *Zoll* or 144 *Linien* or 28.5 centimeters. Four *Zoll* would be the equivalent of 9.5 centimeters, and even 4 *Fuß* would only be 114 centimeters. In his *Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen* (Flensburg, Schleswig, Leipzig: Korten und Boie, 1790), p. 13, Ewald also calls for a minimum height of 4 *Zoll*, but prefers a height of 7 to 10 *Zoll*. Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 11, translates this as 5 feet 4 inches or 1.624 meters.

Ewald's requirements were not very stringent. In 1773 the regiment Royal-Deux-Ponts recruited soldiers in a local newspaper, stipulating that each recruit had to have a minimum height of 1.67 meters (Ernst Drumm, *Das Regiment Royal Deux-ponts* [Zweibrücken: Mitteilungen des historischen Vereins für die Westpfalz in Zweibrücken, 1936], p. 12). In the French army the average height of the Bercsenyi hussars in 1729 was 1.674 meters or 5 feet 6 inches, with the shoes on. 22.7 percent of those who enlisted in 1720/21 were under 25 years old, 33.3 percent between 26 and 30, 19.3 percent between 31 and 35, 18.7 percent between 36 and 40, and 6 percent over 40 years old. In the colonels' company of the David regiment the average height was 1.703 meters or 5 feet 7 inches, which was "[t]all in comparison with the average Frenchman." He adds, however, that "[c]avalrymen were generally chosen a little taller" (André Corvisier, "Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *East European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, Gunther E. Rothenberg et al. eds., [New York: Columbia University Press, 1982], pp. 537-38).

10. This is apparently a reference to an engagement on October 23, 1776, near La Rochelle, New York, where "a handful of my *jägers* engaged with several battalions of Americans" (Ewald, *Diary*, p. 9).

11. Very little is known about Armand François de La Croix, Marquis de Castries (d. 1743). He was one of three sons of Joseph François de La Croix (1663-1728), *maréchal de camp* and governor of Sète. Louis Susane, *Histoire de*

la Cavalerie Française, 3 vols. (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1874), 3:270, lists a "corps mixte de partisans" levied on August 20, 1688, by a Monsieur de La Croix de Castries, which was dissolved in 1706. This seems possible since in 1688 Joseph François, Armand's father, was at that time commanding officer of the French infantry in the Electorate of Cologne. In 1727, he formed a *compagnie franche* of 100 dragoons, which was integrated after his death into the Legion Royale in 1745 (Ribaucourt, *Etudes*, p. 384). Thomas Auguste Le Roy de Grandmaison, *La petite guerre ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne*, 2 vols. (Paris: n.p., 1756), pp. 50, 75, relates raids of de La Croix of 1742 and 1743, when he was captured by the Austrians near Pfarrkirchen. According to Redlich, *Enterpriser*, p. 141, de La Croix was killed in action in 1735 while fighting for Austria. His book, *Traité de la Petite Guerre pour les Compagnies Franches* (Paris: A. Boudet, 1752), was one of the most widely read treatises on the little war and translated into German in 1755. For a short biography of Joseph François, Armand's father, in which Armand is mentioned, see DBF (1956), 7:1402.

In his *Belehrungen über den Kleinen Krieg* (Schleswig: J. G. Röhlß, 1798), pp. 150–53 *et passim*, Ewald, who writes the name as "La Croix," gives numerous examples of de La Croix' exploits in 1704 and 1705.

According to Jähns, *Kriegswissenschaften*, 3:2711, de La Croix was English by birth but rose to the rank of *maréchal de camp* in the French army; the *Traité* was published by his son, who had served under him since 1702 and who also published his father's memoirs (1680–1740). This would attribute the *Traité* to Joseph François de La Croix, whose *Mémoires du Sieur de La Croix, contenant diverses relations très curieuses de l'Empire Othoman* was published in Paris by C. Barbin in 1684. The date of the publication of the *Traité*, 1752, however, would not match with the date of the death of Armand in 1743. The attribution of the *Traité* to Armand François is based on the entry in *Catalogue Général des Livres imprimés de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, 231 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1897–1981), 84:361, where de La Croix is styled as *maréchal des camps et des armées du Roi*, and *The National Union Catalog. Pre-1956 Imprints*, 754 vols. (London/Chicago: Mansell, 1968–1981), 310:615. The same volume, however, gives the death date of the author of the *Mémoires* as 1704 (p. 608).

12. Major Johann Kasimir von Monkewitz (1722–1789) led the *Jäger und Carabiniers* of Bückeburg, 150 men strong, 60 mounted and 90 on foot, in 1762; by 1763 they were 100 men strong each. See ADB (1885), 22:169–71, as well as Leopold von Sichard, *Geschichte der Königlich-Hannoverschen Armee*, 4 vols. (Hannover: Hahn'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1866–1898), 3:393.

13. Colonel Ludwig Johann Adam von Wurmb (1736–1813) entered the Hessian Army and served as a lieutenant in the *jäger* corps during the Seven Years' War. He became a captain after the Battle of Minden. After 1763 he served as a major in the *Leib Infanterie Regiment*. During the American Revolution he served again with the *jäger* and became a lieutenant colonel and commanding officer of the Hessian *Jäger Corps* after the death of Colonel Karl von Donop at Redbank. Adjutant-General to the *Landgraf* in 1789, he became a lieutenant-general and chief of the *Infanterie Leib Regiment* in 1800. He died in 1813 as governor of Cassel. His troops called him "der bittere Wurmb."

Short biographies of Hessian officers can be found in August Woringen, *Bildnisse hessischer Heerführer im hessischen Landesmuseum zu Kassel* (Kassel: Friedrich

Scheel, 1936); August Woring, *Kurfürst Wilhelm I von Hessen und seine Generale* (Kassel: Friedrich Scheel, 1938), p. 11; *Hessenland* (1888), 2:326–28, 341–42; (1889), 3. See also Hans-Friedrich Konze, *Das Feldjäger-Corps von Hessen-Kassel im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1776–1783* (ms, Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg, 1983, ehem. Kurfürstliche Bibliothek XIV B 151 bfa); and Leopold Freiherr von Hohenhausen, *Biographie des Generals von Ochs* (Cassel: Luckhardt'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1827), pp. 323–44. Primary sources on Hessian officers can be found in HSM Bestand 4 h 4006, 4007, and 4011.

14. Presumably the person warning the Hessians was the Reverend Dr. William Smith (1727–1803), first provost of the College of Philadelphia (now the University of Pennsylvania). See Ewald, *Diary*, p. 92, 395, note 97. The incident is also related by Ewald in his *Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg* (Schleswig: J. G. Röhß, 1800), pp. 32–34.

Chapter 2

1. Ewald uses the term *halber Mondbläser*. A *Halbmond* in the eighteenth century was a big bugle horn used to give signals during hunting; later its use was discontinued because of the bulkiness of the instrument. Today the *Brockhaus Enzyklopädie*, 20 vols. (Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1973), 16:602 defines a *Halbmond* as a *Schellenbaum* or jingling Johnny. It was part of the "Turkish military Janissary band" and thus also called a Turkish crescent from the crescent (*Halbmond*) at the top of the pole. (*New Encyclopedia Britannica. Micropedia*, 12 vols. [Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990], 6:554). In his 1796 *Abhandlung*, p. 20, Ewald also uses the term *Halbmond*, which is translated by Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 18, as a "bugle horn." The editors adopt this, correct, translation here too.

Chapter 3

1. The French term *à la débânde* is defined in *Nouveau Larousse Illustré*, 7 vols. (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1898), 3:538, as "En confusion, en désordre, au hasard," meaning to break ranks in disorder, to break into a rout. Ewald, however, is clearly defining the term here in a positive way, meaning to disperse at will, but voluntarily, with a purpose. He uses the term again in chapters 7 and 11.

Chapter 4

1. "Pacon," as Ewald wrote it, is probably "Pon Pon" or "Pond Pond" west of Charleston, South Carolina. See Douglas W. Marshall and Howard H. Peckham, *Campaigns of the American Revolution: An Atlas of Manuscript Maps* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 84, "Draught of Part of the Province of South Carolina . . ."; Ewald, *Diary*, p. 202. The modern hamlet of Pon Pon is located on the east side of the Edisto River in western Charleston County. Pon Pon Church, an Anglican chapel in St. Bartholomew Parish, and the Presbyterian Bethel Pon Pon Church, however, were located on the western side of the river in the eighteenth century in Colleton County (Lester J. Cap-

pon, ed., *Atlas of Early American History: The Revolutionary Era, 1760-1790* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938], map 39, "Religious Congregations in South Carolina 1775"). The incident is not mentioned in the *Diary*, but Pon Pon is noted in Ewald's letter of February 29, 1780 in Bernhard A. Uhlenendorf, ed., *The Siege of Charleston* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938), p. 29. Sir Robert Abercrombie is the officer mentioned (Ewald, *Diary*, p. 378, note 26). Pon Pon is also mentioned in Bruce E. Burgoyne, ed., "C. F. von Bartholomai Diary" (Typescript copy in the Williams E. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), p. 40. For further elaboration on Burgoyne's translations and their location, see Johann Conrad Döhla, *A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution*, ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), pp. ix-x, note 2.

Sir Robert Abercrombie (1740-1827) served as a volunteer in North America during the French and Indian War and became a lieutenant in the 44th regiment in 1759. A captain by 1761, he retired on half-pay in 1761. Major in 1772 and lieutenant colonel in 1773, Abercrombie fought throughout the American war until he was captured at Yorktown with his regiment. A colonel in 1782, he left for India with the 75th regiment in 1788, where he became commander in chief of all British forces after the departure of Lord Cornwallis in October 1793. A lieutenant general in 1797, he returned to England that same year, became MP for Clackmannan in 1798, and a full general in 1802, the same year that increasing blindness forced him to resign his seat in Parliament. See *DNB* (1885), 1:47-48.

2. "Half an hour's distance" corresponds to about 2.5 kilometers or 1.5 miles (Brockhaus, 18:269).

3. Engagement at Bland's Mills, Virginia, January 10, 1781. Howard H. Peckham, ed., *The Toll of Independence: Engagements and Battle Casualties of the American Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 79, estimates British losses at about twenty killed and wounded to none for the Virginia militiamen who ambushed them. At Hood's Point was an uncompleted fortification on the south side of the James River that Baron Steuben wanted built to thwart British ship movements up the river to Richmond. See Ewald, *Diary*, p. 421, note 15, and p. 422, note 33; map in Marshall and Peckham, *Campaigns*, p. 116; Mark Mayo Boatner, III, *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution* (New York: David McKay Company, 1976), p. 511. Hood's Point was located at the mouth of Flowerdew Hundred Creek, Prince George County, Virginia, near the site of the Civil War's Fort Powhatan. The controversy surrounding the construction of a fort there can be retraced in Julian P. Boyd, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 23 vols. to date (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), vol. 4, where Hood's Point is placed on "Wind Mill Hill below the Old Battery" (p. 475).

4. Here Ewald suddenly switches into the first person singular, which we have not repeated.

5. "Zwieback" is a "type of usually sweetened bread baked first as a loaf and later cut into slices and toasted" (William Morris, ed., *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* [New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973], p. 1491). What Ewald means is that a soldier can carry an eight-day supply of zweiback.

6. Ewald uses the term "bread" here figuratively to mean food in general.

7. A "skillful corporal named Sipple" figured prominently in an engagement at Scotts Creek, Virginia (near Portsmouth), March 19, 1781 (Ewald, *Diary*, pp. 291-92). The engagement here was June 26, 1781 at Spencer's Ordinary, James City County, Virginia, about seven miles outside Williamsburg. The "brave Corporal Sipple" was wounded in this action. A Jacob Sippel (born ca. 1750/51) was recruited into the 4th company of *jäger* in January 1777 and is most likely identical with the Sippel promoted to corporal in the 6th company in October 1780. In the HETRINA he is not listed as having been killed. See Archivschule Marburg, *Hessische Truppen im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (HETRINA)*, 5 vols. (Marburg: Archivschule, 1972, vol. 4 (the soldiers are listed in alphabetical order); and Max von Eelking, *The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence, 1776-1783* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, repr. 1969), p. 205, with the correct spelling "Sippel."

In his letter to Baron Jungkenn of June 29, 1781, in which Ewald relates the events of the engagement, he gives the Hessian losses at 3 dead, thirty-nine wounded, and one *jäger* captured. While he points out the bravery of Lieutenant Alexander Bickel, he does not mention Sippel by name (Ewald to Jungkenn, June 29, 1781, Jungkenn Papers 4:36, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).

A short biography of Lieutenant General Friedrich Christian Arnold Jungkenn, gen. Müntzer vom Mohrenstramm (1732-1806), the recipient of the letters in this collection, can be found in Woringer, *Heerführer*, p. 13.

General Lord Cornwallis issued a special commendation to Lieutenant Colonel John G. Simcoe of the Queen's Rangers and Captain Ewald of the *jäger* for their skillful handling of this engagement (Ewald, *Diary*, p. 312).

8. This is again a reference to the Battle at Spencer's Ordinary, June 26, 1781. It is indeed true that Lafayette's much larger force was close by and had Simcoe pursued he might have lost all. Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton spoke highly of how "the Hessian yagers, under Captain Ewald, gallantly resisted the efforts of the [American] assailants, who finding they had not effected a surprise, and that they could not make the impression they expected, began to be apprehensive for their own retreat" (Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* [London: T. Cadell, 1787], p. 301). For a map of the battle, see John G. Simcoe, *History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps called the Queen's Rangers* (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), p. 237.

Here, as always, Ewald spells the name as "de la Fayette."

9. Ewald spells the name as "Portsmuht."

10. Ewald consistently uses the term *die königlich gesinnten* ("royalists") when he speaks of the king's supporters during the war. Rather than switching to the modern term "loyalist," we have maintained Ewald's usage.

11. The Great Bridge, located south of Portsmouth, on the Elizabeth River, Norfolk County, Virginia, was the site of a critical engagement December 9, 1775, where Virginia soldiers repulsed an attack of British regulars. The defeat forced the British to evacuate and burn Norfolk (Marshall and Peckham, *Campaigns*, pp. 10-11). Five years later, when the British returned, it remained an important defensive position covering troops at Portsmouth. So long as General Arnold's or Lord Cornwallis' troops used Portsmouth as their base, controlling

the Great Bridge was essential. It would be the site of several stiff engagements between the British and American troops commanded by Brigadier General Isaac Gregory and Major Amos Weeks (Ewald, *Diary*, pp. 276–80, 287–88, map, p. 257).

Ewald wrote "Camp's Landing" for "Kemp's Landing," now Kempsville in Virginia Beach. The *Diary*, p. 278, describes it as consisting "of ninety dwellings, and is a trading place because of its location. It lies close to the source of the Eastern Branch of the Elizabeth River." This episode is described in the *Diary*, pp. 279–80. The London Bridge was south of Kemp's Landing. For Dauge's and Brock's swamps Ewald wrote "Dowse's" and "Brok's."

12. Ewald uses the term *rifemänner*.

13. In editing Ewald's *Diary*, Joseph P. Tustin could not find what he transcribed as "Turas" plantation (pp. 323–24). Gloucester is opposite Yorktown near the mouth of the York River. In the *Diary*, Ewald describes the incident involving Major Amos Weeks and 100 riflemen and 100 cavalry at Turas Plantation. In the *Treatise*, p. 195, Maimburg speaks of "Ward's Plantation," which is also what Ewald wrote in his 1796 *Abhandlung*, p. 235, located "1 1/2 hours from Gloucester Church." In his *Diary*, p. 10, Ewald mentions a Ward's plantation, albeit in the state of New York. He spells the names as "Louis" and "Avington."

14. The affair of Birkenbusch of 1761 has not been identified. Ewald wrote the name as "Birckenbusch." All spellings of German place-names have been changed to modern usage without notification in the text.

The standard works on the Seven Years' War in the western theater are Carl Renouard, *Geschichte des Krieges in Hannover, Hessen und Westfalen von 1757–1763*, 3 vols. (Kassel: Theodor Fischer, 1863/64); Wilhelm August von dem Osten, *Feldzüge der alliierten Armee in den Jahren 1757–1762 nach dem Tagebuche des Generaladjutanten, nachmaligen Feldmarschalls von Reden*, 3 vols. (Hamburg: B. G. Hoffmann, 1805/6); and Ferdinand Otto Wilhelm Heinrich von Westphalen, *Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg*, 6 vols. (Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1859–1872). The best recent work in English is Reginald Savory, *His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).

The best accounts of irregular warfare in this area are Freiherr von Bothmer, "Einiges aus der Geschichte der Kur-Hannoverschen leichten Truppen während des Siebenjährigen Krieges," *Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt* (1893): 321–65; and Wilhelm Schnorr, "Streifzüge der Lucknerhusaren im Siebenjährigen Krieg an der Lahn und in der Wetterau," *Volk und Scholle* 17 (1939): 43–45.

15. Ewald wrote "Trentown" and "Newyork," but changed the spelling to "Terrentown" in a list of errata at the end of the volume. The reference here is to Tarrytown, New York, and the numerous encounters between the British and Americans on the fringes of the British garrison in New York City and the American fortifications at West Point. In his *Diary* (pp. 140–56), Ewald recounts numerous light infantry and light cavalry engagements and movements in late summer and autumn of 1778. To which expedition Ewald refers is uncertain.

Colonel Andreas Emmerich (1737–1809), Ewald's comrade in arms, had served as an enlisted man under Freytag in the Seven Years' War until he became a second lieutenant in the Volontairs Auxiliaires de Bronswick, which were raised

in 1762. During the American Revolution he commanded a corps of volunteer German cavalry for duty in America. He was executed by the French for his participation in the Marburg revolt in 1809. Ewald counts him "among the premier partisans of our age" (Ewald, *Folge*, p. 46). See also Ewald, *Diary*, p. 405, note 3; and Jähns, *Kriegswissenschaften*, 3:2725.

16. Lieutenant Colonel Carl Levin von Wintzingerode (1738–1781) served in the Hessian guards before joining the *jäger* as a major and commanding officer in June 1761. He died a Prussian as well as a Hessian colonel and adjutant to Frederick the Great. See HSM Bestand 4 h 4006, Wilhelm Clothar Ferdinand Freiherr von Wintzingerode, *Geschichte der Familie von Wintzingerode* (Gotha: J. Perthes, 1913). Ewald spells the name as "Winzingerode."

17. There are several possibilities as to the identity of von Linsing. Otto Christian Wilhelm von Linsing (1730–1805) transferred from the guards and became a major in the Hessian *Jäger Corps* in January 1762. He is listed in HSM Bestand 4 h 4006. During the American Revolution he led a battalion of grenadiers as a colonel. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1804. See Woringer, *Kurfürst Wilhelm I.*, p. 6.

Johann Wilhelm von Linsing (1724–1795) received a company of *jäger* in Major General von der Schulenburg's *Jägercorps* on August 1, 1757, and was a major at the end of the war. By 1776 he was a colonel, in 1779 a major general. He retired a lieutenant general in Hanoverian service in 1793. He is listed in Bernhard von Poten, "Die Generale der Königlich Hannoverschen Armee," *Beihefte zum Militärwochenblatt* (1903), p. 280.

Another possibility would be Karl Christoph von Linsing (1703–1787), the brother of Johann Wilhelm, who was a Hanoverian major in 1756 and in command of one of the companies on foot of Luckner's hussars. During the Seven Years' War he took part in the battles of Hastenbeck, Krefeld, Minden, Münster, Eichsfeld, and Vellinghausen. A colonel in 1761, he commanded the four Hessian companies of foot-*jägers*. A major general in 1770 and lieutenant general in 1777, Linsing retired in 1786. The family now uses the name "von Linsingen." See *ADB* (1883), 18:721–22.

18. Two hours' distance is the equivalent of about 10 kilometers or 6.5 miles.

Chapter 5

1. The most obvious example is the surprise of the Hessian garrison at Trenton, New Jersey, December 26, 1776. Others include the seizure of Stony Point, New York, July 16, 1779, and of Paulus Hook, New Jersey, August 19, 1779. Ewald mentions the latter two in Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 149; on Trenton, see p. 181.

2. Ewald wrote "Pensilvanian."

3. A Major Hausmann is mentioned in Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:41, as commanding officer in Duderstadt in January 1761, where he was taken prisoner. The affair of Raden in the winter of 1761 has not been identified. The best work on the Brunswick troops in the eighteenth century is Otto Elster, *Geschichte der stehenden Truppen im Herzogtum Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel von 1600–1714*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1899–1901).

4. Ewald wrote the name as "Vegetz." Flavius Vegetius Renatus' *Epitoma rei*

militaris, written ca. A.D. 388–395, is the only manual on Roman military institutions to have survived intact. It was of considerable influence on the military thinking of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It was first printed in Latin in Utrecht in 1473 and in German in Augsburg in 1475.

Ewald's source has not been identified, but no German translation from the Latin original appeared between 1475 and 1800, when Johann Heinrich Friedrich Meinecke published the *Anleitung zur Kriegswissenschaft, an den Kaiser Valentinian, in fünf Büchern* (Halle: J. C. Hendel, 1800). A translation from the French was published by Johann Theobald Bion, *Kriegslehren* (Vienna: Trattner, 1759), and republished in 1760 and 1770. The editors have not been able to locate a copy of this translation. The most recent bilingual French-Latin edition that Ewald could have used had been published in Nuremberg by Bauer and Raspe in 1767; the most recent English translation by John Clark in London by W. Griffin in 1767. Ewald's knowledge of the French language, evident in some of his letters to British officers preserved among the Jungkenn Papers in the Clements Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, was good enough for him to have used a French edition.

Rather than retranslate Ewald's German into English we have used the translation given in John Clark, *The Military Institutions of the Romans*, ed. Thomas R. Phillips (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 107.

Chapter 6

1. Ewald describes the raid on Cracow of February 7, 1772, in great detail in chapter 8 as well as in his *Folge der Belehrungen*, pp. 271–73.

The raid on Cremona mentioned here took place during the night of January 31/February 1, 1702, during the War of the Spanish Succession. A Catholic priest in the city of Verona informed Prince Eugene of a dried-out canal that ended in his house and through which one could enter the city unnoticed. During the night some 400 men entered the city and opened a gate for the imperial cavalry to enter. Ultimately the raid failed when the invading troops could not gain the citadel within the city and had to retreat in order to avoid being surrounded. See Max Braubach, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*, 5 vols. (Munich: R. Oldenburg, 1963–1965), 1:334–37. Ewald describes the raid in great detail in his *Belehrungen*, pp. 285–304.

2. "The term comes from Friesland where obstacles such as these were erected to stop Spanish cavalry attacking a force without horses. The chevaux de frise are long beams of wood with pointed stakes crossed and tied to the center beam at several points along each beam" (Paul Sanborn, "Military Primer. Being in fact a brief compendium of essential terms to enlighten the reader on the details of eighteenth-century military life." This "Primer" will be published as an appendix to Richard L. Blanco, ed., *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution* [New York and London: Garland, forthcoming]. We are grateful for permission to use this valuable reference tool before publication.).

3. Ewald again writes "Portsmouth." Portsmouth, located across the Elizabeth River from Norfolk, served as the initial headquarters for Brigadier General Benedict Arnold's raiding party until enough reinforcements arrived for expeditions deep into Virginia in the spring and summer of 1781. For a brief

overview, see Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 376-82.

4. The Hessian *jäger* arrived in Virginia December 29, 1780 and served there until their surrender at Yorktown in October 1781.

5. In his 1790 *Abhandlung*, p. 101, Ewald severely criticizes the American General Charles Lee (1731-1782) and British Colonel William Harcourt (1743-1830) for such behavior, which led to their capture by the enemy in 1776.

6. Colonel von Diemar has not been identified conclusively. He is most likely identical with Albrecht Ludwig von Diemar (1720-1786), who became an ensign in the Hessian cavalry in 1742, a major in 1759, a lieutenant colonel in January 1761, and a major general in 1777. See Woringer, *Heerführer*, p. 7.

On August 14, 1761, the French attacked Lieutenant Colonel von Diemar and 300 men in Horn with about 7,000 to 8,000 men but were forced to retreat with the loss of about 400 dead and wounded and 50 prisoners. Diemar lost 9 men dead and 11 wounded. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:327-28.

The best works on the Hanoverian army besides Sichert and Renouard are Schütz von Brandis, *Übersicht der Geschichte der Hannoverschen Armee von 1617-1866* (Hannover: Hahn, 1903); and Johann Karl Freiherr von Reitzenstein, *Die Königlich Hannoversche Cavallerie und ihre Stammkörper von 1631-1866* (Baden-Baden: Selbstverlag, 1892).

7. The British Legion was formed by Ferdinand of Brunswick in the spring of 1760 with a strength of 5 battalions of 4 companies infantry and one squadron cavalry each for a total of 3,005 men and 130 officers, who were mostly recruited from among French, Swiss, Saxon, Dutch, and English deserters. Hanoverian troops, among them Scheiter and the *jäger*, provided a core of 10 noncommissioned officers and 100 men. On April 4, 1760, the corps received its name; the officers received their commissions dated May 9, 1760. Christoph Carl von Bülow (?) became commanding officer on May 20, 1760. Ewald writes the name as "Bühlow."

The legion took part in the battles of Warburg in 1760, Waldeck and Wellinghausen in 1761, and Amöneburg/Ziegenhain in 1762. In early December 1762 the corps was disbanded with the majority of the troops, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Frederick Beckwith, joining Prussian service as the "Prussian Legion" on January 2, 1763. Beckwith became a Prussian major general but left Prussian service in July 1766.

Contemporaries had quite a different opinion of the legion. The *London Chronicle* wrote in its #950, January 25, 1763, that it was "composed of deserters of all nations. . . . It probably had the name of Legion from our soldiers who never heard of any legion but the legions of the devils mentioned in the Bible." The Hanoverian general August Friedrich Freiherr von Spörcken wrote that the "corps consists of very poorly disciplined people, whom even a man like Bülow can not really force into the right kind of discipline and order" (Sichert, *Geschichte*, 3:124, note 1. In general, see Carl August Pentz von Schlichtegroll, *Die "legion britannique"* (Zentralstelle für deutsche Personen- und Familiengeschichte 20: Leipzig, 1932). Information on the legion can also be found in Savory, *Army*, pp. 202ff.

Carl Ludwig von Udam, a native of Hesse with thirteen years of service (he

joined the Hessian army in August 1747 and became a lieutenant in the Regiment Prinz Anhalt in September 1749), joined the legion on May 10, 1760, as a major and commander of the second battalion of infantry. In 1763 he took Prussian service and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. See HSM Bestand 4 h 4011.

There seems to be some confusion as to the identity of von Bülow. Schlichtegroll, *Legion*, p. 4, identifies him as a Prussian major general, which would correspond with Ewald, who in chapter 8 calls him a "Prussian Colonel" in 1760. Sichert, *Geschichte*, 2:407, writes that Major von Bülow, adjutant-general to Prince Ferdinand, commanded the legion, and in 3:7, lists again a Major von Bülow, adjutant to Prince Ferdinand, as commanding officer. Savory, *Army*, p. 255, note 3 makes a von Bülow the "colonel" of the legion, even though his assertion that von Bülow died in 1761 of a fever is patently wrong. He most likely confuses him with another Captain von Bülow who died on February 15, 1761, after an attack on Marburg. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:68.

A Friedrich Ernst von Bülow (1736–1802) became an ensign in the Hannoverian foot guards in 1752. A lieutenant in 1756, he joined the Hannoverian jäger corps of Georg Ludwig von der Schulenburg in 1757 as a "Stabskapitän" and rose to the rank of major and adjutant to Prince Ferdinand in 1761. He retired to his estates after 1763. See ADB (1876), 3:524–25. A "Stabskapitän" ranks between a lieutenant and a captain.

A Christoph Carl von Bülow (1716–1788) joined the Prussian army in 1731. At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War he was a major; on April 28, 1759, he became a colonel, which would bear out Ewald, and was promoted to major general in November 1760 after the Battle of Torgau. In 1763 he became inspector general of the Prussian cavalry and a general in 1787. See Priesdorff, *Führertum*, 1:511–12, and ADB (1874), 3:514–15. Adolf von Bülow, *Bülow'sches Familienbuch*, 2 vols. (Herberger: Schwerin, 1911–1914), 1:100–101; 2:163 (Friedrich Ernst); and 1:124–33 (Christoph Carl), also does not completely solve the issue, since he does not mention the Legion.

On the defense of Meppen from October 1–3, 1761, see Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:430. Udam had about 500 men under his command when Prince Conde with 45 companies of infantry and 3 regiments of dragoons called for his surrender on September 30. Udam refused and withstood the attacks of the French until the morning of October 3, when he was forced to surrender.

8. Ewald writes "Hobock." There were two attacks on a British blockhouse at Bull's Ferry, New Jersey (near Hoboken)—May 28 and July 21, 1780—where there was a successful British defense. See Peckham, *Toll*, pp. 70–73.

9. Ewald writes "Refuge'es."

10. According to the "Journal kept by the Distinguished Hessian Field Jaeger Corps during the Campaigns of the Royal Army of Great Britain in North America [Part 2]," *Journal of the Johannes Schwalb Historical Association*, ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne (1987), 4:32–33, the attack described here began around 10:00 A.M. on July 21, 1780. General James Irvine attacked the blockhouse with some 1,800 men. When the attack was called off around 1:30 P.M., more than 70 6-pound cannonballs had hit the blockhouse. Irvine lost 90 men dead and wounded compared to Captain Thomas Ward's 5 casualties. Ewald writes the name as "Warth."

Ewald is wrong in attributing the attack to General Anthony Wayne, whose name he spells as "Waiun." The U.S. failure resulted in a satiric verse by British Major John Andre. See Paul David Nelson, *Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), pp. 109–11.

11. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.1.14. Ewald, who took this quote from Thielke, *Eigenschaften*, p. 190, wrongly places the quotation marks at the end of the paragraph. Rather than retranslate Thielke into English, we have used the translation given in Xenophon, *Hellenica, Books VI & VII, Anabasis, Books I–III*, ed. Carleton L. Brownson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 423.

Chapter 7

1. Ewald uses the French term *en échelon*, which is defined in the *Nouveau Larousse Illustré* (4:24) as a disposition that "allows to engage various elements successively, while retaining the faculty of lining up simultaneously some of them, and remaining free to face at will in a number of directions."

2. This refers to an encounter on October 23, 1776, near East Chester, New York, south of New Rochelle, noted in Ewald, *Diary*, p. 9.

3. Friedrich Adolph Baron von Riedesel, Baron zu Eisenbach (1738–1800), joined Hessian forces at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War and took part in the Battle of Minden in 1759, where he became a captain at age twenty-one. In May 1761 he left Hessian service to become a lieutenant colonel in the service of Brunswick, where he became commanding officer of a regiment of hussars. In 1776 he was a colonel in the service of Brunswick, and when the reigning duke agreed to send an expeditionary corps to America, Riedesel was promoted to major general and commanding officer of the Brunswick troops. Captured at Saratoga, Riedesel spent some time in Virginia with the Convention Army until he was exchanged in October 1780. He spent the rest of the war in Canada and returned to Germany in October 1783. See *ADB* (1889), 28:531–32.

His, as well as his wife's, memoirs form an important source for the American Revolution. See Max von Eelking, *Leben und Wirken des Herzoglich Braunschweig'schen General-Lieutenants Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, Freiherrn zu Eisenbach*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: Otto Wiegand, 1856); and *Baroness von Riedesel and the American Revolution, Journal and Correspondence of a Tour of Duty 1776–1783*, ed. Marvin L. Brown, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965).

On May 23, 1762, Riedesel with 600 men surprised a small detachment of French light infantry under Colonel de Larre near Göttingen and took thirty-one men prisoners. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:554.

Chapter 8

1. The Chasseurs de Monet were raised in March 1761. They consisted of sixty *chasseurs à pied*, forty *chasseurs à cheval*, and fifty hussars. See Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'Infanterie Française*, 5 vols. (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876), 5:375. During the raid of July 2–3, 1762, Monet, three officers, and thirty men were captured; Hanoverian losses amounted to 5 wounded. The raid itself was carried out by Major Gyarmati (Bothmer, "Leichte Truppen," p. 358). Sichert, *Geschichte*, p. 609, gives the French losses as 3 officers, including Monet, and twenty men

captured. Monet dined with Prince Ferdinand and was escorted to the French camp in Cassel the next day. Monet rebuilt his *chasseurs* under the name of Chasseurs de Bonn, but the unit was dissolved in November 1762 (Oré, "Fischer," p. 543). Ewald writes the name as "Monnet."

2. As a major, Ernst Ludwig Wilhelm von Speth (1728–1800) commanded the newly created (1759) Brunswickian *jäger* regiment (326 men) from 1760 until its dissolution in 1768. From 1776 to 1783 he served with the Brunswick troops as commanding officer of the Regiment von Riedesel in America and was promoted to colonel with the rank of brigadier in 1780. He died a major general and commanding officer of the Brunswick troops in Wolfenbüttel. See *An Eyewitness Account of the American Revolution and New England Life. The Journal of J. F. Wasmus, German Company Surgeon, 1776–1783*, trans. Helga Doblin, ed. Mary C. Lynn (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 38, note 4. See also Elster, *Geschichte*, 1:388; 2:244; and the "Kurze Stamm- und Kriegsgeschichte der Herzoglich Braunschweigischen Truppen von 1635, bis zu deren Auflösung im Jahre 1806, durch die Gewaltherrschaft Napoleons," *Braunschweigisches Magazin* 64 (1851): 280, 286–87. Ewald writes the name as "Spaeth."

3. The "hereditary prince" is Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand of Brunswick (1735–1806). The eldest son of the reigning duke, he was a major general at the time. A gallant soldier, he was wounded in the Battle of Nauheim in 1762. Thirty years later he commanded at Valmy. Badly wounded in the Battle of Auerstädt in 1806, he died in November of the same year. A short biography can be found in *ADB* (1881), 15:272–81.

During the night of September 5/6, 1760, Prince Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand with 6 battalions of infantry and 10 escadrons of cavalry surrounded Zierenberg, which was defended by about 1,100 French troops. The infantry entered the city unnoticed, took the whole officer corps and 300 to 400 men prisoners, and killed or wounded many more. The allied losses were 4 killed and 9 wounded. The ruse of beating French signals is also mentioned in Georg von Wissel, *Geschichte der Errichtung sämtlicher Chur-Braunschweigisch-Lüneburgischen Truppen*, 2d ed. Zelle: J. D. Schulze, 1786), p. 62. For a more detailed description, see Renouard, *Geschichte*, 2:604–8.

4. Colonel Christoph Carl von Bülow's(?) raid on Marburg at 6:00 A.M. on September 10, 1760, was carried out by 500 men infantry and 2 squadrons of hussars. The city itself was not occupied, but when Bülow was unable to enter the castle, which was defended by about 250 men, he retreated with 7 officers and 60 men prisoners. What Ewald does not mention here is that on the way back to the main army, Bülow was routed by the French and lost almost 400 of his men and all his baggage. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 2:613–17, where Bülow is ranked as a major. If Renouard is correct, Friedrich Ernst von Bülow would have carried out the raid. See above, chapter 6, note 7.

According to Renouard (*Geschichte*, 2: 614), the raid on Butzbach was carried out on September 11, 1760, between 5:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. by Captain von Hattorf and a detachment of Hannoverian *Jäger*. The loot was about 100 fat bulls.

There is no noble family by the name of von Padewitz; Ewald possibly means the Prussian Major (later General) Joachim Bernhard von Prittwitz (1726–1793), in command of a detachment of hussars, who cooperated closely with the troops

of Prince Ferdinand. See Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von dem Knesebeck, *Historisches Handbuch des Adels im Königreich Hannover* (Hannover: Hahn, 1840); and also Tempelhof, *Geschichte*, 5:26.

5. There is neither a detailed modern nor a contemporary eyewitness account of the events described here by Ewald. The standard work on St. Eustatius in the American Revolution, J. Franklin Jameson, "St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review* 8 (1903): 683-703, covers only the conquest by the British in February 1781. Most authors mention the reconquest only in one sentence or two. See Jonathan R. Dull, *The French Navy and American Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 248: "Bouillé with 1,500 troops and three frigates recaptured Saint Eustatius as he had captured Saint Vincent and Dominica." Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 454 writes: "The French had recovered St. Eustatius in a manner disgraceful to the British garrison." For a contemporary, but not an eyewitness, account, see *The Operations of the French Fleet under the Count de Grasse in 1781-2*, ed. John Shea (New York, 1864; repr. Da Capo Press, 1971), pp. 91-93, which shows that Ewald's account is extremely accurate. He also recounts the raid in his *Belehrungen*, pp. 359-63, hinting that he knew Colonel Cockburn personally.

6. James Cockburn (d. 1783), served for thirty-six years in the British army, mostly in the 35th foot, which he joined in 1757. He fought with Wolfe at Quebec, at Bunker's Hill and White Plains, and was colonel of his regiment and commanding officer on St. Eustatius in 1781. After the island was taken on November 26, 1781, Cockburn was court-martialed for his role and cashiered in 1783. He died shortly afterwards. See *DNB* (1886), 4:644.

Admiral George Brydges, First Baron Rodney (1719-1792), entered the navy in 1732. In 1742 he commanded his first ship; by 1748 he was governor of Newfoundland. Vice-admiral in 1762, he was made a baronet for his exploits in the Caribbean in 1764. Virtually bankrupt after 1768, he lived in France from 1775 until May 1778. In 1780 he sailed for the West Indies as admiral and commander of a British fleet but failed to engage the French fleet under Louis Urbain de Bouëx, Comte de Guichen (1712-1790). In the spring of 1781, he took St. Eustatius and confiscated and sold the property of Dutch and English traders alike. When Bouillé recaptured St. Eustatius and the fleet transporting the booty fell into French hands, Rodney was left with a number of costly lawsuits. On April 12, 1782, Rodney scored his greatest victory when he routed the French fleet under Francois Joseph Paul, Marquis de Tilly, Comte de Grasse (1723-1788). Even though he failed to completely destroy the French, Parliament dropped the inquiry into his behavior on St. Eustatius and voted him an annual pension. King George III created him a peer (*DNB* (1888), 17:81-86).

7. Françoise Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé (1739-1800), entered the French army in 1753. A colonel by 1763, he departed with the regiment Vexin, which he had received in 1761, for Martinique in 1765. In 1768 he became governor of Guadeloupe, in 1777 governor of the French West Indies (until 1783). The conquest of Santo Domingo in 1778 made him a major general; by 1782 he was a lieutenant general. A determined counter-revolutionary, Bouillé was involved in the unsuccessful flight of Louis XVI at Varennes. In 1793 he settled in England and died in London in 1800 (*DBF* (1954), 6:1315-16).

8. The seven ships mentioned here are the *Amazone*, a frigate built in St. Malo in 1778. She carried twenty-six cannons. The same is true for the *Galatée*, built at Rochefort in 1779. The *Diligent* was a frigate, built in 1761. She carried twenty-six cannons and was shipwrecked in February 1782 (Dull, *Navy*, pp. 356–57). The *Eagle* (*l'Aigle*) was an English corvette that had been captured by the French. *La Charmante* carried thirty-eight guns, and the *St. Louis* was a supply ship. See Vicomte de Noailles, *Marins et Soldats Français en Amérique pendant la Guerre de l'Indépendance des États-Unis (1778–1783)* (Paris: Librairie Académique Didier, 1903), pp. 261–62, 375, 382. *La Felicité* was a troop transport that had transported part of the Deux-Ponts Regiment to America in 1780. See *The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783*, eds. Howard C. Rice, Jr., and Anne S. K. Brown, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 1:118, note 1.

John Cornelius O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969), p. 626 states that de Bouillé sailed with 10 ships, 3 frigates, 4 corvettes, and 3 armed boats. He had with him 300 men each of the regiments Auxerrois, Royal Comtois, Dillon, and Walsh plus 300 grenadiers and *chasseurs* of different corps. Altogether some 400 men managed to land.

9. The Regiment Auxerrois was formed in 1776 from the second and fourth battalions of the Regiment La Marine under Claude-Charles Vicomte de Damas-Marillac. Its first battalion was already stationed in Martinique in 1775, the second followed in 1777. In the West Indies it took part in the conquest of Dominique in September 1778 and the siege of Savannah in 1779. In 1783 it returned to France. For a brief history, see Susane, *Histoire de l'Infanterie Française*, 3:32–38.

Royal Comtois was formed in 1674 and received its name in 1685. In 1772 its officers rebelled when the regiment was to be stationed permanently in the colonies. Seven captains were sentenced to between ten and twenty years in prison. By 1778 it was stationed in Boulogne. One battalion of Royal Comtois was sent to Martinique in February 1780 (Susane, *Histoire de l'Infanterie de Française*, 4:411–19).

The three Irish regiments, Dillon, Walsh, and Berwick, were collectively known as the Irish Brigade. The regiments Dillon and Berwick were formed in 1690, Walsh in 1698, by Irish refugees in France. In 1776 their respective colonels were Count Arthur Dillon, Jean Charles Berwick, Duke of Fitz-James, and Antoine Count Walsh-Serrent. See Susane, *Histoire de l'Infanterie de Française*, 5:57–65 (Dillon), 66–72 (Berwick), and 94–101 (Walsh).

The second battalion of Walsh left for the French Antilles in July 1778. The first battalion of the Regiment Dillon was sent to Martinique in May 1779, where it took part in the conquest of Grenada, the siege of Savannah, and the subsequent campaigns in the Antilles. Its second battalion arrived in Martinique in March 1781. The second battalion of Berwick did not arrive in Martinique until late 1782.

The Regiment Martinique was formed in 1772 from various detachments already stationed permanently in the West Indies and took part in all major engagements in the Antilles after 1778. See Susane, *Histoire de l'Infanterie de Française*, 5:174–75.

10. Arthur Comte Dillon (1750–1794) was descended from an Irish family that had taken French service in 1690. In 1772 he became colonel of the Regiment Dillon, stationed in the French Antilles. Brigadier on March 1, 1780, he served at Yorktown and became governor of St. Christophe in 1782 and Tobago in 1786. In 1789 he returned to France as a deputy for Martinique. A lieutenant general in 1792, he was executed as an enemy of the revolution on April 13, 1794. See Gilbert Bodinier, *Dictionnaire des Officiers de l'Armée Royale qui ont combattu aux États-Unis pendant la Guerre d'Indépendance* (Château de Vincennes: Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, 1982), p. 142.

11. O'Callaghan, *History*, p. 627, gives the distance as 2 leagues. Since an English league normally has 3 miles, this would be the equivalent of 6 miles or 9.6 kilometers. There existed, however, in the eighteenth century a *lieue d'Angleterre* of 5.569 kilometers, which would place the distance at 11.14 kilometers or almost 7 miles (11.26 kilometers). This would correspond with Ewald who was using the German mile here with one German mile equaling 7.42 kilometers (11.13 kilometers). Noailles, *Soldats*, p. 261, gives the distance as 2 *lieues*, one *lieue marine* being 5.556 kilometers, which would put the distance at 11.11 miles. If he is using the *lieue de terre* or *lieue commune* of 4.445 kilometers, the distance would only be 8.9 kilometers, a little over 5 miles. See *Grand Larousse Encyclopédique*, 10 vols. (Paris: Larousse, 1962), 6:748.

12. O'Callaghan, *History*, p. 627, also identifies the Chevalier de Fresne as a major in Royal Comtois, who took with him 100 *chasseurs* of Royal Comtois and Auxerrois. Cockburn was taken prisoner by the Chevalier O'Connor, captain of *chasseurs* in the Regiment Walsh.

13. Claude Charles, Vicomte de Damas-Marillac (1731–1800), joined the French army in 1748. A lieutenant in 1752, he became a captain in 1755 and a major in 1763. By 1776 he was colonel in the Regiment Auxerrois. In 1778 he was promoted to brigadier for his role in the conquest of Santo Domingo. In February 1782 he became governor of Guadeloupe. In 1783 he succeeded Bouillé as governor of the French West Indies. In 1791 he returned to France but left again in 1793 after the revolutionaries incarcerated him for a short time in 1793. See *DBF* (1965), 10:25.

14. De la Motte, identified by O'Callaghan as a captain of *chasseurs* in Auxerrois, could not be identified more closely. The French losses were 10 men, all by drowning; the British lost 677 in prisoners alone. Each of the French soldiers received a reward of 100 crowns or 25 pounds. See O'Callaghan, *History*, pp. 627–28.

15. Claude Gabriel de Choisy (1723–1799?) entered the army in 1741 as a common soldier. In 1757 he was a captain and a major in the Volontaires de Haynault in 1763. Lieutenant colonel in the Legion de Lorraine by 1767, he went to Poland in 1771 and took part in the defense of Cracow, where he was taken prisoner. By the time of his return to France in 1773 he had been promoted to brigadier (1772). In 1780 he came to America as a brigadier in Rochambeau's army. He was in command at the siege of Gloucester in 1781 and promoted to major general. In 1792 he retired as a lieutenant general and died after September 1792. He was not the colonel of the Legion de Lorraine as Ewald would have it. See *DBF* (1959), 8:1225–26.

The Legion de Flandre had its origins in various irregular troops formed in

1744 and 1748, which merged in 1749 under the name of *Volontaires de Flandre*. In April 1757, the *Volontaires de Flandre* were divided into two regiments of 398 men each, the *Volontaires de Flandre* and the *Volontaires de Haynault*. Together they provided valuable service during the Seven Years' War under Thomas-Auguste Le Roy de Grandmaison, who took command in December 1758. Between March 1763 and January 3, 1770, Baron de Vioménil was commanding officer of the unit, which had merged into the *Legion de Haynault* in 1762 and later changed its name to *Legion de Flandre* in 1769, until he resigned in order to participate in the Polish rebellion. See Oré, "Fischer," pp. 544-46; and Susane, *Histoire de la Cavalerie*, 3:109-14.

On the military aspects of the Polish rebellion of 1771/72 that followed the first partitioning of Poland, see Jozef Andrzej Gierowski, "The Polish and Lithuanian Armies in the Confederations and Insurrections of the Eighteenth Century," in *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, eds. Gunther E. Rothenberg et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), pp. 215-38.

16. The officer Saillant has not been identified; a Guillaume de Charlot (1734-1794?), son of the first commissioner of war, was a captain in the regiment *Tourraine* in 1771, with which he later took part in the siege of Yorktown. He retired in 1794 as a colonel. See Bodinier, *Dictionnaire*, p. 94.

There were two members of the Vioménil family fighting in Poland. Antoine Charles du Houx, Baron de Vioménil (1728-1792), lieutenant in 1741, captain in 1747, colonel of the *Volontaires de Dauphiny* in 1759, and brigadier in 1762, became the commanding officer of the *Legion de Haynault/Lorraine* in 1763 and was campaigning in Corsica when he decided to come to Poland in August 1771. He returned to France in 1772. A provisional lieutenant general in 1781, he came to America as second in command to General Rochambeau. Governor of La Rochelle in 1783, he became a full lieutenant general that same year. A staunch supporter of the monarchy, he was seriously wounded in the defense of the *Tuilleries* in August 1792 and died a few months later. See Bodinier, *Dictionnaire*, p. 160. Ewald spells the name first as "Viomesnill," and then as "Viomesnil."

The other member of the family, Antoine Louis, Chevalier du Houx de Vioménil (1745-1821), had been a captain in the *Legion de Lorraine* when he came to Poland in 1771. A lieutenant colonel in 1779, he came to America as an aide de camp to his uncle Antoine Charles. *Maréchal de Camp* in 1791, he retired but stayed in France during the Revolution. See Bodinier, *Dictionnaire*, p. 161.

Antoine Charles de Vioménil gives a first-hand account of the events of 1772 in his letters. See Antoine Charles du Houx, Baron de Vioménil, *The private letters of Baron de Vioménil on Polish affairs, with a letter on the siege of Yorktown*, ed. John Francis Gough (Jersey City: Doan, 1935), pp. 130-39, with a letter by Choisy. In December 1771, Choisy purchased a house near the walls of Cracow for observation. At the same time he was in close contact with the Carmelites within the city who kept him informed of happenings inside. The surprise on the night of February 1/2, 1772 (not February 7), with the help of the Carmelites, who had had a hole made into the walls surrounding the monastery, which were integrated into the city walls, was successful, and his "little cousin

killed three Russian sentinels and a captain before any of his soldiers had entered the citadel" (p. 131). Vioménil mentions one more officer named Despréz. Ewald also retells the raid in his *Folge der Belehrungen*, pp. 271-73. Tiniec, directly south of Cracow, is spelled by Ewald as "Tynieck."

17. Grandmaison, *Kleiner Krieg*, p. 127 gives an example of a successful raid carried out this way, which he apparently takes from de La Croix. Ewald mentions such an endeavor by de La Croix against Huy in the Netherlands during the War of the Spanish Succession in his *Belehrungen*, p. 278.

18. In the morning of May 30, 1762, Major von Wintzingerode approached Sababurg with about five straw-covered wagons in which some twenty jäger were hiding. The enterprise failed when the supporting troops were discovered too soon. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 3:555.

In the *Folge der Belehrungen*, p. 285, Ewald claims that the raid on Stony Point on July 15, 1779 had been prepared similarly by American officers who had entered the fortifications disguised as farmers trying to sell food-stuffs.

19. Bernhard Duke of Sachsen-Weimar (1604-1639) was one of the most ardent if unsuccessful supporters of the Protestant cause. Colonel of a regiment of cavalry in 1625 in the service of Denmark, he left that service in 1627 for Dutch service. After the arrival of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, he took Swedish service and stood poised to invade the Tyrol in 1632. After the Battle of Lützen, Bernhard became commanding officer in Franconia, from where he conquered Landsberg in 1633. In the same year the Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna made him a present of the duchy of Franconia, including the Prince-Bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg. He had no time to enjoy his new duchy, dying of exhaustion before the end of the war in 1739.

The raid on Mannheim took place on December 29, 1631/January 8, 1632. Bernhard approached the city before daybreak claiming to be imperial soldiers pursued by the enemy. When the gates were opened, the city was conquered. The Spanish commander Maravel was released for ransom but executed by the Spanish after a court-martial in Heidelberg. The raid is described by Ewald in his *Belehrungen*, p. 247, as well as in Friedrich Walter, *Mannheim in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, 3 vols. (Mannheim: Stadtverwaltung, 1907), 1:162; and in Bernhard Röse, *Herzog Bernhard der Große von Sachsen-Weimar*, 2 vols. (Weimar: Landes-Industrie-Comtoir, 1828/29), 1:160. A short biography of Duke Bernhard can be found in *ADB* (1875), 2:439-50.

20. This is a reference to the Battle of Paoli, Pennsylvania, on September 21, 1777, when Major General Charles ("No-flint") Grey (1729-1807) led a night attack against troops commanded by Major General Anthony Wayne near Paoli Tavern, northwest of Philadelphia. Grey's night march from Whitemarsh and his bayonet attack were successful because he achieved surprise by requiring his troops to remove their flints from loaded rifles so as not to accidentally warn the Americans of their approach. The Americans called it a war atrocity and labeled the operation the "Paoli Massacre." See Christopher Ward, *The War of the Revolution*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 1:358-59. Ewald spells the names as "Gray," "Vayhn," and "Whitemarch."

For another commentary on this engagement, see Bruce E. Burgoyne, ed., "Journal kept by the Distinguished Hessian Field Jäger Corps during the Cam-

paings of Great Britain in North America [Part 1]," *Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association* (1987), 3:45-62.

21. Ewald apparently thinks that security has been so comprised as to make a retreat necessary.

22. De La Croix' *Traité de la Petite Guerre* was published in a German translation in the *Kriegesbibliothek, oder gesammlete Beyträge zur Krieges-Wissenschaft* (Breslau, 1755), 1:105-132.

Chapter 9

1. Here Ewald once again switches from the third person singular to the first person plural, talking about "a moment in our life." We have opted to keep the third person singular.

2. With the entrance of France into the war on the American side, the British had to consolidate their garrison in the rebellious colonies. On June 16, 1778, General Sir Henry Clinton began an evacuation of Philadelphia headed to New York across New Jersey. Washington and the Continental Army followed, harassing the British and eventually engaging in the Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778. Count Casimir Pulaski does not seem to have been a significant contributor to the pursuit across the Jerseys in 1778, despite what Ewald has to say. Nor, for that matter, was Lafayette (Ward, *War*, 2:571-86). Ewald's comment on the success of Colonel von Wurmb was not echoed in his *Diary*, p. 135, where he notes that when covering the rear "I was so hard pressed on the flanks at different times that the [Jäger] Corps and the light infantry had to support me. The enemy kept hanging on me up to the new camp [at Monmouth]. I lost over 60 men out of 180 foot jägers and 30 horsemen, among which may well be some 20 men who dropped dead from the great heat and fatigue."

Similar commentaries on the retreat across New Jersey are found in Burgoyne, ed., "Journal . . . Hessian Field Jäger Corps [Part 1], pp. 53-55; and Bruce E. Burgoyne, ed., "Lieutenant Heinrich Carl Philipp von Feilitzsch Diary (1777-1780)," (Typescript in the William E. Clements Library, 1989), pp. 29-31.

3. For 1777, General Sir William Howe determined to seize Philadelphia. Initially he hoped to march across New Jersey and to use the move to entice Washington out of his fortified positions near Morristown into general combat in central New Jersey. Starting on June 12, the two armies made a series of moves with Washington so threatening Howe's flanks and rear that he could not use this route against Philadelphia. Throughout this series of maneuvers, Ewald reported that "all our outposts were alarmed and harassed by the enemy, both day and night" (*Diary*, p. 65). Eventually, General Howe decided to withdraw and to attack Philadelphia from the south using the British fleet to bring him to the north end of the Chesapeake Bay, where he launched a new campaign. During the withdrawal, June 19-28, from Bonhampton to Amboy, the Americans "alarmed all the outposts all night long, and a great number of riflemen, supported by light cavalry and guns, followed us so closely that we had to withdraw under constant skirmishing" (Ewald, *Diary*, p. 65). Ewald spells the names as "Rariton Lending" and "Ponentown."

Count Casimir Pulaski (ca. 1748–1779), spelled "Pulawski" by Ewald, had to flee to Turkey in 1772 after the unsuccessful Polish revolt against Russia in 1771/72. In July 1777 he arrived in the United States with a letter of recommendation from Benjamin Franklin. In September 1777 he became brigadier general and commanding officer of the continental dragoons. After resigning this position, he started raising his own body of mounted troops in the summer of 1778 without authorization. He died in an attack near Savannah in October 1779. See Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, pp. 900–01.

4. The most detailed analysis of the Battle of Minden of 1759 can be found in Grosse Generalstab, *Die Kriege Friedrichs des Großen*, 19 vols. in 18 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1890–1914), part 3, where volume 11 is devoted to the battles of Minden and Maxen.

Major Heinrich Wilhelm von Freytag (1720–1798) joined the Hannoverian army in 1737 and became a *Capitän-Lieutenant* after Fontenoy. In 1757 he joined the Hannoverian *Jäger-Corps* raised by *Vize-Jägermeister* and Major General Graf von der Schulenburg, as a major. In 1760, Freytag received permission to raise a *Jägercorps* of his own, composed of 636 men mounted in 6 companies. Schulenburg's corps also expanded; in 1761 and 1762 it had 6 companies on foot and 3 mounted, for a total of 1,218 men infantry and 636 men cavalry. After the conclusion of peace in 1763, the *Jäger Corps*, the hussars of Luckner, and the corps of Scheiter formed the core of the 2 newly formed regiments of light dragoons under now Lieutenant General von Freytag.

Between 1764 and 1783 Freytag spent almost twelve years in England. In 1792 he was second in command of the Hannoverian army, but retired after receiving a wound in September of the same year. Freytag died a Hannoverian field marshal in 1798. See ADB (1878), 9:374–76; and Poten, *Generale*, p. 173.

In 1758, Major Heinrich Ludwig von Stockhausen (1714–1794) raised a *Scharfschützenbataillon*, composed of 3 companies on foot and 2 mounted, 632 men strong. Stockhausen had been a lieutenant of grenadiers in the Hessian army in 1748 and slowly risen through the ranks. In 1755 he was a captain in the Hannoverian army. In 1760, he had one squadron mounted at 230 men; in 1761 he had 3 companies on foot and 2 mounted, 228 and 403 men total, respectively. In April 1762, Stockhausen's force was integrated into Freytag, whose corps was now 2,497 men strong. A colonel after the Battle of Wilhelmstal (1762), Stockhausen became a major general in 1777, took over Scheiter's regiment in 1788, and died a lieutenant general and commanding officer of Minden in Hannoverian service. On Stockhausen, see Poten, *Generale*, p. 279. On Scheiter, see above, chapter 1, note 5.

5. On the events of August 1–3, 1759 as described here, see Renouard, *Geschichte*, 2:242–45; and Bothmer, "Leichte Truppen," pp. 337–38.

6. Ewald is still talking about the retreat of 1777, mentioned in note 3, and that of 1778, mentioned in note 2, above.

7. *En échiquier* is defined in the *Nouveau Larousse Illustré* (4:28) as "a battle formation or order, in which the troops are ranged in different rows with intervals between them so that the empty squares be reasonably equal to the occupied ones and the occupied ones of each row match the empty ones which are before it. . . . Such a formation has been used chiefly in retreat marches."

8. The Battle of Greenspring near Jamestown, Virginia, July 5, 1781, saw

Lafayette attack Lord Cornwallis as he was trying to recross the James River for Portsmouth, where he was to embark some troops for General Clinton in New York (Ward, *War*, 2:875–77). Ewald's *jäger* were not involved in this encounter as they were part of the advance party Cornwallis sent to the south shore of the river (Ewald, *Diary*, p. 315).

Other Hessian accounts of the Greenspring operation are found in Burgoyne, ed., "Journal . . . Hessian Field Jäger Corps [Part 2]," *Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association* (1987), 4:32; Döhla, *Hessian Diary*, pp. 128–33; and "Extract from the Diary of the Honorable Jäger Corps—From the Campaign of 1780," in *Hessian Journals: Unpublished Documents of the American Revolution*, ed. Valentine C. Hubbs (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1981), pp. 101–9.

Major DuPuy's operations near Morristown took place most likely in June, not July, 1780. Presumably they involved Knyphausen's Springfield, New Jersey (near Morristown) raid of June 7–23, in which the von Bose regiment participated, DuPuy's promotion recommendation may have been in July, hence the discrepancy in dates. See Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, pp. 1045–48.

The Musketeer Regiment von Bose (until 1778: von Trumbach) under Lieutenant General Carl Johan von Bose arrived in New York in August 1776. In 1778/79 it took part in the siege of Savannah and was sent to Charleston in December 1779. It surrendered with Cornwallis at Yorktown and returned to Hesia in November 1783. A short biography of von Bose can be found in Woringer, *Heerführer*, p. 6.

Major Christian DuPuy (or duBuy), a native of Dresden, was a *Stabskapitän* in the Hessian guards during the Seven Years' War. In 1775 he had reached the rank of captain in the infantry regiment von Dittfurth. He became a major in von Bose in February 1776 and distinguished himself near Morristown in June 1780 and was promoted to lieutenant colonel. He distinguished himself again in the Battle of Guilford Court House, for which he received the order *Pour la vertu militaire*. He died in 1793 as a colonel and commanding officer of the Hessian "Leib Infanterie Regiment." See Hohenhausen, *Biographie*, p. 328; Eelking, *Allied Troops*, pp. 201, 324; HETRINA II; and HSMS 4 h 4011.

Chapter 10

1. Ewald writes here "with the blank gun." The editors have chosen to translate this as a bayonet charge rather than an attack with an empty or unloaded gun. Light infantrymen at that time, including the Hessian *jäger*, did not normally have bayonets but *Hirschfänger* (hunting knives). In discussing the arms of light troops in chapter 2 above, Ewald explicitly calls for bayonets as part of the equipment of such troops, at least for the fusiliers if not for the *jäger*. In his *Treatise*, p. 72, he again gives all the cavalrymen as well as those men not equipped with rifles, excepting the *jäger*, bayonets. This is not surprising since one of the lessons learned in the American Revolutionary War was the need of bayonets for light troops. See also below, chapter 11, note 3.

2. Presumably Ewald refers to a foraging expedition in the vicinity of Quibbletown (now New Market), New Jersey, in January and February 1777. Engagements on January 24 and 30 between British and Virginia troops inflicted

severe casualties on the former. See Peckham, *Toll*, p. 30; *Diary*, pp. 52–55. Ewald concludes in his *Diary* (p. 55) that the British forces “would have been gradually destroyed through this foraging; from here on the forage was procured from New York.”

Ewald's comments are confirmed in other Hessian materials relating to the difficult winter following the Battle of Trenton. The Platte Grenadier Battalion Journal noted: “If I exclude two unsuccessful expeditions, or more accurately, sallies, to Bound Brook, the entire winter was spent on the defensive, except to acquire forage. For this purpose it was often necessary to send out five or six regiments in order to dislodge the enemy. Duty for the troops was extremely difficult and very hard. Everyone who went on duty had to sleep under the open sky. Snow fell often and was deep and it seemed colder to us here than it was in Europe.” See [Karl Bauer?], “Platte Grenadier Battailon Journal,” ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne (Dover, Del.: The Translator, 1990; from a copy in the Lindgerwood Collection, Morristown, N.J.). The quote is from a copy deposited in the William E. Clements Library. Chaplain Philipp Waldeck of the 3rd Waldeck Regiment wrote from Elizabeth, N.J., January 3, 1777: “One can no longer lie down to sleep without thinking this is the last night, the last night of freedom. Instead of, as usual, undressing in the evening, one becomes accustomed to dress completely, and to go to bed in this manner” (“The Diary of Philipp Waldeck,” ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne from a copy in the Bancroft Collection of the New York Public Library [Dover, Del.: The Translator, 1983; copy in the William E. Clements Library]). Even more poignant were the notes of Private Carl Philipp Steuernagel of the same regiment: “If a man came off guard duty, he was immediately called upon for guard duty to repel an American attack, which came often, necessitating a continuous alert so that all of the few men not on duty had to be ready for immediate response. . . . No noncommissioned officer during this period, which lasted until the 9th of January 1777, dared to remove his shoes or socks, let alone his shirt” (Carl Philipp Steuernagel, “A Brief Description,” ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne, from a copy in the Bancroft Collection of the New York Public Library [Dover, Del.: The Translator, 1982]).

Grandmaison, *Kleiner Krieg*, p. 180, relates a similar incident from the year 1743 in Bavaria and urges strong support for foraging parties.

3. Ewald called the village “Miltztown,” but it is most likely Millstone (Somerset Court House), New Jersey. The *Diary*, p. 64, says they first encamped on June 13, 1777 “between Millstone and Middlebush.” Ewald, *Diary*, pp. 64–65, notes that “General Washington, who neither moved [from Morristown] nor let himself be lured out of his strong position by this demonstration, sent out several detachments daily which observed and harassed our army, whereby constant skirmishing ensued.” Ewald does note (*Diary*, p. 65) that on June 23 the Queens Rangers were covering the *right* flank and “it strayed too far from the army, and was attacked so severely by a superior force that half of the corps was killed or wounded. During this retreat [from Millstone to Amboy] the detachment under Captain [C. A. von] Wreden also suffered very much.” See also Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, p. 1017.

Captain Carl August von Wrede (d. 1791) joined the *jäger* corps in February 1774 and led one of the two companies of *jäger* in America for which he received the order “pour la vertu militaire.” He was discharged in May 1779.

After 1783 he joined the services of Hesse-Darmstadt and rapidly rose to the rank of colonel, but died in 1791. See Konze, *Feldjäger*, p. 69; Hohenhausen, *Biographie*, p. 343; HETRINA IV; and HSM Bestand 4 h 4011. Both Tustin as well as Ewald usually spell the name as "Wreden," and the same spelling can also be found in Hessian documents.

Nothing is said about their being lured by cows into an ambush, but this seems to have been a standard ruse of irregular warfare. Bothmer, "Leichte Truppen," pp. 348-49, relates a similar incident for June 1760, in the vicinity of Göttingen, and Ewald advises such ruses in Maimburg, *Treatise*, p. 245.

4. This incident has not been identified.

5. At the Battle of Mile Square Road, Westchester County, New York, August 31, 1778, a well-planned operation by troops under Lieutenant Colonel John G. Simcoe and Colonel Andreas Emmerich (see introduction, note 5; and chapter 4, note 14, above), ambushed a detachment under Captain Daniel Williams and Chief Daniel Ninham, killing thirty-seven, wounding approximately eight, and capturing ten Americans. See Peckham, *Toll*, p. 54; *Diary*, p. 145. Ewald spells the names as "Newyorck" and "Miles Square," and the name of the Indian chief as "Noham." He also retells the incident in his *Belehrungen*, p. 316.

6. Several episodes of ambushes by light infantry and cavalry units of both sides are recounted in *Diary*, pp. 202-4; see also Peckham, *Toll*, pp. 68-69. Perhaps the most famous episode is the Battle of Monk's Corner, South Carolina, April 14, 1780, where Tarleton's Legion and Patrick Ferguson's Rangers ambushed American cavalry. The battle eliminated the American forces' avenue of escape from Charleston. See Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (New York: Paragon House, 1981), pp. 47-48.

Ewald spells the name as "Charlestown."

Chapter 11

1. Ewald here uses the term *Partheygänger*, defined by Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon*, 64 vols. in 63, plus 4 suppl. (Leipzig and Halle: Zedler, 1732-50), 26:1050, as the "leader of a . . . party," who is called "ein Partheygänger (partisan) oder Partisan."

2. Brigadier General William Maxwell (ca. 1733-1796) was a New Jersey Irish farmboy who participated in General Edward Braddock's ill-fated campaign of 1755 and who served as an officer in New Jersey regiments later in the French and Indian War. As a colonel, he served as commissary for British forces at Mackinac Island, Michigan, before returning to become a leading revolutionary advocate in his home colony. As a colonel of the 2nd New Jersey Regiment he participated in the Canadian invasion of 1776. In the Pennsylvania campaign of 1777, "Scotch Willie" Maxwell commanded Maxwell's Light Infantry, a composite unit of men from each of Washington's six brigades. Reputedly drunk at the Battle of Brandywine, Major William Heath called him "a damned bitch of a General." Elements of the episode described in the text are discussed in *Diary*, pp. 88-89. This is one of the few times that Maxwell receives accolades for his military accomplishments. Ewald may be crediting Maxwell for

more than is justified, since Anthony Wayne commanded the bulk of the forces attacking the British advance party under Lord Cornwallis at the engagement in Chester County, Pennsylvania, September 16, 1777. For more on Maxwell, see Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, pp. 686–88.

"Donop's Corps" is the *jäger* corps of Hesse-Cassel, named after their commanding officer, in which Ewald served. Karl Aemilius Ulrich von Donop was born January 1, 1732. By 1766 he was colonel of the Hessian guards regiment, chamberlain, and aide-de-camp to Landgraf Frederick II. In 1776 he was appointed commanding officer of the *Feldjägercorps* but died on October 22, 1777, during the failed attempt to storm Fort Redbank. See Friedrich Henkel, "Die von Donop in hessischen Diensten," *Hessenland* 6 (1892): 247–50; Konze, *Feldjäger*, p. 68; and Hohenhausen, *Biographie*, p. 328.

Ewald spells the names as "Brandeweinfluß," "Chulkill," and "Cochen Miet-ing's Haus." "Puds Haus" has not been identified.

3. Ewald is describing the Battle of Cooch's Creek or Cooch's Mill, Delaware, September 3, 1777, where forces under General Lord Cornwallis encountered Maxwell's Light Infantry. According to Ewald's *Diary*, p. 78, "The majority of the *jägers* came to close quarters with the enemy, and the hunting sword was used as much as the rifle." Ewald spells the name of the location as "Crutches Mill, Pennsylvania."

4. Originally part of the American defensive network around New York, Fort Independence fell to the British on October 30, 1776. Located in the Bronx, north of Manhattan Island, it is not to be confused with the outpost of the same name, part of the West Point defensive system located north of Peekskill. It was besieged by American troops commanded by Major General William Heath (1737–1814), January 18–29, 1777. Presumably the reference is to the counter-attack of January 25, which routed the Americans. Washington censored Heath for his misconduct in the affair. See Douglas Southall Freeman, *George Washington: A Biography*, 7 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948–1957), 4:185–86, 384–85, 521, note; Boatner, *Encyclopedia*, pp. 378, 499. For Heath's side, see William Abbatt, ed., *Memoirs of Major General William Heath* (New York: William Abbatt, 1901), pp. 99–104. Ewald spells the name as "Fort Independent on York Island."

Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Carl von Prüschenk (d. 1800) transferred from the dragoons to the *jäger* in 1771 and was a major in the fourth company of *jäger* in December 1775. In 1779 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and second in command of the Hessian *jäger* in America. He also received the "pour la vertu militaire." After 1783 he transferred back to the cavalry but was again with the *jäger* in 1787, when he became a colonel. In 1793 he was in command of the *jäger* but was seriously wounded during fighting in the Netherlands. He died in 1800 as Hessian major general and commander of Ziegenhain. See Konze, *Feldjäger*, p. 68; HETRINA IV; HSM Bestand 4 h 4007; and Hohenhausen, *Biographie*, p. 338.

5. On March 26, 1761, the Grenadier Battalion Schlotheim, composed of the grenadier companies of the 4 Hessian guard regiments and some 300 men strong, was surprised and surrounded by 30 squadrons of French cavalry near Uttershausen. Schlotheim had his battalion form a *quarree* and prepare to fire at the approaching enemy while marching on. Impressed by the courage and

determination of Schlotheim, the French Marshal Broglio ordered all attacks to cease and let Schlotheim escape. At the same time he sent a messenger to Prince Ferdinand congratulating him on such brave troops. See Renouard, *Geschichte*, 181–82.

6. *Quarree* is used to describe the formation of troops in a square, which allows for defense in all directions.

Appendix

1. A *honnête homme* is defined in *Nouveau Larousse Illustré* (4:951) as arising out of the concept of the *gentilhomme*, which is defined in military terms: "le courage et la générosité, car l'idéal du gentilhomme est encore place dans la guerre." Under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment, the military aspects became less important. They were replaced by intellectual and social concerns as the British *gentleman* became the model for men to follow.

Ewald, who uses the German term *guter Mann*, a free translation of the French *honnête homme*, clearly has the older roots in mind when he uses the *honnête homme* here. For a brief discussion of the concept, see Gerhard Papke, *Von der Miliz zum stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen des Absolutismus* (Munich: Bernhard und Graefe, 1979), pp. 47–51.

2. The story as related here is recounted in *Diary*, pp. 269–70. The encounter took place January 10, 1781. Lieutenant Colonel Simcoe claims he put the *jäger* in ambush and that their objective was achieved; Ewald's account is much less dramatic but more specific in details. No reference to Captain Schmidt (Smith?) has been found. See Simcoe, *Queen's Rangers*, pp. 168–69.

Ewald spells the name as "Stupen." On the location of Hood's Point, Virginia, see chapter 4, note 3. See also Robert Selig, "Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben's Kommando in Virginia (1780/81)," in Giesebrecht, *Steuben*, pp. 115–25.

3. The story of Lieutenant Balthasar Merz is recounted in *Diary*, pp. 150–51. Merz' bravery was such that when paroled, the American captain delivering him brought a letter of commendation for the Hessian officer's bravery written by an American officer. According to Ewald, at the site near Tarrytown, New York, where this encounter took place on September 30, 1778, he had "never seen a battlefield on a small scale more horrible than the little spot on which this slaughter took place. In a space the length of about 150 paces and the width of a country road, we found twenty-one completely mutilated bodies, counting friend and foe, and seven horses" (*ibid.*, p. 151). The heroism of Lieutenant Merz is recounted in Burgoyne, ed., "Journal . . . Hessian Field Jäger Corps [Part 1]," p. 56.

Balthasar Merz (1731/32–1783) was a second lieutenant in the Hessian regiment Büna in 1761 and a full lieutenant in 1775. He came to America in 1776 with the regiment, in which he was promoted to *Premier Lieutenant* in January 1778. He served intermittently in his regiment and the *jäger* corps throughout the war. He died as a *Stabskapitän* in July 1783. See Konze, *Feldjäger*, p. 72; HETRINA IV, and HSM 4 h 4011. On the event recounted here, see also Eelking, *Allied Troops*, p. 161. The name can also be found spelled as "Mertz" in Hessian documents.

4. This episode occurred near Abingdon Episcopal Church, six miles north

of Gloucester, Virginia, August 12, 1781. See *Diary*, p. 323. "Tales" should be the same place as mentioned as "Turas" in chapter 4, note 12.

Alexander Wilhelm Bickel (d. 1810) joined the *jäger* as an enlisted man. He rose through the ranks during the American war (he was second lieutenant in December 1777) for bravery. Captured twice (in December 1781 and in January 1783), he was one of the two *Premier lieutenants* (since November 1781; and three second lieutenants) to be discharged in May 1784. On January 1, 1787, he was reinstituted as a second lieutenant in the *jäger* corps and promoted to first lieutenant in July of the same year. In November 1788 he became a for-ester in Hessa and died when he fell into an old mineshaft near Schmalkalden as Westphalian subinspector of forests. See Konze, *Feldjäger*, p. 71; Hohenhausen, *Biographie*, p. 324; HETRINA IV; and HSM Bestand 4 h 4011.

Select Bibliography

- Adams, John A. "Heavy versus Light Forces: A Middle Ground." *Military Review* 66 (October 1986): 65-73.
- Addington, Larry H. *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- Alger, John I. *Definitions and Doctrines of Military Art*. West Point Military History series 1. Wayne, N.J.: Avery Publishing Group, 1985.
- Anderson, Matthew S. *War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
- Asprey, Robert B. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. 2 vols. New York: Doubleday, 1975.
- Atkinson, C. T. "The Highlanders in Westphalia, 1760-1762." *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 20 (1940/41): 208-23.
- Atwood, Rodney. *The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Bardt, Malte. *Geschichte der Feldjägertruppe*. Ms Feldjägerbataillon 740, Mainz, 1980.
- Beattie, Daniel. "The Adaptation of the British Army to the Wilderness Warfare," in *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Maarten Ultee. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1986, pp. 56-83.
- Boatner, Mark Mayo, III. *Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*. New York: David McKay Company, 1976.
- Bothmer, Freiherr von. "Einiges aus der Geschichte der Kur-Hannoverschen leichten Truppen während des Siebenjährigen Krieges." *Beihefte zum Militär-Wochenblatt* (1893): 321-65.
- Brandis, Schütz von. *Übersicht der Geschichte der Hannoverschen Armee von 1617-1866*. Hannover: Hahn, 1903.
- Braubach, Max. *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen*. 5 vols. Munich: R. Oldenburg, 1963-1965.

- Braubach, Max. "Der bayerische Bauernaufstand von 1705/06," in *Erbe und Verpflichtung*. Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966, pp. 175-91.
- Bredow, Claus von. *Historische Rang- und Stammliste des deutschen Heeres*. 2 vols. Reprint. Osnabrück: Biblio, 1972.
- Canby, Steven L. "Light Infantry in Perspective." *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 28-31.
- Cappon, Lester J., ed. *Atlas of Early American History: The Revolutionary Era, 1760-1790*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938.
- Childs, John. *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982.
- Clodfelter, Mark A. "Between Virtue and Necessity: Nathaniel Greene and the Conduct of Civil-Military Relations in the South, 1780-1782," *Military Affairs* 52 (1988): 169-75.
- Cochenhause, D. von. "Vor 150 Jahren. An der Wiege neuzeitlicher Infanterietaktik," *Wissen und Wehr* 14 (1933): 210-21.
- Comte de Saxe, Maurice. *Les Rêveries, ou Mémoires sur l'art de la guerre*. 2 vols. La Haye: P. Gosse, 1756.
- Copeland, Peter F., and Albert W. Haarmann. "The Provisional Chasseur Companies of Hesse-Cassel during the Revolutionary War," *Military Collector and Historian* 18 (1958): 11-13.
- Corvisier, André, "Military Emigration from Central and Eastern Europe to France in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in *East European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, eds. Gunther E. Rothenberg et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 515-48.
- Crowell, Howard G., Jr., and Jared L. Bates. "Heavy-Light Connection: Division," *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 15-18.
- Czege, Huba Wass de. "Three Kinds of Infantry," *Infantry* 75 (July-August 1985): 11-13.
- Decker, Carl von. *Der kleine Krieg im Geist der neueren Kriegführung*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1844.
- Die Kriegsschule. Oder die Theorie eines jungen Kriegsmannes in allen militairischen Unternehmungen, aus den berühmtesten Kriegsbüchern gezogen und zusammengesetzt von einem kaiserl. königl. Hauptmann der Infanterie. Vienna: n.p., 1777.
- Döhla, Johann Conrad. *A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution*, ed. Bruce E. Burgoyne. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.
- Dull, Jonathan R. *The French Navy and American Independence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- DuPuy, William E. "The Light Infantry: Indispensable Element of a Balanced Force," *Army* 35 (June 1985): 26-41.
- Düring, Georg Wilhelm von. *Geschichte des Schaumburg-Lippe-Bückeburgischen Karabinier- und Jäger-Corps; Ein Beitrag zur Lehre des Kleinen Krieges, in Beispielen ausgezeichneter Waffenthaten dieses Corps, während des siebenjährigen Krieges*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1828.
- Eelking, Max von. *Leben und Wirken des Herzoglich Braunschweig'schen General-Lieutenants Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, Freiherrn zu Eisenbach*. 3 vols. Leipzig: Otto Wiegand, 1856.

- Eelking, Max von. *The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence, 1776-1783*. Reprint. Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1969.
- Elster, Otto. *Geschichte der stehenden Truppen im Herzogtum Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel von 1600-1714*. 2 vols. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger, 1899-1901.
- Emmerich, Andreas. *Partisan in War, or, The use of a corps of light troops to an army*. London: n.p., 1789.
- English, J. A. "Thinking about Light Infantry," *Infantry* 74 (November-December 1984): 19-25.
- Ewald, Johann. *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg*. Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer, 1785.
- Ewald, Johann. *Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen*. Flensburg, Schleswig, Leipzig: Korten und Boie, 1790.
- Ewald, Johan. *Belehrungen über den Krieg*. Schleswig: J. G. Röhlß, 1798.
- Ewald, Johann. *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. Joseph P. Tustin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
- Ewald, Johann. *Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg*. Schleswig: J. G. Röhlß, 1800.
- Ewald, Johann. *Gedanken eines hessischen Officiers über das, was man bey Führung eines Detachements im Felde zu thun hat*. Cassel: Johann Jacob Cramer, 1774.
- Ewald, Johann. *Zweite und letzte Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg*. Schleswig: J. G. Röhlß, 1803.
- Fann, Willerd R. "On the Infantryman's Age in Eighteenth Century Prussia," *Military Affairs* 41 (1977): 165-70.
- Ferling, John, ed. *The World Turned Upside Down*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1988.
- Fuller, J. F. C. *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century*. London: Hutchinson and Co., 1925.
- Galvin, John R. "Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission," *Infantry* 74 (July-August 1984): 10-14.
- Galvin, John R. "The Heavy/Light Concept," *Armed Forces International* 119 (July 1982): 60-80.
- Gann, Lewis H. *Guerrillas in History*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971.
- Gieraths, Günther. *Die Kampfhandlungen der Brandenburgisch-Preussischen Armee, 1626-1807*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1964.
- Gierowski, Jozef Andrzej. "The Polish and Lithuanian Armies in the Confederations and Insurrections of the Eighteenth Century," in *East Central European Society and War in the Pre-Revolutionary Eighteenth Century*, eds., Gunther E. Rothenberg et al, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, pp. 215-38.
- Godechot, Jacques. "L'Influence de la Tactique et de la Stratégie de la Guerre d'Indépendance Américaine sur la Tactique et la Stratégie Française de l'Armée de Terre," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* 41 (1979): 141-47.
- Grandmaison, Thomas Auguste Le Roy de. *La petite guerre ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne*. 2 vols. Paris: n.p., 1756.
- Griebel, Rolf-Eberhard. *Historische Studien zu Gotthold Ephraim Lessings "Minna von Barnhelm oder das Soldatenglück"*. Diss. Phil., Würzburg, 1978.

- Gumtau, Carl Friedrich. *Die Jäger und Schützen des Preussischen Heeres*. 3 vols. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1834–1838.
- Hahlweg, Werner. *Typologie des modernen Kleinkrieges*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1967.
- Hahlweg, Werner. *Guerilla: Krieg ohne Fronten*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968.
- Hahlweg, Werner. *Preussische Reformzeit und Revolutionärer Krieg*. Frankfurt: E. S. Mittler, 1962.
- Hahlweg, Werner, ed. *Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966.
- Hartzog, William W., and John D. Howard. "Heavy-Light Operations," *Military Review* 76 (1987): 25–33.
- Heym, Otto. *Geschichte des Königlich Preussischen Reitenden Feldjägerscorps von 1740–1919*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1926.
- Higginbotham, Don. *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789*. New York: Macmillan, 1971.
- Hoffmann, Elliot W. *The German Soldiers in the American Revolution*. Ph.D diss., University of New Hampshire, 1982.
- Hoffman, Ronald, and Peter J. Albert, eds. *Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984.
- Hoffman, Ronald, et al., eds. *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985.
- Hohenhausen, Leopold Freiherr von. *Biographie des Generals von Ochs*. Cassel: Luckhardt'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1827.
- Houlding, John A. *Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715–1795*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
- Houx, Antoine Charles du, Baron de Vioménil. *The private letters of Baron de Vioménil on Polish affairs, with a letter on the siege of Yorktown*, ed. John Francis Gough. Jersey City: Doan, 1935.
- Ingrao, Charles W. *The Hessian Mercenary State: Ideas, Institutions, and Reform under Frederick II, 1760–1785*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Ingrao, Charles W. "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: The Kuruc War (1703–1711)," in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, eds., Béla K. Király and Gunther E. Rothenberg. New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979, pp. 42–66.
- Jähns, Max. *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften vornehmlich in Deutschland*. 3 vols. Reprint. New York/Hildesheim: Johnson and Georg Olms, 1966.
- Jeney, Louis de. *Le partisan, ou l'art de faire la petite guerre avec succès selon le génie de nous jours*. La Haye: H. Constapel, 1759.
- Kielmann, Carl E. *Die Entstehung der Jägertruppe im deutschen und preussischen Heere*. Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1883.
- Király, Béla. "War and Society in Western and East Central Europe: Similarities and Contrasts," in *War and Society in East Central Europe*, eds. Béla Király and Gunther Rothenberg. New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1979, pp. 1–36.
- Konze, Hans-Friedrich. *Das Feldjäger Corps von Hessen-Kassel im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg 1776–1783. Versuch einer historischen Skizze*. Ehemals

- Kurfürstliche Bibliothek im Staatsarchiv Marburg, StMarburg XIV B 151 bfa.
- Kunisch, Johannes. *Der kleine Krieg. Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1973.
- Laqueur, Walter. "The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine," *Journal of Contemporary History* 10 (1975): 341-82.
- Laqueur, Walter. *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Essay*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976.
- Legahn, Ernst A. "Preußische Partisanen," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 18 (1968): 159-75.
- Lepel-Spangenberg, von. *Geschichte des kurfürstlich hessischen Jägerbataillons*. Kassel: n.p., 1853.
- Lind, William S. "Light Infantry Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 (June 1990): 42-47.
- Lumpkin, Henry. *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South*. New York: Paragon House, 1981.
- Mackesy, Piers. *The War for America, 1775-1783*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- McMichael, Scott R. *A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry*. Combat Studies Research Survey No. 6. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army and General Staff College, 1987.
- McMichael, Scott R. "Proverbs of the Light Infantry," *Military Review* 65 (September 1985): 23-28.
- Maimburg, A. *Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops*. By Colonel Johann von Ehwald [sic]. London: T. Egerton, 1803.
- Marburg, Archivschule. *Hessische Truppen im Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg (HETRINA)*. 5 vols. Marburg: Archivschule, 1972.
- Marshall, Douglas W., and Howard H. Peckham. *Campaigns of the American Revolution: An Atlas of Manuscript Maps*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1976.
- Moldenhauer, Siegfried. *Geschichte des Kurhessischen Jäger-Bataillons Nr. 11*. Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1913.
- Murphy, Orville T. "The French Professional Soldier's Opinion of the American Militia in the War of the Revolution," *Military Affairs* 33 (1969): 191-98.
- Nelson, Paul David. "British Conduct of the American Revolutionary War," *Journal of American History* 65 (1978): 623-53.
- Nelson, Paul David. *Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.
- Nicolai, Martin L. "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Regular Soldiers during the Seven Years' War," *Canadian Historical Review* 70 (1989): 53-75.
- O'Callaghan, John Cornelius. *History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France*. Shannon: Irish University Press, 1969.
- Oré, Capitaine. "Fischer et l'origine des Chasseurs," *Revue de Cavalerie* 26 (April 1910): 45-55; (August 1910): 512-61; (October 1910): 49-63; (November 1910): 174-91.
- Osten, Wilhelm August von dem. *Feldzüge der alliierten Armee in den Jahren 1757-*

- 1762 nach dem Tagebuche des Generaladjutanten, nachmaligen Feldmarschalls von Reden. 3 vols. Hamburg: B. G. Hoffmann, 1805/6.
- Papke, Gerhard. *Von der Miliz zum stehenden Heer: Wehrwesen des Absolutismus*. Munich: Bernhard und Graefe, 1979.
- Paret, Peter. "The Relationship Between the Revolutionary War and European Military Thought and Practice in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War*, ed. Don Higginbotham. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976, pp. 144-57.
- Paret, Peter. *York and the Era of Prussian Reform*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Paret, Peter. "Colonial Experience and European Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 37 (1964): 47-59.
- Paret, Peter. *Clausewitz and the State*. New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Paret, Peter, and John W. Shy. *Guerrillas in the 1960s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Pas, Antoine de, Marquis de Feuquières. *Mémoires sur la Guerre*. 4 vols. Amsterdam: J. F. Bernard, 1730.
- Peckham, Howard H., ed. *The Toll of Independence: Engagements and Battle Casualties of the American Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Priesdorff, Kurt von. *Soldatisches Führertum*. 10 vols. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, [1936?].
- Quimby, Robert S. *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Tactics in Eighteenth-Century France*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957.
- Redlich, Fritz. *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1964/65.
- Reitzenstein, Johann Karl Freiherr von. *Die Königlich Hannoversche Cavallerie und ihre Stammkörper von 1631-1866*. Baden-Baden: Selbstverlag, 1892.
- Renouard, Carl. *Geschichte des Krieges in Hannover, Hessen und Westfalen von 1757-1763*. 3 vols. Kassel: Theodor Fischer, 1863/64.
- Ribaucourt, Edouard de. *Etudes du dossier complet concernant les premiers chasseurs à pied et à cheval sous Louis XV. La vie militaire et les exploits de J.-C. Fischer, brigadier des armées du roi Louis XV, fondateur et commandant le corps des chasseurs (1743-1761)*. Paris: Librairie Universelle, 1928.
- Rice, Howard C., Jr., and Anne S. K. Brown, eds. *The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783*. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Robson, Eric. "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions," *Army Quarterly and Defense Journal* 62 (1952): 209-22.
- Rogers, Hugh C. B. *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960.
- Royster, Charles. *Light-Horse Harry Lee and the Legacy of the American Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

- Russell, Peter E. "Redcoats in the Wilderness. British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740-1760," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35 (1978): 629-52.
- Rüstow, Wilhelm. *Geschichte der Infanterie*. 2 vols. Nordhausen, 1864; repr. Wiesbaden: RTL Verlag, 1981.
- Savory, Reginald. *His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
- Saxe, Maurice de. *Les Rêveries ou Mémoires sur l'Art de la Guerre*. La Haye: n.p., 1756.
- Schmitt, John F. "Light Infantry Tactics at the Company Level and Below," *Marine Corps Gazette* 74 (June 1990): 48-52.
- Schnorr, Wilhelm. "Streifzüge der Lucknerhusaren im Siebenjährigen Krieg an der Lahn und in der Wetterau," *Volk und Scholle* 17 (1939): 43-45.
- Shy, John. "The American Revolution. The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in *Essays on the American Revolution*, eds. Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973, pp. 121-56.
- . *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Shy, John, and Thomas W. Collier. "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 815-62.
- Sichard, Leopold von. *Geschichte der Königlich-Hannoverschen Armee*. 4 vols. Hannover: Hahn'sche Hofbuchhandlung, 1866-98.
- Simcoe, John Graves. *A Journal of the Operations of The Queen's Rangers, from the End of the Year 1777, to the Conclusion of the Late American War*. Exeter: For the Author, 1787.
- Simcoe, John G. *History of the Operations of a Partisan Corps called the Queen's Rangers*. New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844.
- Steele, Ian K. *Guerrillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689-1760*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969.
- Strachan, Hew. *European Armies and the Conduct of War*. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1983.
- Susane, Louis. *Histoire de l'Infanterie Française*, 5 vols. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876.
- Susane, Louis. *Histoire de la Cavalerie Française*, 3 vols. Paris: J. Hetzel, 1874.
- Tarleton, Banastre. *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America*. London: T. Cadell, 1787.
- Tempelhof, Georg Friedrich von. *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem Könige von Preussen und der kaiserin Königin und ihren alliierten*. 6 vols. Berlin: J. F. Unger, 1783-1801.
- Treutlein, Klaus. "Friedrich Wilhelm von Steubens Dienstzeit in der preussischen Armee (1746-1763)," in *Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben: Leben Zeit und Zeitgenossen*, ed. Werner Giesebrecht. Würzburg: Handelsdruckerei, 1980, pp. 25-58.
- Uhlendorf, Bernhard A., ed. *The Siege of Charleston*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938.
- Varkonyi, Agnes. "Rákóczi's War of Independence and the Peasantry," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hun-*

- gary, eds. Janos M. Bak and Béla K. Király. New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982, pp. 369-92.
- Ward, Christopher. *The War of the Revolution*. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Weigley, Russell F. *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970.
- Westphalen, Ferdinand Otto Wilhelm Heinrich von. *Geschichte der Feldzüge des Herzogs Ferdinand von Braunschweig-Lüneburg*. 6 vols. Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, 1859-1872.
- Wetzel, Georg Heinz. *Die Hessischen Jäger*. Kassel: George, 1987.
- Wetzel, Georg Heinz. *Das Hochfürstlich Hessische Feld-Jaeger Corps im Operationsgeschehen des Amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieges (1776 bis 1783)*. Kassel: George, 1991.
- Wissel, Georg von. *Geschichte der Errichtung sämtlicher Chur-Braunschweigisch-Lüneburgischen Truppen*. 2d ed. Zelle: J. D. Schulze, 1786.
- Wissel, Georg von. *Der Jäger im Felde, oder Kurze Abhandlung wie der Dienst bei leichten Truppen im Felde zu verrichten*. Göttingen: J. C. Dieterich, 1778. Reprint. Göttingen: J. C. Dieterich, 1784.
- Woringer, August. *Bildnisse hessischer Heerführer im hessischen Landesmuseum zu Kassel*. Kassel: Friedrich Scheel, 1936.
- Woringer, August. *Kurfürst Wilhelm I von Hessen und seine Generale*. Kassel: Friedrich Scheel, 1938.
- Wright, John W. "The Corps of Light Infantry in the Continental Army," *American Historical Review* 31 (1926): 454-61.
- Wright, Robert K., Jr., *The Continental Army*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983.
- Zwengel, Otto. "Zur Theorie des kleinen Krieges," *Allgemeine Militärrundschau* 13 (1969): 397-404.

Index

- Abercrombie, Sir Robert, 76, 140
- Abington Episcopal Church (Virginia), 81, 160-61
- Adams, John A., 55, 56
- Addington, Larry H., 44
- Albert, Peter J., 54
- Alexander, John T., 46
- Alger, John I., 52
- Almerode, Germany, 132
- Altenhasungen, Germany, 111
- Amazon* (French naval vessel), 104, 150
- Amboy, New Jersey, 114
- American Revolution, 20, 23, 63, 65;
 - Ewald's experiences in, 23-27, 97;
 - impact on European military, 28-29;
 - impact on Ewald, 22;
 - partisan warfare in, 5, 115. *See also* New Jersey campaigns; New York campaigns; Virginia campaign; and names of various battles
- Andreasberg, Germany, 83
- Antigua, 104
- Arnold, Benedict, 81, 128, 141, 144
- Asprey, Robert B., 43
- Atkinson, C. T., 47
- Atwood, Rodney, 7, 43, 46, 51, 52
- Auerstädt, battle of, 27
- Austrian Succession, War of, 13
- Auxerrois regiment (French army), 104, 150, 151
- Bardt, Malte, 47
- Basta, Graf G., 41
- Bates, Jared L., 56
- Beattie, Daniel, 46, 54
- Bellona* (journal), 4, 41
- Bernhard, Duke of Sachsen-Weimar, 107, 153
- Bettenhausen, Germany, 88
- Bickel, Alexander Wilhelm, 130, 141, 161
- Birkenbusch, Germany, 82
- Bland's Mills, Virginia battle of (1781), 78, 140
- Bonn, siege of, 18
- Bose, regiment von, 116, 156
- Bouillé, François Claude Amour, Marquis de, 104, 105, 149, 150
- Braubach, Max, 42
- Brock's Swamp, Virginia, 81, 141
- Brogie, Marshal de, 14
- Browne, George Graf, on partisan warfare, 4, 41
- Brunswick army, 98, 102, 103
- Bückeburg, Germany, 115.

- Bülow, Christoph Carl von, 103, 104, 146, 148
 Bülow, Dietrich von, 50
 Bülow, Friedrich Ernst von, 103, 104, 146, 148
- Canby, Steven, on modern light infantry, 30, 54
 Carlsbach, Carl August Struensee von, 4, 40-41
 Cassel (Kassel), Germany, 17, 18, 19, 88, 99, 102, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 131
 Cavalry, light, 79-80; light cavalry-light infantry team, 64, 71-72; at outposts, 86, 89, 125-27; on patrols, 127-32; in pursuit, 77; on raids, 102; in towns, 93, 110; training of, 74
 Charleston, South Carolina, 119
 Charlot, Guillaume de, 106, 152
La Charmante (French naval vessel), 104
 Childs, John, 44
 Choisy, Claude Gabriel de, 106, 151
 Clausewitz, Carl von: cited, 39, 40, 45, 53; on Ewald's writings, 3; on partisan warfare, 11, 27
 Clausthal, Germany, 83
 Clinton, Sir Henry, 114, 154
 Clodfelter, Mark A., 51
 Cochenhausen, D. von, 54
 Cockburn, James, 104, 149
 Collier, Thomas W., 51-52
 Comtois, Royal Regiment (French army), 104, 105, 150
 Conflans, Louis Gabriel de, 67, 136
 Cooch's Creek, Delaware, 124, 159
 Copeland, Peter F., 48
 Corbach, Germany, 104, 111
 Cornwallis, Lord Charles, 81, 116, 140, 141, 159
 Corvisier, André, 46, 137
 Cracow, Poland, raid on (1772), 91, 106, 144
 Cremona, Italy (1702), 91, 144
 Crowell, Howard G., Jr., on modern light infantry, 56
- Dassel, Germany, 82-83, 98
 Dauge's Swamp, Virginia, 81, 142
 De la Motte, Captain, 105-6, 151
 Diemar, Albrecht Ludwig von, 95, 145
 Diemel River, Germany, 103, 108
Diligent (French naval vessel), 104, 105, 149
 Dillon, Arthur Count, 105, 151
 Discipline, 20, 22, 27, 69, 124, 127
 Dobbs, Ferry, New York, 130
 Dominique, 104
 Donop, Karl Emil von, 19, 138, 159
 Dörnberg, Germany, 108, 110
 Dörnhagen, Germany, 88, 89
 Dransfeld, Germany, 102
 Duderstadt, Germany, 83, 143
 Duffy, Christopher, 48
 DuPuy (DuBuy), Christian, 116, 156
 DuPuy, William, on modern light infantry, 37, 55
 Düring, Georg Wilhelm, 47
 Dürr, Wilhelm, 47
- The Eagle* (French naval vessel), 104
 Eder River, Germany, 103
 Eichsfeld, Germany, 82-83
 Elizabeth River, Virginia, 82, 142
 Elster, Otto, 48, 143
 Emmerich, Andreas, 28, 29, 53, 82, 119, 142-43, 158
 Emmerich revolt, 27
 English, J. A., 54
 Erpe River, Germany, 111
 Eschwege, Germany, 131
 Eisebeck, Germany, 98
 Ewald, Johann (von): impact of American Revolution upon, 23-27; life, 1-3, 18-19, 141; relation ideas to modern U.S. light infantry doctrine, 29-38; sources for writings of, 3-4; writings of: *Abhandlung über den kleinen Krieg* (1784) [*Treatise on Partisan Warfare*], 2, 19-23, 27-29, 34, 39, 41, 50-56; *Abhandlung vom Dienst der leichten Truppen* (1790) [*Treatise upon the Duties of Light Troops*], 34, 39, 51, 56, 137,

- 143, 158; *Belehrungen über den Kleinen Krieg* (1798), 138, 149, 153, 158; *Diary of the American War* (1799), 2, 136, 141, 142, 143, 147, 154, 158, 160; *Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg* (1800), 56, 139, 144, 153; *Gedanken eins hessischen Officers* (1774), 1-3, 41; *Zweite und letzte Folge der Belehrungen über den Krieg* (1803), 137
- Fann, Willerd R., 50
- Farbemühle, Germany, 98
- Fasanenhof, Germany, 102
- La Felicite* (French naval vessel), 104
- Ferdinand, Prince of Brunswick, 12-14, 145, 160
- Ferguson, Patrick, 158
- Feuquières, Antoine de Pas, Marquis de, 6, 12, 42, 45
- Fischer, Johann Christian, 136
- Folard, Jean Charles de, 4, 41
- Forstbach, Germany, 88
- Fort Independence (Bronx, New York), 124, 159
- Frankenberg, Germany, 103, 104, 111
- Frederick II (Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel), 18, 50, 68, 136-37
- Frederick the Great (King of Prussia), 5, 10, 13, 15, 28, 44
- French army, 12-14, 83, 88, 91, 98, 102, 103; Minden campaign (1759), 114-15; St. Eustatius campaign (1781), 104-6, 149-51
- French navy, 104-6, 149-51
- French Revolution, impact on warfare, 26, 27
- Fresne, Major de, 105
- Frey, Sylvia R., 54
- Freytag, Heinrich Wilhelm von, 114-15, 155
- Fulda River, Germany, 102, 108
- Fuller, J. F. C., 47
- Gage, Thomas, 47
- Galatée* (French naval vessel), 104, 149
- Galvin, John R., on modern light infantry, 37, 55, 56
- Gann, Lewis H., 43, 54
- Gehrenrode, Germany, 83
- Germantown, Pennsylvania, battle of (1777), 24, 70
- Gieboldehausen, Germany, 82
- Gieraths, Günther, 44
- Gloucester County, Virginia, 81, 161
- Gneisenau, Neithardt von, 29
- Godechot, Jacques, 53
- Goshen Meeting House, Pennsylvania, 123, 159
- Goslar, Germany, 83
- Göttingen, Germany, 83, 98, 147
- Grandmaison, Thomas Auguste Le Roy de, 138, 152; cited, 40, 43, 153, 157; source for Ewald, 4
- Granges, Philipp Ludwig Bouton des, 15, 47
- Gray, A. M., on U.S. Marine Corps doctrine, 31, 36
- Great Bridge, Virginia, 81, 141
- Greenspring, Virginia, battle of (1781), 116, 155-56
- Grey, Sir Charles, 33, 107
- Griebel, Rolf-Eberhard, 44, 46
- Gruber, Ida D., 54
- Guerrilla warfare, 8, 29. *See also Kleiner Krieg*; Partisan warfare; *Petite guerre*
- Gumtau, Carl Friedrich, 40, 43, 48, 52
- Haarmann, Albert W., 48
- Habsburg Empire, 5, 10; partisan troops of, 12-14, 27
- Hahlweg, Werner, 10, 25, 29, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54
- Hanoverian army, 95, 102, 104, 145
- Hartzog, William W., 55, 56
- Harz mountains (Germany), 83
- Hausen, Germany, 132
- Hausmann, Major, 90, 143
- Heath, William, 158, 159
- Heiligenrode, Germany, 88
- Heiligenstadt, Germany, 82-83
- Helsa, Germany, 88, 102, 131

- Herbsthausen monastery, Germany, 102
- Heyerode, Germany, 99
- Heym, Otto, 47
- Higginbotham, Don, cited, 29, 52, 54, 145
- Hildburghausen, Joseph Friedrich Duke of, 13
- Hildesheim, Germany, 90
- Hinrichs, Johann (von), 28, 53
- Hoboken, New Jersey, 95-96
- Hoffman, Elliott W., 50
- Hoffman, Ronald, 51, 54
- Hood's Point, Virginia, 78, 140
- Horn, Germany, battle of (1761), 95
- Houlding, John A., 46
- Howard, John D., 55, 56
- Howe, Sir William, 123, 154
- Hungary, 12-13
- Ingrao, Charles W., cited, 5, 42, 45, 49
- Intelligence, military, 24-25, 70, 85, 87
- Irish Brigade (French army), 104, 150
- Irvine, James, 146
- Jäger* troops: in Ansbach-Bayreuth army, 16, 82, 114; in Bavarian army, 18; bayonets for, 156; in Bückeburg, 47; development of, 10; Ewald's ideas about, 20-23, 34-38; in Hessian army, 15-19, 30, 31, 48-50, 82, 83, 114; in Minden campaign, 115; in Nassau, 47; need for, 67-68; in Prussian army, 15-16; in Saxony, 47; in withdrawals, 121-24. *See also* Light infantry
- Jähns, Max, cited, 41, 45, 48, 138, 143
- James River, Virginia, 116, 128, 140
- Jena, battle of (1806), 27
- Jeney, Louis de: cited, 40, 43; on partisan warfare, 6, 7; source for Ewald, 4
- Jungkenn, Friedrich Christian, 141
- Kalenberg, Germany, 83
- Karl Wilhelm, Prince of Brunswick, 103, 107
- Kaufungen, Germany, 88
- Keegan, John, cited, 7, 43
- Kemp's Landing, Virginia, 81, 142
- Kennett, Lee, 46
- Kerstlingerode, Germany, 83
- Khevenhüller-Metsch, Prince Johann Joseph, 13
- Kielmann, Carl E., 47
- Király, Béla K., 43, 45; on Kociusko, 53-54; on partisan warfare, 7, 46
- Kleiner Krieg*: definition of, 5-8; development, 9. *See also* Guerrilla warfare; Partisan warfare; *Petite guerre*
- Kleist, Wilhelm Gottfried Arndt von, 67, 135
- Klipstein, Friedrich Leopold, 53
- Konze, Hans-Friedrich, 49-50
- Körle, Germany, 99
- Kosciusko, Tadeusz, in American Revolution, 28, 53, 54
- Kriegesbibliothek*, source for Ewald, 4
- Kunisch, Johannes, cited, 27, 42, 44, 46, 53
- Kuruc* rebellion, 13, 45
- Kwasny, Mark V., cited, 5, 42
- La Croix, Armand François de, 137, 138; mentioned, 69, 111, 154; source for Ewald, 4, 41
- LaFayette, Marie Joseph P.Y.R.G. du Motier, Marquis de, 53; in New Jersey campaign of 1778, 114; in Virginia campaign of 1781, 80, 116
- Lahn River (Germany), 103
- Laqueur, Walter: cited, 43; on partisan warfare, 7, 29, 54
- Laudon, Gideon Ernst Freiherr von, 42
- Lauterberg, Germany, 83
- League of Augsburg, War of the, 17
- Le Cointe, Jean Louis: cited, 43; source for Ewald, 4, 7, 40
- Lee, Henry ("Light-Horse Harry"), 6
- Legahn, Ernst A., 5, 42

- Leine River (Germany), 82
 Lepel-Spangenberg, von, 48
 Lewis' Plantation (Virginia), 81
 Lichtenau, Germany, 131, 132
 Light infantry: in British army, 15, 47, 71, 86; in Canadian army, 30; in combined arms team, 37; in Continental army, 36, 47, 86; Ewald's ideas on, 20-23; in French army, 15; in French Revolution, 26; officers of, 11-12, 71-73; in towns, 93; training of, 73-74; troops of, 12-19; in U.S. Army, 29-38, 55-56; in U.S. Marine Corps, 31, 33, 34, 36-37, 55-56.
See also Cavalry, light; *Jäger* troops; Partisan warfare
 Lind, William S., on modern light infantry, 30-31, 54
 Lindau, Germany, 82
 Linsing, Christian Wilhelm von, 83, 143
 Linsing, Johann Wilhelm von, 143
 Linsing, Karl Christoph von, 143
 Lloyd, Henry, 133-34; source for Ewald, 3, 40, 65
 London Bridge, Virginia, 81
 Lorey, Friedrich Heinrich, 18-19
 Luckner, Nikolaus (von), 67, 102, 135-36

 Mannheim, Germany, 107, 153
 Marburg, Germany, 103, 111
 Maria Theresa (Empress of Austria-Hungary), 13
 Martinique Regiment (French army), 104, 150
 Marwitz, J. F. A. von der, 44
 Maxwell, William, 158-59
 Mayr, Johann (von), 67, 135
 McMichael, Scott, on modern light infantry, 32, 55, 56
 Melsungen, Germany, 99
 Menning, Bruce W., 48
 Meppen, Germany, 95, 146
 Merz, Balthasar, 130, 160
 Mile Square, New York, 119, 158
 Militia, American, 115

 Millstone (Somerset Court House), New Jersey, 35, 118-19, 157
 Minden, battle of (1759), 114-15, 155
 Mohacz, battle of (1726), 12
 Moldenhauer, Siegfried, 47-48
 Monet (Monnet), Corps de, 102, 147-48
 Monkewitz, Johann Kasimir von, 69, 138
 Monk's Corner, South Carolina, 158
 Munster, Germany, 69, 95
 Murphy, Orville T., 53

 Namur, siege of (1695), 17
 Nelson, Paul David, 53, 54, 55
 New Jersey campaigns, 115; 1776, 35, 132, 143; 1777, 25, 35, 114, 118, 155, 156-57; 1778, 35, 114, 154, 155; 1780, 94, 146
 New York campaigns: 1776, 34, 98, 147, 159; 1777, 159; 1778, 119, 130, 142; 1779, 143; 1781, 31
 Nicolai, Martin L., 44
 Niedenstein, Germany, 111
 Nieder Elungen, Germany, 108, 109, 110
 Niederscheden, Germany, 115
 Ninham, Chief Daniel, 119, 158
 Norfolk, Virginia, 141, 144
 North Carolina, 81
 Northwest Landing, Virginia, 81
 Nothfelden, Germany, 111

 Oberkaufungen, Germany, 102, 131
 Obernfeld, Germany, 83
 Ochs, Adam Ludwig (von), 28, 53
 Officers, 21, 28; absence from duty, 86-87; education of, 63-64, 132; innovation by, 36-37; leadership characteristics of, 75-76; in light infantry units, 71-72
 Ohmberg, Germany, 83
 Oré, Captain, 42
 Organization, military (light infantry), 21-22, 30, 71-72
 Orleshausen, Germany, 88

- Oxford English Dictionary* (1989), on partisan warfare, 6, 43
- Padewitz, Captain von. *See* Prittwitz, Joachim Bernhard von
- Paoli, battle of (1777), 34, 107, 153–54
- Papke, Gerhard, 44, 160
- Paret, Peter: cited, 40, 43, 44, 46, 52, 54; impact of American Revolution on European military, 28–29; on partisan warfare, 7, 54
- Partisan warfare, 5–8, 41–43, 54. *See also* Guerrilla warfare; *Kleiner Krieg*; Light infantry; *Petite guerre*
- Paulus Hook, New Jersey, battle of (1779), 143
- Pennsylvania campaigns, 1777, 70, 87, 123, 124, 154; 1778, 154
- Petersburg, Virginia, 78
- Petite guerre*, 5–8, 14, 41–43. *See also* Guerrilla warfare; *Kleiner Krieg*; Partisan warfare
- Philadelphia, 24, 70, 154
- Poland, 12
- Polish rebellion of 1771–72, 91, 106, 152–53
- Pon Pon, South Carolina, 76, 139–40
- Portsmouth, Virginia, 81, 93, 141, 144
- Poston, David Lee, 55
- Princess Anne County, Virginia, 81
- Prittwitz, Joachim Bernhard von, 104, 148–49
- Prüschenk, Ernst Karl von, 19, 124, 159
- Pulaski, Count Casimir, 114, 154
- Puységur, Jacques François de Chastenet, Marquis de, source for Ewald, 4
- Quibbletown (New Market), New Jersey, 156–57
- Quimby, Robert S., 44
- Raden, Germany, 90
- Rákóczi rebellion (1701–11), 5, 13
- Rall, Johann Gottlieb, 18, 48–49
- Raritan Landing, New Jersey, 114
- Rations, 79
- Raymond, Thomas, 17–18, 48
- Recruitment, 20, 68–69
- Redlich, Fritz, 44
- Revolutionary warfare, 23–27
- Rhoden, Germany, 109
- Rhum River, Germany, 83
- Rhumspringe, Germany, 83
- Riedesel, Friedrich Adolph Baron von, 52, 98, 147
- Rijnberg, siege of (1633), 17
- Robinson's Corps (British army), 78
- Robson, Eric, 46
- Rodney, Sir George Brydges, Baron, 104, 149
- Rogers, Hugh C. B., 44, 47
- Rogers, Robert, 47
- Röhrenfurt, Germany, 99
- Rothenberg, Germany, 83
- Rothenberg, Gunther, cited, 7, 45, 46, 48
- Royster, Charles, 42
- Russell, Peter E., 54
- Russian army, 91, 106
- Rüstow, Wilhelm, 48
- Sababurg, Germany, 107, 153
- Saillant (French officer), 106, 152
- St. Christopher (St. Kitts), 104
- St. Eustatius, battles of (1781), 33, 104–6, 149–51
- St. Geniès, Ray de, 6, 42
- St. Louis* (French naval vessel), 104
- St. Pierre, 104
- Saldern, Friedrich Christoph von, 63, 133; source for Ewald, 3, 40, 44
- Sandy Hook, New Jersey, 114
- Saxe, Maurice de, source for Ewald, 4, 11, 41, 45
- Scharnhorst, Gerhard von: on Ewald's writings, 3, 20, 28; on *jäger* troops, 50
- Scheiter, Georg Heinrich Albrecht von, 67, 82, 136, 155
- Schill revolt, 27
- Schlotheim, Grenadier Battalion (Hessian army), 124, 159–60
- Schmidt, Captain, 128
- Schmitt, John F., 32, 55

- Schulze, Winfried, 42
 Schuylkill River (Pennsylvania), 123
 Schwarzenbach, Germany, 99
 Scott's Creek, Virginia, 141
 Seidel, Carl von, 50
 Selig, Robert A., 51
 Seven Years' War, 5, 69, 82, 90, 102, 103, 107, 124, 156; battle of Minden, 114-15; Hanoverian campaign, 88, 95; *jäger* troops in, 16, 63, 83, 124
 Shy, John, 51-52
 Silesian wars, 13, 18
 Simcoe, John Graves: in American Revolution, 28, 53, 134; cited, 6, 43; in New York campaigns, 82, 119; in Virginia campaign of 1781, 80, 81, 128, 141, 160
 Sippel, Jacob, 80, 141
 Smith, George, 6
 Smith, Rev. Dr. William, 139
 Spanish Succession, War of, 5, 91
 Spencer's Ordinary, Virginia, battle of (1781), 80, 141
 Speth, Ernst Ludwig Wilhelm von, 102, 148
 Stadtbergen, Germany, 103, 109
 Stamford, Carl von, 48
 Steele, Ian K., 5, 42
 Steuben, Friedrich Wilhelm von, 51, 52, 128
 Stevenson, Roger, 6, 43
 Stockbridge Indians, 119, 158
 Stockhausen, Heinrich Ludwig von, 155
 Stony Point, New York, battle of (1779), 143
 Strach, Stephen G., 48
 Strachan, Hew, 44
 Tactics, 22-23; advanced guard, 75-83; ambushes, 26, 37, 86, 117-21; baited attack, 35; combined arms, 37-38; night attack, 101-2; outpost duty, 37, 85-90; patrolling, 93-94; in pursuit, 113-16; raids, 33-34, 101-11; rearguard, 37; reconnaissance, 33, 37, 97-99; surprise, 35, 86, 90, 91, 103-8; town attack, 109-10; town defense, 91-96; withdrawal, 37, 87, 97-98, 121-24
 Tales Plantation (Virginia), 130
 Tarleton, Sir Banastre: in American Revolution, 134; in South Carolina campaign, 158; in Virginia campaign, 141
 Tarrytown, New York, 82, 142
 Terrain analysis, 34-35
 Thirty Years' War, 18
 Thököly, Imre, 12-13
 Tielke, Johann Gottlieb, source for Ewald, 3, 40, 65, 133
 Tiniec, Poland, 106
 Training, military, 23, 32-34, 63, 70, 73-74, 108-11, 124, 132, 133
 Trenton, New Jersey, battle of (1776), 143
 Turas (Ward's) Plantation (Virginia), 81
 Turpin de Crissé, Lancelot, source for Ewald, 4, 40
 Udam, Carl Ludwig von, 95, 145-46
 U.S. Army, field manuals, 54-56
 U.S. Marine Corps, light infantry doctrine, 31-37, 55-56
 Valentini, Georg Wilhelm Freiherr von, 28
 Varkonyi, Agnes, 46
 Vegetius Renatus, Flavius: cited, 90, 143-44; source for Ewald, 4
 Ville, Antoine de, on partisan warfare, 12, 45
 Vioménil, Antoine Charles du Houx, Baron de, 106, 152
 Vioménil, Antoine Louis, Chevalier de, 106, 152-53
 Virginia campaign (1780), 25, 31, 32, 36, 78, 80, 81, 93, 116, 141, 144, 155-56, 160. *See also* Great Bridge, Virginia; Greenspring, Virginia; Spencer's Ordinary, Virginia; Yorktown
 Volksmarsen, Germany, 108, 109, 110
 Volksmarshausen, Germany, 102, 115

- Walburg, Germany, 88, 131, 132
 Waldau, Germany, 88
 Waldeck, Germany, 103
 Warburg, Germany, 108, 109, 111
 Ward, Thomas, 95, 156
 Washington, George, 27, 34, 36, 98,
 114, 123; on partisan corps, 6
 Wass de Czege, Huba, on modern
 light infantry, 55
 Wayne, Anthony, 34, 95, 108, 146–
 47
 Weeks, Amos, 142
 Weigley, Russell F., cited, 5, 42
 Welda, Germany, 109
 Weller, Jac, 51
 Weser River (Germany), 102
 Wetzell, Georg Heinz, 19, 48, 49, 50
 Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania. *See* Paoli
 Wildemann, Germany, 83
 Wilhelmstal, battle of, 102
 William V, Langraf of Hessen-Kassel,
 17
 William IX, Langraf of Hessen-
 Kassel, 50
 Williamsburg, Virginia, 80
 Wintzingerode, Carl Levin von, 82–
 83, 107, 143, 153
 Wissel, Georg von; on partisan war-
 fare, 4, 10, 41, 44, 50
 Wormsthal, Germany, 83
 Wraxall, John, 13
 Wrede, Carl August von, 157–58
 Wright, John W., 47
 Wright, Robert K., Jr., 47
 Wunsch, Johann Jacob (von), 135
 Wurmb, Ludwig Johann Adam von,
 70, 82, 114, 138, 154
 Wurmb, Philipp von, 19, 24
 Wüst, Georg Baron de, 41

 Xenophon: cited, 96, 147; source for
 Ewald, 4

 York, Hans David von: on Ewald's
 writings, 3; on partisan warfare, 7
 Yorktown, battle of (1781), 19, 33

 Zedler, Johann Heinrich, 5–6, 42
 Zierenberg, Germany, 103, 107, 108,
 111
 Zwengel, Otto, 53
 Zwergen, Germany, 102

ROBERT A. SELIG, Visiting Assistant Professor of History at Hope College, has published a number of scholarly articles dealing with eighteenth-century German-American history. German is his first language.

DAVID CURTIS SKAGGS, Professor of Military History and Strategy at the Air War College, has written a number of publications on the history of the American Revolutionary era and on military history. He also served as Command Historian, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. His books include *Roots of Maryland Democracy, 1753-1776* (Greenwood, 1973), and he is co-editor of *In Defense of the Republic: Readings in American Military History*.